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Abstract 
This dissertation defends an answer to the question: to what extent, if any, are aesthetic 
values in art objective?  I defend what I call Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism, which can be 
summarised as follows.   
A work of art has a certain aesthetic value if and only if a human critic, in the circumstances 
ideal for the aesthetic experience of that work, would experience the work as having that 
ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞ ? ‘ǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŚĞƌĞŝƐŵĞĂŶƚŝŶĂďƌŽĂĚƐĞŶƐĞ ?ĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŶŐŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
understanding as well as perception.  We should regard such a critic as someone who would 
detect the aesthetic value rather than make it the case that the work had that value.  
Experiencing a work as being aesthetically valuable in a certain way involves having an 
aesthetic experience which is itself valuable.  Such an experience will be pleasurable, often 
in complex ways. 
Although critics in ideal circumstances for the aesthetic experience of a work detect 
aesthetic values rather than making it the case that the work has certain aesthetic values, 
the work only has those values because the resultant aesthetic experiences had by such 
critics are themselves valuable.  The aesthetic values of a work are, however, realised by 
properties of the work which dispose it to cause such valuable aesthetic experiences for 
humans in the circumstances ideal for the aesthetic experience of the work.  Those 
properties are what is aesthetically valuable in the work, and they are objective in the sense 
that their existence and character is independent of whether they are detected or 
responded to.  This account therefore retains elements of both subjectivist and objectivist 
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approaches to aesthetic value.  It can, I argue, make sense of our conflicting intuitions about 
the objectivity or subjectivity of aesthetic values in art. 
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Preface 
This is a dissertation in Aesthetics, the branch of philosophy concerned with beauty, ugliness 
and related values such as elegance and garishness.  This dissertation can be classed as 
primarily a work of Meta-Aesthetics: a division of Aesthetics which can be understood by 
analogy with Ethics.  In Ethics, we have the following divisions:   
Applied Ethics is the philosophy of which actions are morally good, bad, better or 
worse in particular situations, for example in the ethics of abortion. 
Normative Ethics is the philosophy of what makes an action morally good, bad, 
better or worse, for example Consequentialism states that the consequences of 
actions are what determine their moral value. 
Meta-Ethics is the philosophy of Ethics, covering issues such as whether moral values 
exist, whether they are objective, and whether moral judgments are cognitive. 
Similarly, in Aesthetics we can identify the following three divisions: 
Applied Aesthetics is the philosophy of whether and to what extent particular objects 
are beautiful or ugly (or otherwise aesthetically valuable or disvaluable). 
Normative Aesthetics can be identified as the philosophy of what makes objects 
beautiful or ugly. 
Meta-aesthetics can be seen as the philosophy of Aesthetics, covering issues such as 
whether aesthetic values exist, whether they are objective, and whether aesthetic 
judgments are cognitive. 
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In this dissertation I am interested in what aesthetic values are and to what extent they are 
objective, and these are issues in Meta-Aesthetics but the answers I defend involve 
normative aesthetical claims about broadly what makes works of art aesthetically valuable.  
The dissertation is structured as follows: there are two introductory chapters; followed by 
two chapters in which I develop what I am calling Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism; followed 
by three chapters dealing with some of the main objections and challenges to the view; 
followed finally by a concluding chapter in which I summarise the claims I have made and 
the arguments for them. 
Chapter 1 introduces concepts of objectivity and Objectivism and the notion of cognitive 
command as an indication of objectivity and an explanation of convergence in judgment.  
Chapter 2 introduces concepts of art, aesthetic value, taste, and aesthetic value judgment.  I 
present an apparent paradox involving conflicting intuitions about the objectivity or 
subjectivity of aesthetic values in art, and I introduce two major historical attempts to 
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ƚŚŝƐ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ P ĂǀŝĚ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ  ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ŽĨ ƚĂƐƚĞ ?ĂŶĚ /ŵŵĂŶƵĞů <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ Đritique of 
 ‘ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚĂƐƚĞ ? ?DǇŽǁŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝƐĂĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ
theories.1 
ŚĂƉƚĞƌ  ? ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ŽĨ ƚĂƐƚĞ ? ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƚǁŽ ƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ
defending the revised account from the charge that it is viciously circular or unsubstantive.  I 
argue that on the modified Humean account I propose, the aesthetic values of art should be 
construed as objective dispositions.  I defend the revised Humean account from the charge 
                                                             
1 HUME, David. Of the standard of taste. In HUME, David, and MILLER, Eugene F. (ed.) Essays: Moral, Political 
and Literary (2nd Edition).  Liberty Fund Inc., 1985, pp. 226-49.    
KANT, Immanuel. Critique of judgement. Hafner Press, 1951. 
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that it cannot account for cases in which something interferes with the manifestation of 
aesthetic values-as-dispositions. 
Chapter 4 further develops the modified Humean account by introducing an element of 
Subjectivism into the account, but without, I argue, compromising on the claim that 
aesthetic values in art are objective dispositions.  I argue that aesthetic values in art are 
objective dispositions to produce valuable aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances.  I 
defend the claim that it is because of the values of some aesthetic experiences that works 
disposed to produce them are aesthetically valuable.  I propose a Kant-inspired psychology 
of aesthetic experience and suggest that aesthetic experiences are valuable insofar as they 
are pleasurable in their involvement of thoughts and imaginings appropriate to the object.   
Chapter 5 considers whether aesthetic values in art are relative to a frame of reference, and 
whether it is possible for critics to faultlessly disagree.  I suggest that there is reason to 
doubt that faultless disagreements occur, but that Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism can 
explain many cases in which it might seem that they do occur, and one might even interpret 
such cases as genuinely faultless without this posing a problem for the account.  I also 
consider how best to explain variations in taste along cultural lines, and resist certain 
relativistic explanations to which my account is opposed. 
Chapter 6 considers scepticism about the existence of aesthetic values and the 
descriptiveness of aesthetic value judgments.  I suggest that Moderate Aesthetic 
Objectivism does not posit strange entities and that, while it seems that aesthetic value 
judgments are descriptive, if one is inclined to favour a Non-Cognitivist analysis of the 
semantics of such judgments one need not reject the metaphysical claim that aesthetic 
values in art are objective. 
 11  
 
Chapter 7 responds to the argument that objectivist theories of aesthetic value cannot 
account for the supposed facts in the epistemology of aesthetic testimony.  I argue that 
aesthetic testimony provides evidence of aesthetic values, and that while the evidence may 
be weak and difficult to accumulate, this is not a reason to doubt that such values are 
objective. 
Chapter 8 draws conclusions from the previous chapters and summarises their main claims 
and arguments. 
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1. Objectivity 
1.0 Introduction 
In this first introductory chapter I attempt to identify the conditions for the sort of 
objectivity which I claim that aesthetic values in art possess.  I begin by distinguishing 
between two kinds of objectivity and clarify that the Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism I 
defend says that aesthetic values in art are ontologically objective.  I then identify a sliding 
scale between Extreme Subjectivism and Extreme Objectivism, and position my own 
account between these two extremes.  I consider the objectivity of properties of works of 
art in relation to what I argue is the Response-Dependence of aesthetic value concepts.  I 
explain that Objectivism is seen as necessary but not sufficient for Realism.  Finally, I 
consider some indications of and requirements for ontological objectivity.   
I conclude, provisionally, that the aesthetic values of works of art may be to some extent 
ontologically objective even though aesthetic value concepts are response-dependent.  The 
convergence of aesthetic value judgments, which is plausibly due to the cognitive command 
aesthetic values exert on our descriptions of them, is an indication of this ontological 
objectivity. 
1.1 Epistemic and Ontological Objectivity2 
Objectivity pertains to objects and subjectivity pertains to subjects.  There are at least two 
kinds of objectivity which are important for the purposes of this dissertation.  Firstly, 
ontological objectivity is the ontological status of an entity as independent of our responses 
                                                             
2 This distinction can be found in SEARLE, John R. The problem of consciousness. Consciousness and cognition, 
2:4, 1993: 310-319; pp. 313-4. 
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to it.  For example, the Earth is an object which, long before anyone was there to respond to 
it, perceive it, form beliefs about it, and so on, had the property of being round.  This object 
continued to have this property even when we misjudged its shape as flat.  The properties 
of objects can therefore be ontologically objective by being response-independent in the 
sense that their presence and character is fixed independently of how we respond to them.   
This first kind of objectivity is also exemplified by the property of being (more or less) 
rectangular in shape, as instantiated by many paintings.  Whether the aesthetic properties 
of such paintings are similarly response-independent and ontologically objective is another 
mĂƚƚĞƌ P ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? WŝĐĂƐƐŽ ?ƐGuernica is dynamic irrespective of whether it is 
judged to be dynamic, or responded to as dynamic. 
Examples of properties which lack ontological objectivity might include the following.  
Suppose one describes the Earth as a frightening place: this is perhaps to attribute a 
subjective quality to an ontologically objective object; a subject finds the object to be 
frightening in virtue of responding or being disposed to respond to it with certain subjective 
states such as feelings of fear.  Perhaps an object cannot have an ontologically objective 
property of being frightening, so the property of being frightening may be an example of a 
subjective property.  Guernica itself is, presumably, an ontologically objective object, with 
certain ontologically objective properties, but its aesthetic property of being dynamic 
 ?ĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐ ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ƐƵĐŚ Ă ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ) ŵĂǇ ďĞ ĂƐ ŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂƐ Ă ƐŽůŝĚ ŽďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ
ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐŽĨƐŚĂƉĞ ?ŽƌĂƐƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƐƚŚĞĂƌƚŚ ?ƐƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇŽĨďĞŝŶŐĨƌightening.   
Secondly, epistemic objectivity can come in the form of abilities exercised, by a subject, in 
perception and deliberation.  Peter Railton distinguishes between three different abilities 
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which seem to constitute the epistemic objectivity of subjects, and I think these abilities 
have implications for the ontological objectivity of properties: 
1. The ability to reliably detect things. 
2. The ability to reason well. 
3. The ability to be impartial or disinterested.3 
A subject exercising one or more of these abilities will, it seems, acquire an epistemic access 
to that which is ontologically objective.  As John Searle explains, there is a sense in which 
ontologically subjective mental states might be understood by means of the epistemic 
objectivity of scientific enquiry, so it is false that epistemic objectivity implies ontologically 
objective entities.4  But where such ontologically objective entities are to be found, the 
means by which they are found will, it seems, be epistemic objectivity.   
To reliably detect things is, at least sometimes, to be aware of that which has a stable, 
independent character and existence, which different subjects at different times can 
become aware of.  To reason well seems to involve reasoning in a way that will allow one to 
infer that which is objectively true.  Truth, I assume, supervenes on being ? the truth value 
of a proposition cannot change without the objective state of the world changing ? so to 
successfully infer the truth is also to become aware of ontologically objective states of 
affairs.  Finally, to be impartial or disinterested is to avoid the corruption of one's judgment, 
about that which is ontologically objective, by one's subjective interests and biases.  In doing 
so one can be sensitive to that which is ontologically objective. 
                                                             
3 RAILTON, Peter.  Aesthetic value, moral value and the ambitions of naturalism.  In LEVINSON, Jerrold (ed.) 
Aesthetics and ethics: Essays at the intersection. Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 59-105; pp. 63-5. 
4 SEARLE 1993, pp. 313-4. 
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Epistemic objectivity can, it seems, involve one or more of these three abilities, which are 
distinct from, but also related to, the ontological objectivity of the properties of objects, 
which is the type of objectivity that I will argue that aesthetic values in art can have.  I have 
suggested that ontological objectivity is an independence from responses.  The three 
epistemic abilities I have mentioned seem to imply that ontological objectivity may also 
involve: being there to be experienced upon being detected; making some propositions true 
and others false; or constraining thought or discourse in a way that undermines the 
influence of subjective biases and interests.  Ontological objectivity may come in degrees: it 
could be that some or all of the requirements of ontological objectivity can be met to 
different extents, or that something can be more or less objective by meeting more or fewer 
of these requirements.  If so, a moderate form of Objectivism may be defended.  Before I 
explain such a moderate view, it will be necessary to clarify what Objectivism is. 
1.1.1 Objectivity and Objectivism 
One of the main claims of this dissertation is that aesthetic values in art are ontologically 
objective to a large extent: their existence and character is largely independent of our 
responses or dispositions to respond to them.  A secondary claim is that we are capable of 
attaining at least a modest level of epistemic objectivity that enables us to detect some of 
these values.  The epistemic objectivity of people, or their mental states, is what enables 
them to detect that which is ontologically objective, namely response-independent 
properties of objects.  I will now demonstrate this with the earlier example of the shape of 
the planet.   
Judgments that the Earth had the property of being flat were, I think we can assume, based 
on our impression of the environment: the curvature of the Earth is often indiscernible to us 
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and landscapes free of objects such as hills and mountains tend to appear flat, and so we 
have sometimes assumed that the Earth is an expanse of flat land plus whatever peaks and 
valleys we find.  This is of course an error because the Earth is a globe, and the error seems 
to have been due to subjective impressions constrained by limits of sensation and 
information, and an inadequate sensitivity to the way the world really is. 
Science tells us that there is far more to the universe than what we are naturally sensitive 
to.  Richard Dawkins has suggested a useful way of describing this: our senses are attuned to 
ƚŚĞ  “DŝĚĚůĞtŽƌůĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐĂŶĂƌƌŽǁƌĂŶŐĞ ŝŶƚŚĞƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƐŵĂůůĂŶĚ
the very large: we have evolved to perceive medium-sized objects which are relevant to our 
survival.5  We are unable with the naked eye to discern atomic, let alone-sub-atomic, 
objects.  We may be able to see, unaided, large objects such as stars and planets, but not 
with the kind of detail or reliability that we have evolved to enjoy in relation to things such 
as animals, plants and features of the landscape.   
We are therefore quite naturally less epistemically objective in relation to facts such as the 
shape of the Earth than we are to, say, the shape of an apple.  But the shape of each of 
these objects is equally ontologically objective: each object has the shape it does 
independently of how it seems to us.  In the case of the medium-sized object we are 
relatively good at discerning this shape, whereas in the case of the Earth it was historically 
easy for us to misjudge its shape, and yet in both cases the shape is there to be experienced, 
constraining our attempts to describe it, making some propositions true and others false. 
                                                             
5 See STONE, M.J. Strange science in the middle World [online], 2006 [viewed 23 August 2014].  Available from: 
http://www.mcgill.ca/reporter/39/05/dawkins/. 
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Our discourse about the shape of the Earth is constrained by its objective shape because 
ǁŚĞŶǁĞƚĂůŬĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂƌƚŚ ?ƐƐŚĂƉĞǁĞ attempt to describe it.  This has the result that the 
ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ‘ƚŚĞĂƌƚŚŝƐƌŽƵŶĚ ?ŝƐƚƌƵĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ‘ƚŚĞĂƌƚŚŝƐĨůĂƚ ? ŝƐĨĂůƐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
propositions these statements express are made true and false respectively by the objective 
shape of the Earth.  Furthermore, the shape of the Earth is there to be experienced, so that 
when there has been a consensus that the Earth is flat it was nevertheless the case that the 
ĂƌƚŚǁĂƐƌŽƵŶĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƌƚŚ ?ƐĂĐƚƵĂůƐŚĂƉĞǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽďĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ?ǁŚŝĐh of 
course it was.   
This seems to imply a strong form of Objectivism ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƐŚĂƉĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƌƚŚ PƚŚĞĂƌƚŚ ?Ɛ
shape is independent of how we respond to it, or how we are disposed to respond to it, 
because even if we had never discovered that the Earth is round or never had the ability to 
ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌ ƚŚŝƐ ? ŝƚ ŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƌŽƵŶĚ ?  dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĂƌƚŚ ?Ɛ ƐŚĂƉĞ ďĞŝŶŐ
ontologically objective, there to be experienced, constraining discourse about it by making 
some propositions true and others false, independently of what beliefs we form or how we 
respond.  That at least is the picture of ontological objectivity that I have been painting.  I 
will argue that the aesthetic values of art are to a certain extent ontologically objective; in 
other words I will defend a Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism.  To start to piece together this 
view, I will now define some further crucial terms and present some basic assumptions. 
1.2 Art Works and their Properties 
It is relatively uncontroversial to claim that works of art have objective features: they are 
objects which instantiate some properties whose nature is determined independently of our 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐŽƌĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĂǀŝĚŽǁŝĞ ?ƐůĂƚĞƐƚĂůďƵŵŚĂƐ
14 tracks.  If one judges the album to ŚĂǀĞŽŶůǇ ? ?ƚƌĂĐŬƐ ?ƚŚĞŶŽŶĞ ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚŝƐĨĂůƐĞĂŶĚŝƐ
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the product of error.  The error involves failing to correctly discern the number of tracks on 
ƚŚĞĂůďƵŵĂŶĚďĞŝŶŐŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶŵŝƐĂƉƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝŽŶƚŽĨŽƌŵĂ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ
false.  The number of tracks on the album is there to be experienced and remains 14 
regardless of how anyone responds or is disposed to respond.   
dŚĞƌĞŵŝŐŚƚďĞĂŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŚŽǁǁĞĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞŽĨĂ ‘ƚƌĂĐŬ ? ?ďƵƚŝĨǁĞ
think of the object (for the sake of argument) as a vinyl record with distinct grooves marking 
the separation between each track, the number of these grooves is, it seems, independent 
of how we are disposed to respond to grooves in a piece of vinyl.  The work is such that 
when pressed onto vinyl it will normally be divided by distinctive grooves into 14 sections, 
ĂŶĚŝĨǁĞĐĂůůƚŚĞƐĞƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĐŬƐ ? ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞĂ  ? ?ƚƌĂĐŬƐŽŶƚŚĞĂůďƵŵĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŝƐƐŽ
independently of how many tracks we are inclined to identify the album as having.  It 
therefore seems that a work of art can have objective properties, and although this is not 
sufficient for the objectivity of aesthetic values in art, it may of course be necessary. 
Aesthetic properties are a subset of the properties of art works: the properties of an art 
object which are aesthetically relevant are its aesthetic properties.  I will explain what I 
ŵĞĂŶďǇ ‘ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůůǇƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ? ?ďƵƚĨŝƌƐƚůĞƚƵƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌǁŚĂƚĂŶ ‘ĂƌƚǁŽƌŬ ?ŽƌĂ ‘ǁŽƌŬŽĨĂƌƚ
Žƌ ĂŶ  ‘Ăƌƚ ŽďũĞĐƚ ? ŝƐ  ?/ ǁŝůů ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƚĞƌŵƐ interchangeably).  I intend to make as few 
assumptions about the ontology of art as I can manage for the purposes of this dissertation, 
but it seems clear that it varies for different mediums.  A painting as a work of art seems to 
consist largely of distributions of paint over a canvas, whereas a piece of music perhaps 
cannot be identified with any particular artefact, and seems rather to be something like an 
abstract sequence multiply realised in distinct performances.  The ontology of a musical 
recording ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĂǀŝĚŽǁŝĞ ?ƐůĂƚĞƐƚĂůďƵŵ ?ĐĂŶƉĞƌŚĂƉƐďĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝŶŬŝŶĚƚŽ
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that of a musical composition such as a work of Classical music.  Arguably the visual art in 
which an album is packaged is part of the work, perhaps making the album a type of multi-
media art work.  Such considerations are beyond the scope of this dissertation so I will try to 
assume nothing more than that there are many different kinds of object which can be 
described as works of art.  
A work of art is an object of some kind or another, and like all objects a work of art has 
various properties.  Some of the properties of an art object are aesthetic properties because 
they are aesthetically relevant, which means they are properties of the object which, as I 
will begin to argue in chapter 3, are apt to produce responses in ideal circumstances which 
are aesthetic experiences.  Insofar as such experiences are pleasurable or displeasurable, 
they bestow upon the work aesthetic values, which the work has largely in virtue of its 
mundane properties, which are aesthetic properties when they realise aesthetic values in 
the work according to their relationship to the pleasures and displeasures of the aesthetic 
experiences of observers in ideal circumstances.  In subsequent chapters I will explain and 
defend this view in detail.  Now I move on to some relevant distinctions among the 
properties of objects including works of art. 
1.2.1 Objective Primary and Secondary Qualities 
This dissertation will defend a conception of aesthetic values in art as dispositions, realised 
by ontologically objective, descriptive properties of art objects, to produce aesthetic 
experiences in certain circumstances, experiences which themselves have some positive or 
negative value.  The valence of such experiences, I will argue, renders the dispositional 
aesthetic values of art works values as opposed to mere dispositions to produce 
experiences.  As I will explain in chapter 4, this latter claim amounts to an element of 
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Subjectivism in my account.  So in defending wŚĂƚ/ĐĂůů ‘Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism ? I 
defend the view that descriptive properties of art objects ? which are objective properties in 
that they can be instantiated regardless of whether we are disposed to experience the 
object as having them or to ascribe them to the object ? can realise the aesthetic values of 
works of art.   
Properties such as shape or mass are often classed as primary qualities because the shape 
or mass of something seems not to depend on how things appear to us.  Typically colours 
are taken to be secondary qualities because, for example, a red hat seems to have the 
property of being red only because it normally looks red to us.  There are other ways of 
drawing the primary-secondary distinction and it is debatable whether the distinction ought 
to be drawn at all, but what matters here is that properties which are classed as secondary 
qualities need not also be classed as subjective properties.   
Objects can instantiate properties in a subjective sense, such that an object O has property P 
because a subject S in circumstances C ascribes P to O.  Such Ps are subjective properties and 
are not ontologically objective.  For example, suppose that a rectangular cake is tasty just 
because I like it and regard it as tasty.  Whatever I think about its shape, it is (I assume) 
objectively rectangular: it has the ontologically objective property of being rectangular, but 
only the subjective property of being tasty. 
Given the definition of ontological objectivity in §1.1 as response-independence, it would 
seem that a secondary quality, in virtue of being response-dependent, must be a subjective 
property.  But as John McDowell explains, primary and secondary qualities can both be 
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objective in the sense that they are there to be experienced.6  Secondary quality concepts 
are defined with reference to subjective responses, but this does not imply that the 
corresponding properties themselves have a nature which is dependent on subjective 
responses.  The nature of properties such as colours can be determined independently of 
responses, but such that certain responses such as the response of seeing something as red 
can normally be expected to be caused by the property when it is encountered.   
Secondary quality P* is instantiated by O if and only if an S in C would ascribe P* to O.  Such 
P*s are not necessarily subjective properties, as it may be the case that an S in C would 
ascribe P* to O because O is objectively P*; as opposed to O being P* only because S in C 
would ascribe P* to O.  Colour may again be an apt example here: an object can perhaps be 
objectively red even if its redness is a secondary quality.  Whereas, perhaps, the object's 
tastiness may be a matter of personal taste in the sense of being a subjective (as well as 
secondary) quality of the object.   
Here, then, are two orthogonal distinctions between kinds of property: subjective or 
objective properties; and primary or secondary properties.  Primary properties might never 
be subjective properties (or rather, subjective properties might always be secondary 
properties), but objective properties may be primary or secondary, as I have explained.  I 
will be defending the view, roughly speaking, that aesthetic properties are objective 
secondary properties.  I will now explain this further. 
                                                             
6 MCDOWELL, John Henry.  Values and secondary qualities.  In SAYRE-MCCORD, Geoffrey (ed.) Essays on moral 
realism. Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 166-80; pp. 168-70. 
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1.3 Aesthetic Objectivism 
Regarding the extent to which the aesthetic values of works of art are ontologically 
objective, there is a spectrum of available positions ranging from Extreme Objectivism, the 
view that they are completely objective, to Extreme Subjectivism which is the view that they 
are not at all objective.  Objectivism is the view that properties posited in a given discourse 
are to some extent ontologically objective, which involves response-independence: their 
character being determined independently of our responses or dispositions to respond to 
them.  Extreme Aesthetic Objectivism would have it that aesthetic values are completely 
determined by something other than our responses or dispositions to respond to them.  In 
defending a Response-Dependence theory of aesthetic values I will be retreating from this 
extreme position, but I will also avoid the opposite extreme which states that aesthetic 
values are entirely constituted by our responses or dispositions to respond to them. 
An example of something which is entirely constituted by responses or dispositions to 
respond, and therefore lacks any ontological objectivity, might be: what it is like to be a bat.  
The phenomenal consciousness of bats is not, when not experienced, lying dormant ready 
to be experienced, at least not by us, and it seems to have no existence beyond the 
experience of it.  As Thomas Nagel explains, an objective description of bats cannot include 
what it is like to be one.7  This might just be because knowledge of what something is like is 
procedural and has no propositional content corresponding to a state of affairs that has 
ontological objectivity.  I discuss phenomenal consciousness in relation to the degree to 
which aesthetic values are objective in §2.3.2. 
                                                             
7 NAGEL, Thomas. What is it like to be a bat? The philosophical review, 83:4, 1974: 435-450. 
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An example closer to the topic of this dissertation is that of moral value, for instance the 
moral rightness of providing asylum to a refugee: perhaps the moral value of this action (for 
a particular case) is just as objective as the shape of the Earth, or perhaps it is just as 
subjective as what it is like to be a bat, or perhaps it lies somewhere between these two 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ?  sĂůƵĞƐ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ  ‘ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞǇĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? Žƌ ƚŚĞǇ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ
objective properties, or they might be something in between, such as properties that have 
some degree of objectivity and some degree of subjectivity.  I will argue that the aesthetic 
values of art works are, as it were, in between the subjective responses of the beholder and 
the objective features of the work.   
1.3.1 Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism as Intersubjectivism 
In this dissertation I assume that many ordinary descriptive features of objects are 
ontologically objective, including features of art works such as the shape of a sculpture or 
the duration of a piece of music.  More controversially, I will be arguing that the dispositions 
of a work to produce aesthetic responses are realised by such natural properties, and that 
these dispositions are the aesthetic values of a work.  The aesthetic values of a work are its 
propensities in virtue of its natural properties to produce aesthetically relevant responses.  
So aesthetic values such as dynamism are realised by natural properties such as shapes and 
colours, and because such natural properties dispose a work to produce aesthetic 
responses, it is appropriate to ascribe such aesthetic values to the work.  There are more 
and less appropriate ways of responding to and evaluating works of art, due in part to their 
ontologically objective natural properties, but due in particular to how those properties 
arouse human sensibilities. 
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ŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŶĂŵĞĨŽƌƚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁŵŝŐŚƚďĞ ‘/ŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƐŵ ? ?ďƵƚI have chosen instead to 
ůĂďĞů ŵǇ ǀŝĞǁ  ‘DŽĚĞƌĂƚĞ ĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ KďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƐŵ ? ? ƚŽ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ
objective natural properties of art objects in realising aesthetic values as capacities to please 
our aesthetic sensibilities.8  This emphasis is an attempt to ally the view here defended with 
ŽƚŚĞƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇŽĨǀŝĞǁƐĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚďĞĂƵƚǇŝƐŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇ  ‘Ă
matter of tĂƐƚĞ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ƚŚĂƚŽŶĞ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ďĞ ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶ /ŶŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
^ƵĐŚKďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƐŵƐĂƌĞƌŝŐŚƚ ?/ĂƌŐƵĞ ?ƚŽƌĞũĞĐƚƚŚŝƐ “ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐŽĨphilosophy ?ĂƐ,ƵŵĞĐĂůůƐŝƚ ?9  
However, I wish to make some concessions to that species of philosophy without affirming 
it, such that Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism could, if one prefers, be called  ‘Aesthetic 
Intersubjectivism ?.  The view may also be considered a form of Response-Dependence, as I 
will now explain. 
1.3.2 Response-Dependence 
Response-dependent properties are secondary qualities, and again they may or may not be 
subjective properties.  But rather than response-dependent properties, I wish now to focus 
on response-dependent concepts.  Some Response-Dependence theories identify certain 
concepts as applicable to an object O depending on how a subject S would respond to O in 
circumstances C.  The relevant circumstances in analysing response-dependent concepts can 
be abnormal, idealised circumstances.  For example, whereas whether an object is red will 
depend on how we see the object in circumstances which are defined as 'normal', whether 
ĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝƐďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵůŵŝŐŚƚĚĞƉĞŶĚŽŶŚŽǁŽŶĞǁŽƵůĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝƚŐŝǀĞŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌƚ ?
critical faculties.  This is roughly what Hume claims about beauty, and which I defend in 
                                                             
8 dŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƐŵ ? ŝƐ ƵƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂǇ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ŝŶ KZ^, ? &ĂďŝĂŶ ? ^ĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
intersubjectivity of aesthetic evaluations. Dialectica, 61:3, 2007: 417-446. 
9 HUME 1985, pp. 229-30. 
 25  
 
Chapter 3.  For now I will further explain the form of Response-Dependence that I will 
endorse. 
Response-Dependence theories of value compare values to secondary qualities such as 
colour.  Response-Dependence is (as far as this dissertation is concerned) a theory about 
concepts, which states that whether certain concepts pick out one property or another 
depends on our dispositions to respond to certain properties.10  In other words, our 
dispositions to respond to the properties of objects might, for example, determine which 
properties our colour concepts pick out.  Suppose that we have evolved to respond in 
certain ways to certain reflectance properties, and that this leads us to form a concept of 
redness which picks out some reflectance properties rather than others.  This is very 
different from our dispositions to see things in colour altering the reality of coloured 
objects.  The properties we pick out when we judge something to be red may be entirely 
independent of our dispositions to respond in that way, even though the concept deployed 
in the judgment may be a product of the way we are disposed to respond to the world. 
To analyse a concept in terms of responses, we can prioritise certain observational 
conditions: normal conditions are those in which certain perturbing influences are absent, 
whereas ideal conditions are those in which all accessible information is available to be 
accessed.11  Response-Dependence theses involve biconditionals such as the following: 
1. X is red if and only if normal observers in normal conditions would see X 
as red.12  
                                                             
10 PETTIT 1991, pp. 608-9. 
11 PETTIT 1991, p. 594. 
12 This view is described by, for example, BOGHOSSIAN, Paul A., and VELLEMAN, J. David. Colour as a 
secondary quality. Mind, 98:389, 1989: 81-103. 
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EŽƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ? ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ĚĞĨŝŶĞ  ‘ƌĞĚ ? ŶŽƌ ƚĞůů ƵƐ ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ĂďŽƵƚ ǁŚĂƚ ƌĞĚŶĞƐƐ ůŽŽŬƐ ůŝŬĞ ?
Nevertheless, 1 is not a trivial thesis because it tells us that whether something is red 
depends on whether it would be experienced as red by normal observers in normal 
conditions: 1 therefore clarifies to some degree the concept of redness, albeit without 
ƐƵƉƉůǇŝŶŐĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƌĞĚ ? ?ƐDĂƌŬ:ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂĐůĂŝŵŝƐŶŽƚĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽ
give a reductive theory of redness, but rather an attempt to clarify the conceptual 
ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ƌĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ŽĨ ŶŽƌŵĂůŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌƐ ŝŶ ŶŽƌŵĂů ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?13  
dŚĞĐůĂŝŵŝƐƚŚĂƚŽƵƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ?ŽƌĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ?ƐŚĂƉĞƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ‘ƌĞĚ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐ
does not imply ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƐŚĂƉĞƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇŽĨƌĞĚŽďũĞĐƚƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ‘ƌĞĚ ?ŝƐƐŚĂƉĞĚ
so as to fall upon some objects and not others, depending on the properties of those 
objects. 
What, then, is the reality of a red object according to a Response-Dependence theory of 
colour?  This is too big a question for me to answer here, but one possibility is that an object 
which is red is an object with certain reflectance properties, or indeed whatever it is that a 
physical object must have in order to make it look red to us in daylight, assuming that we 
are not colour blind, and that all other normal conditions are in place.  We call objects that 
ŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƐĞƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ‘ƌĞĚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇůŽŽŬĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶǁĂǇƚŽƵƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐŝŵƉůŝĞƐ
ŽŶůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ‘ƌĞĚ ?ŝƐƌĞƐponse-dependent, not that the reflectance properties of red 
things, which (let us suppose) cause us to see them as red, are determined by our 
dispositions to respond by seeing them as red. 
In the closest possible world in which no human being can distinguish red from green and 
we call all green objects and ĂůůƌĞĚŽďũĞĐƚƐ ‘ŐƌĞĞŶ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶ
                                                             
13 JOHNSTON, Mark. III ? Dispositional theories of value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Volumes, 1989: 139-174; pp.147-8. 
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red objects compared to the actual world, and the same physical differences between red 
and green objects are present in both worlds.  And yet, perhaps, colour concepts are 
response-dependent because colours are secondary qualities.  Response-dependence does 
not seem to imply a strong form of Subjectivism, and is in fact consistent with the 
ontological objectivity of the properties upon which response-dependent concepts fall.    
Having introduced the concept of Objectivism for a given domain of enquiry, and its relation 
to Response-Dependence theories of concepts, I will now clarify how Objectivism relates to 
ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ZĞĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ĂŶĚ ŝn doing so further clarify the other views I have begun to 
describe, including my own Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism. 
1.3.3 Realism and Objectivism 
In this dissertation I defend a moderate form of Objectivism, which is to be distinguished 
from Realism.  Realism is, briefly, the view that the objects we attempt to describe in a given 
discourse are real, for example discourse about tables is about real tables, and the 
judgments we make about tables are attempts to accurately represent those tables.  What 
exactly does it mean for something to be real or for a discourse to be realist?  Phillip Pettit 
suggests that it usually involves three claims: 
Descriptivism: the discourse attempts to describe the world, positing the 
existence of certain entities. 
Objectivism: the character of those entities is fixed independently of our 
dispositions to respond to them or form beliefs about them. 
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Cosmocentrism: learning about those entities involves discovery rather than 
invention, and discovery is a matter of contingent success so that mistakes 
are possible.14    
Realism about tables, then, would involve the claim that tables are such that our discourse 
about them is able to satisfy the three constraints listed above.   
I will not try to provide a full defence of this conception of Realism, but if it is correct then in 
defending a claim of Objectivism in the case of discourse about aesthetic values in art, I will 
go some way towards defending a form of Aesthetic Realism: Realism about aesthetic 
values, specifically in works of art.  The type of objectivity at play in Objectivism as defined 
by Pettit seems to be ontological objectivity as it is to do with the response-independent 
character of certain properties.  I assume that what is real must be ontologically objective, 
but my claim that aesthetic values in art are ontologically objective to a certain degree 
might not by itself establish that the aesthetic values of art are real in the sense that they 
are part of the fabric of the world or in the sense that our aesthetic discourse involves 
attempting to describe them.  This is implied by theories of Realism such as the above, 
which regard Objectivism as a necessary but not sufficient condition for Realism.15  
Pettit provides the above analysis of Realism for the purpose of comparing it to Response-
Dependence theories ?'ŝǀĞŶWĞƚƚŝƚ ?ƐĂŶĚŵǇŽǁŶĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨKďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
objectivity it would seem that Response-Dependence and Objectivism are incompatible, but 
Pettit denies this, as I will explain shortly.  Pettit suggests that Response-Dependence is 
consistent with Descriptivism and Objectivism, but not Cosmocentrism.  Response-
                                                             
14 PETTIT, Philip. Realism and response-dependence. Mind, 100:4, 1991: 587-626; pp. 589-90. 
15 See also DEVITT, Michael. Realism & Truth.  Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd, 1984; pp. 13-14. 
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Dependence theories, he claims, replace Cosmocentrism with Anthropocentrism, which for 
the aesthetic values of art is the claim that they are values only for Humans.16  From the 
perspective of an intelligent non-Human species there might be no aesthetic values or they 
might be distributed differently because of the major differences in sensibility between 
species.  I will now explain this further. 
1.3.4 Anthropocentric Objectivism 
A sensibility is a set of abilities and capacities possessed by a subject, allowing them to 
respond to the world in certain ways, perform perceptual discriminations, and other 
behaviours involving sensitivity to the external world.  For example, the sensibilities of bats 
make them sensitive to sound in such a way that they navigate their surroundings by the 
use of echolocation.  Human sensibilities are differently sensitive to the world, so human 
sensibilities differ significantly from the sensibilities of bats.  But sensibilities are not merely 
perceptual: human beings, at least, are usually emotionally sensitive to certain things, for 
example events or other people.  There are other ways too in which we can be disposed to 
respond, for example we are disposed to think about the world in certain ways. 
Because the Anthropocentrism in Response-Dependence about aesthetic values limits the 
scope of the view to aesthetic values for human sensibilities, Pettit regards Response-
Dependence as a minor retreat from Realism; minor because Objectivism and Descriptivism 
are consistent with Response-Dependence.17  The latter are consistent with Response-
Dependence because they are claims, respectively, about the descriptivity of certain 
judgments and the mind-independent existence of certain properties.  Response-
                                                             
16 PETTIT 1991, p. 593. 
17 PETTIT 1991, p. 623. 
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Dependence as a claim about concepts does not come into conflict with any such claims 
about judgments or properties.  Consider the following example. 
Suppose that colour concepts are response-ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ‘ƌĞĚ ?ĂƉƉůŝĞƐƚŽ
ĂŶ ŽďũĞĐƚ ŝĨ ĂŶĚ ŽŶůǇ ŝĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĂƚ ŽďũĞĐƚ ŝŶ ŶŽƌŵĂů ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ
such that one would deploy that concept and apply it to the object.  In other words, the 
ŽďũĞĐƚŝƐ ‘ƌĞĚ ?ŝĨĂnd only if in normal circumstances it would look red.  It is consistent with 
this response-dependence claim ? ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ  ‘ƌĞĚ ? ? ƚŽ ĐůĂŝŵ ĂůƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶĞ ǁŽƵůĚ
ascribe that concept to the object because the object is (objectively) red. 18  This latter claim 
ŝƐŶŽƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ‘ƌĞĚ ?ďƵƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŽƌĚĞƌŽĨĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƌĞĚŶĞƐƐŽĨ
an object and the responses of those who perceive it under certain circumstances.  Not only 
ŝƐ ƚŚŝƐ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ĐůĂŝŵ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐůĂŝŵ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ  ‘ƌĞĚ ? ďĞŝŶŐ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ-
dependent, but in many such cases it seems perverse to affirm the claim about the concept 
and deny the claim about the property.   
WĞƚƚŝƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚWĞƚĞƌDĞŶǌŝĞƐ ? examples of such perversity include this: Mary caught the flu if 
and only if she was infected by the flu virus.19  Assuming that such a claim is true and that 
Mary has caught the flu, to deny the further claim that Mary caught the flu because she was 
infected would at the very least be wrong given what we know about the relationship 
between the flu virus and influenza itself.  Similarly, we might not be able to maintain 
certain response-dependence biconditionals without accompanying claims about the 
objectivity (or lack thereof) of that which is being responded to.  Certainly there is nothing in 
such biconditionals to preclude an order of determination holding between each element of 
                                                             
18 Pettit and Peter Menzies defend this consistency here: MENZIES, Peter & PETTIT, Philip. Found: the Missing 
Explanation. Analysis, 53:10, 1993: 100-8. 
19 MENZIES & PETTIT, 1993, p.108. 
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the biconditional, and iĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ? ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƌƵŶƐŽŶĞ ǁĂǇ ? ŝƚ ƐĞĞŵƐǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ Ă ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ
Objectivism.  I will now explain this in greater detail. 
1.3.5 The Order of Determination 
WĞƚƚŝƚ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚKďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƐŵŝƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ-Dependence is that 
Response-Dependence is a theory about concepts, not about the reality of ontologically 
objective properties of objects.  For example, a piece of music may have properties which, 
due to our propensities to respond to them, fall under an aesthetic value concept such as 
ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ĞůĞŐĂŶĐĞ ?  dŚĂƚ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŝƐ ? ĂƐ WĞƚƚŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ƐĂǇ ?  “ƐŚĂƉĞĚ ? ďǇ ŽƵƌ ĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ
respond to certain sounds, such that a piece of music may have the aesthetic value of 
elegance because we have those dispositions to respond.20   But that is not to say that the 
very properties which we are sensitive to in the music, to which we respond in the relevant 
ways, are shaped by our dispositions to respond.     
Richard Joyce suggests that Pettit's assurance that response-dependence does not preclude 
Objectivism is unlikely to satisfy those who are put off by the Subjectivism involved in the 
Response-Dependence analysis of concepts.21  One might hold the intuition (as I do) that the 
beauty or ugliness of a work of art is objective, and therefore be sceptical that whether 
something falls under such aesthetic concepts depends in some way on the activity of our 
minds.  But if, as Pettit explains, such concepts can depend in some way on the activity of 
our minds and yet pick out that which is mind-independent, it is not clear that there is any 
                                                             
20 PETTIT 1991, pp. 608-9. 
21 JOYCE, Richard. Moral Anti-Realism [online] in ZALTA, Edward N (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2015 [viewed 10 August 2015].  Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/moral-anti-realism/. 
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rational basis for the habit of moving from scepticism about the mind-dependence of 
aesthetic properties to scepticism about the response-dependence of aesthetic concepts. 
As we have seen already, Response-Dependence theories can be stated as biconditionals as 
in 1 of §1.3.2.  Such claims raise a question as to which side of the biconditional, if either, 
determines the other.  This question, as Crispin Wright explains, marks a distinction 
between classes of statements about which our judgments formed in the right conditions 
determine the extension of the truth predicate among them, and classes about which our 
ideal judgments at most reflect an independently determined extension.22   
The same type of question arises in what is known as the Euthyphro Dilemma: assuming that 
X is pious if and only if the gods love X, do the gods love X because X is pious, or is X pious 
because the gods love X?23  /ŶtƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐ ?ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶďĞĐŽŵĞƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐůŝŬĞ PĚŽƚŚĞ
ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŐŽĚƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐƚƌƵĞƚŚĂƚyŝƐƉŝŽƵƐ ?ŽƌŝƐƚŚĞƚƌƵƚŚŽĨy ?ƐƉŝĞƚǇ
determined independently of the opinions of the gods, the latter being a mere reflection of 
the fact that X is pious?  The distinction may be further summarised as follows: supposing 
that X is pious if and only if the gods love X, then either the gods are reliable detectors of 
piety, or piety is constituted by the love of the gods. 
On a Response-Dependence account of aesthetic value concepts, values picked out by such 
concepts may therefore be things that are reliably detected in certain conditions, or they 
may be constituted by our responses in such conditions.  The first possibility would seem to 
justify a moderate form of Aesthetic Objectivism, because aesthetic values in art can have 
their character fixed independently of our dispositions to respond to them, and yet because 
                                                             
22 WRIGHT, Crispin.  Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press, 2009; p. 120. 
23 WRIGHT 2009, p. 108. 
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this character is such that it determines certain responses in certain conditions, there is a 
sense in which aesthetic values in art are dependent on responses, or rather they are 
relational with respect to our dispositions to respond. 
1.3.6 Towards a Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism 
In this dissertation I defend a moderate Objectivism about aesthetic values in art and 
explain how this is consistent with Response-Dependence about aesthetic value concepts.  I 
will more briefly defend Descriptivism for aesthetic value judgments about works of art, but 
I will argue that Aesthetic Objectivism does not depend on Descriptivism.  My focus, then, is 
on the claim that the aesthetic values of art are largely ontologically objective.  Dependence 
on dispositions to respond might seem to preclude ontological objectivity in the sense of 
having a character fixed independently of our dispositions to respond, but in this 
dissertation I argue that this is not the case.   
Our dispositions to respond to objects do not determine their properties of shape, and our 
dispositŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ƚŽ ĂŶ ŽďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƐŚĂƉĞĚŽ ŶŽƚ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞ ǁŚŝĐŚ
properties they are, but they might determine our concepts of shape and whether those 
concepts pick out one property or another.   
In chapter 3 I argue, after Hume, that the ontologically objective properties of works of art 
are naturally fitted to produce particular responses, so that expertise and error are possible 
in the application of aesthetic value concepts to works of art.  Those concepts are 
dependent on our dispositions to respond to the properties of art works, but the properties 
they pick out are objective and it is a matter of contingent success whether one detects the 
aesthetic values of a work of art. 
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As will become clear in chapter 3, my account employs the notion of an ideal observer.  The 
importance of normal or ideal conditions to a Response-Dependence thesis relates to the 
idea that some kind of normative notion must be imported in the analysis of a concept in 
order for that concept to be normative. Johnston argues convincingly that because of the 
essential connection between value and its commendatory function, there can be no 
account which reduces value to non-normative concepts.24  As I explain in chapters 3 and 4, 
the notion of an ideal aesthetic experiencer, and of aesthetic experiences as valuable in 
virtue of being pleasurable, can supply this normativity in a Response-Dependence analysis 
of aesthetic value concepts. 
I will argue that our dispositions to respond to the properties of works of art shape concepts 
suĐŚĂƐƚŚĂƚŽĨ ‘ďĞĂƵƚǇ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƉƉůǇƚŽƐŽŵĞǁŽƌŬƐĂŶĚŶŽƚƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ŶĚǇĞƚ ?ŽƵƌ
dispositions to respond do not shape the properties of works of art, which retain their 
ontological objectivity at least to a significant degree.  On the above moderately Objectivist 
reading of Response-dependence, it is implied that the aesthetic values of works of art are 
themselves dispositions to produce certain experiences in certain conditions.  They depend 
for their manifestation on dispositions on the part of human subjects, and this means they 
are not full-blown ontologically objective entities.  They are, however, dispositions realised 
by ontologically objective properties which trigger our responses to them.25 
Specifically, aesthetic values in art are realised by objective properties of works such as 
distributions of paint in a painting, sequences of sound in a piece of music, shapes carved 
                                                             
24 JOHNSTON 1989, pp. 156-7. 
25 I remain neutral as to whether dispositions are identical with that which realises them.  A discussion of this is 
summarised here: CHOI, Sungho and FARA, Michael, Dispositions [online] in ZALTA, Edward N (ed.) The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014 [viewed 10 August 2015]. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/dispositions/. 
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into marble forming a sculpture, literal meanings of sentences in a work of Literature, and 
so on.  These properties can trigger certain responses in virtue of which the objects that 
instantiate them can be identified as having certain aesthetic values qua dispositions to 
produce valuable aesthetic experiences.  Given our propensities to respond to certain 
salient features of objects, the descriptive properties of objects can realise dispositions to 
produce aesthetic responses. 
Aesthetic values in art, I will argue, are the dispositions of works of art to cause valuable 
aesthetic experiences for ideal observers in ideal conditions.  Aesthetic values qua 
properties of art works apt to produce valuable aesthetic experiences are objective, but qua 
that which is instrumental to the production of valuable aesthetic experiences, the nature of 
aesthetic values as instruments of aesthetic experience is fixed by human propensities to 
respond and is therefore not entirely objective.   The reality of art objects is largely fixed 
independently of how we are disposed to respond to them, but aesthetic value concepts are 
determined by our dispositions to respond, so that the concepts fall upon works which have 
anthropocentric aesthetic values.   
Before moving onto the second introductory chapter, in which I focus on what aesthetic 
values in art are and how our intuitions about them seem to be in conflict, I will first 
consider what seems to be an indication of ontological objectivity, which will be especially 
important in chapter 5 when I consider the possibility of faultless disagreement.  
1.4 Cognitive Command 
According to Objectivism, an objective state of affairs has a nature which is independent of 
the judgments we make about it, or more generally the responses we have or are disposed 
to have towards it.  According to Descriptivism, our judgments about objective matters are 
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attempts to accurately reflect reality.  Disagreements about the aesthetic values of a work 
of art are, I will argue, best explained in many cases by deficiencies on the part of at least 
one participant in the disagreement, and this explanation amounts to an Objectivism about 
the aesthetic values of art.   
Wright uses the term cognitive command to refer to the notion that for a domain in which 
beliefs are representational, differences of opinion are best explained by one or more 
cognitive shortcomings on the part of at least one subject involved in the disagreement.26  
He describes cognitive command as follows: 
It is a priori that disagreements, when not attributable to vagueness, 
are ultimately explicable in terms of cognitive shortcomings; 
specifically, some material ignorance, material error, or prejudicial 
assessment.27 
Material ignorance and error and prejudicial assessment seem to constitute a failure of 
ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?  Ɛ / ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ZĂŝůƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ƚƌŝƉĂƌƚŝƚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐ
objectivity involves detection, deliberation and disinterestedness.  A failure to detect things 
will of course lead to ignorance, failure to deliberate properly will lead to errors in 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ Ă ůĂĐŬ ŽĨ ĚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŶĞƐƐ ǁŝůů ĂůůŽǁ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ ďǇ
prejudice.   
Another way of describing the notion of cognitive command, then, is as the idea that for a 
domain in which beliefs are truly representational, disagreements will be explainable by 
                                                             
26 WRIGHT, Crispin. Realism: the contemporary debate Ww(h)ither now? In HALDANE, John and WRIGHT, Crispin 
(eds.).  Reality, Representation, and Projection.  Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 63-84. 
27 WRIGHT 1993, p.72. 
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shortcomings in epistemic objectivity.  This is because such beliefs are attempted 
representations of things which are ontologically objective, and such things constrain our 
discourse so that errors of description are possible.   
Suppose, for example, that judgments in Biology can truly represent the facts of biology.  
Suppose two biologists disagree about whether the Bonobo is, according to a particular 
measure, the closest living relative of the Human, which is presumably a matter of fact.  
Supposing for a moment that my limited knowledge of this subject is not way off the mark, 
the disagreement might be settled by whether there is, according to a particular measure, a 
greater ontologically objective similarity between the genomes of Humans and Bonobos 
than there is between Humans and all other known species.  The disagreement will be 
explainable by some kind of cognitive shortcoming or shortcomings on the part of at least 
one of the two biologists: one of them might be unaware of crucial data, they may have 
misunderstood it, or they might assess it in a manner that is biased towards their 
preconceived opinion.   
This is because ontologically objective states of affairs exert a cognitive command on our 
attempts to represent them, so if two observers with ideal epistemic objectivity were to 
observe something ontologically objective, they would not disagree about it.  Since the 
similarities between us and other species are not (I assume) merely a matter of opinion or 
 ‘ƚĂƐƚĞ ? ?ĂƚůĞĂƐƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐƉƵƚĂŶƚƐŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞŵĂĚĞƐŽŵĞŬŝŶĚŽĨŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ? 
Suppose now that aesthetic evaluations of works of art can truly represent the objective 
aesthetic values of works.  Aesthetic disagreements would then be explainable by cognitive 
shortcomings, or in other words, by one or more disputant failing to be perfectly 
epistemically objective in relation to the aesthetic values of a work.  I am currently listening 
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to Hex Enduction Hour by The Fall (an album of songs), for the first time, and I am forming 
judgments about what I take to be its aesthetic merits and defects.  Other listeners are likely 
to dŝƐĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚŵǇĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐĐĂůůŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵ^ŵŝƚŚ ?/ĨƚŚĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐŽĨƚŚŝƐ
album are ontologically objective then, on the account I have been describing, either I or 
Smith or both of us is subject to some kind or kinds of cognitive shortcoming which will 
explain disputed aesthetic judgments about the work.   
As I listen to the album, I cannot make out all of the lyrics, and I am therefore failing to 
detect some features of the work, and I am ignorant of those features.  In that respect at 
least, my epistemic objectivity in relation to this work of art at this moment is imperfect.  
DǇĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŵŝŐŚƚĂůƐŽďĞ ŝŶŚŝďŝƚĞĚďǇĨĂƵůƚǇ ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ
those lyrics I can make out I might be misinterpreting.  It is also quite possible (perhaps very 
likely) that my evaluations of the work are influenced by certain biases.  Perhaps I am 
ŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚƌŽĐŬŵƵƐŝĐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐŝƚǇŽĨDĂŶĐŚĞƐƚĞƌŝƐŐŽŽĚĞǀĞŶǁŚĞŶŝƚŝƐŶ ?ƚ ?ĚƵĞ
ƚŽ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ŚŝŐŚůǇ-acclaimed rock music.  In other words, failures of 
epistemic objectivity in relation to works of art can explain disagreements about 
ontologically objective aesthetic values of works, supposing that such things exist. 
1.4.1 Divergence 
Divergent responses to ontologically objective matters seem, then, to be best explained by 
shortcomings in epistemic objectivity.  An analogy suggested by Wright illustrates this.28    
Suppose two cameras, designed to produce clear photographs with no distorting special 
effects, receive the same input but produce dissimilar outputs: they are pointed in the same 
direction from the same location in the same conditions of lighting, weather and so on, and 
                                                             
28 WRIGHT 1993, p.72. 
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yet the photographs they produce are significantly dissimilar.  Given the supposition that 
external conditions are the same, it seems there must be a fault internal to at least one of 
the two cameras: for example, the lens may be dirty or the film may be damaged.  If the 
divergent outputs of the two cameras cannot be explained by divergent inputs, then the 
explanation must be that at least one of the cameras has functioned imperfectly.  This is 
because of what these cameras are: they are machines designed to produce images 
resembling their inputs.  Similarly, our judgments are, at least in some cases, attempts to 
represent the world, and our disagreements about that which is ontologically objective and 
that we can truly represent are either due to divergences of input or due to cognitive 
shortcomings.   
The basic idea underlying the notion of cognitive command, then, is that in certain 
discourses our opinions are not optional: at least one of the two cameras in the above 
analogy, assuming they are designed to produce a true representation, is malfunctioning 
due to being faulty.  Similarly, there are discourses in which we are commanded by the facts 
to form particular judgments, and when we do not form those judgments we fail to 
represent the facts.  Disagreements within such a discourse are faulty disagreements.  I 
discuss in chapter 5 whether disagreements about the aesthetic values of works of art are 
necessarily faulty or whether faultless disagreements can occur.   
It seems that a discourse in which the subject matter is ontologically objective, for example 
the discourse regarding the DNA of Bonobos and Humans, will be a discourse in which we 
can expect disagreements to be explainable by cognitive shortcomings.  This is because 
ontologically objective entities will be stable inputs due to their independence from our 
responses to them or dispositions to respond to them.  Our responses to them will reflect or 
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fail to reflect their independent constitution, and when divergent judgments are formed 
about them this will be due to failures on the part of the judgers.  The presence of cognitive 
shortcomings in cases of disagreement within a discourse would seem to be an indication 
that the subject matter of the discourse is ontologically objective and in virtue of this exerts 
cognitive command.  But the exertion of cognitive command may not be what it is for 
something to be ontologically objective; it may instead merely be a product of that 
objectivity and an indication of it.   
1.4.2 Convergence 
Wright develops the notion of cognitive command from the notion that on matters 
objective we can expect judgments to converge, just as we can expect the outputs of well-
functioning cameras to converge when the inputs are the same, given that the function of a 
camera is to produce an image resembling its input.29  This notion of convergence again 
might only be something we would expect from descriptions, in conditions of epistemic 
objectivity, of that which is ontologically objective, rather than an explanation or an account 
of that ontological objectivity.  Either way, an understanding of convergence is likely to take 
us towards an understanding of ontological objectivity. 
Convergence can either be the reduction of disagreement over time or the persistence of 
agreement over time.  That something is ontologically objective does not entail that 
opinions about it will converge, but convergence of such opinions is perhaps something we 
should normally expect, at least in conditions of epistemic objectivity.  An indication of the 
truth of some form of Aesthetic Objectivism, then, would be the convergence of aesthetic 
                                                             
29 WRIGHT 1993, pp. 69-73. 
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value judgments best explained by an increasing awareness of the objective aesthetic values 
of works of art.   
Michael Slote makes a plausible speculation that personal aesthetic tastes tend to change in 
particular directions, for example one who prefers the music of Bruckner to that of Mozart 
might come to prefer Mozart to Bruckner, whereas it is less likely that the opposite change 
in taste will take place.30  This can be explained by further acquaintance with the works of 
art produced by these composers involving acquaintance with the objective aesthetic values 
of these works, leading to an increased awareness that, in fact, Mozart was a better 
composer than Bruckner.  I defend in chapter 3 the view that convergences of aesthetic 
judgment by many critics from different cultures and eras is best explained by the 
objectivity of aesthetic values, and by masterpieces of art being substantially aesthetically 
valuable.  I also mention in §7.5.4 a study which suggests that aesthetic value judgments do 
converge upon further acquaintance with works of art. 
One might argue that such convergence of aesthetic opinion is due to the influence of critics 
and teachers, which would explain other phenomena such as cultural trends in aesthetic 
opinion.  But Slote suggests that even if this is the explanation for what convergence there 
is, this cannot explain why particular aesthetic opinions originally took hold.31   
One might say that convergence of judgment is adequately explained by our having similar 
psychologies, without the need to appeal to agreement over that which is objective.  
Psychology can explain responses, and similarity of psychology can explain similarity of 
                                                             
30 SLOTE, Michael A. The rationality of aesthetic value judgments. The Journal of Philosophy, 68:22, 1971: 821-
839. 
31 SLOTE 1971, pp. 825-6. 
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response, but on the assumption of a mind-independent reality of some kind, this reality 
supplies an explanation of similarities of psychology and of response.  We have adapted to 
be sensitive in certain ways to the environment so that we may survive, and it is the 
environment that plausibly explains many convergences of judgment at least indirectly, 
even if the direct explanation is that we have similar psychologies. 
Unidirectional changes of taste, then, might be best explained by objective entities, namely 
aesthetic values; unidirectional changes of taste are, as it were, what Aesthetic Objectivism 
might look like, but it is an empirical question whether changes in taste are unidirectional.  
In this dissertation I will not presume to have the scientific skills or experience required to 
properly assess such empirical claims, although I will refer to the occasional empirical study 
that sheds a little light on the empirical premises involved in the philosophical subject 
matter of the dissertation.   
For now all I am suggesting is that convergence would be evidence of cognitive command 
being exerted by the aesthetic values of works of art due to those values having ontological 
objectivity.  What, if anything, can this tell us about what it is for such values to be 
ontologically objective?  It seems to me that aesthetic value judgments would be likely to 
converge in the right conditions because aesthetic values in art are objective, and not that 
such convergence constitutes their objectivity.  Perhaps the objectivity of aesthetic values is 
constituted by their commanding that we form certain cognitions rather than others, or 
perhaps ontological objectivity is something else which underlies cognitive command and 
ĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ P ŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŽ ĂůƐŽ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞ Ă ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?Ɛ ďĞŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƌĞ ƚŽ ďĞ
experienced, independently of how we are disposed to experience it, and determining that 
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we experience it in certain ways.  I will return to these issues in relation to the aesthetic 
values of art in chapter 3. 
1.5 Conclusions 
In this first introductory chapter I have identified the relevant type of objectivity for the 
purpose of defending a Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism about the aesthetic values of art.  I 
have explained that aesthetic values in art may be to a certain extent ontologically 
objective: that is, they may be partly constituted by properties which are fixed 
independently of our dispositions to respond to them.  And yet, I will argue, aesthetic value 
concepts are response-dependent in the sense that a work of art has certain aesthetic 
values and falls under such concepts if and only if it has the capacity to produce certain 
responses in certain conditions.  I will fill out the details of these claims in due course.  I 
have begun to argue that Response-Dependence about the aesthetic values of art is 
consistent with a Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism.  The order of determination can be such 
that aesthetic values determine the responses in virtue of which they are aesthetic values, 
and this makes it possible for us to make errors about the aesthetic values of art works, and 
makes it likely that in the right circumstances our aesthetic evaluations will converge.   
Having introduced a relevant concept of objectivity and Objectivism, in the next 
introductory chapter I introduce concepts of aesthetic value in art, the nature of judgments 
about such values, and the conflicting intuitions that seem to arise regarding the objectivity 
or subjectivity of aesthetic values.  After this the remainder of the dissertation is devoted to 
defending, in detail, a Response-Dependence account of aesthetic values in art as a form of 
Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism. 
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2. Aesthetic Values in Art 
2.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I introduce the notion of aesthetic values in art.  I begin by considering which 
objects should be classed as works of art.  I then distinguish between thick and thin value 
concepts.  I then introduce an apparent paradox in aesthetics involving the appearance that 
 ‘ďĞĂƵƚǇ ŝƐ ŝŶƚŚĞĞǇĞŽĨƚŚĞďĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶďĞŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶĂďŽƵƚ
whether something is beautiful.  I suggest that Hume moves towards the right sort of 
solution to this apparent paradox, according to which aesthetic values are objective 
capacities to produce certain subjective experiences.32  I then describe how Kant 
characterises aesthetic judgments and aesthetic experiences in his attempt to address the 
paradox, and suggest that elements of this view are consistent with a Hume-inspired ideal 
observer theory of aesthetic values in art, as I will explain in further detail in subsequent 
chapters. 
2.1 Art 
I assume in this dissertation that art is, at least partly and in many cases, an aesthetic 
practice: the artist attempts to produce, whether by creation or appropriation or some 
other means, an object which is aesthetically valuable.  Some aestheticians claim that there 
are non-aesthetic works of art: works which are not intended to be aesthetically valuable.  
                                                             
32 HUME 1985. 
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ƵĐŚĂŵƉ ?Ɛ  ‘ƌĞĂĚǇŵĂĚĞƐ ? ĂƌĞ ŽŶĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ?33  But I focus in this 
dissertation on works of art that are intended to be aesthetically valuable, or are part of a 
tradition of producing art that is supposed to be aesthetically valuable.  I suspect that a 
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨǁŽƌŬƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƵĐŚĂŵƉ ?ƐĐĂŶďĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďƵƚ/ǁŝůůŶŽƚŽĨĨĞƌ
it here. 
I will not, in this dissertation, try to provide a water-tight definition of  ‘Ăƌƚ ? ?  / ƐŚŽƵůĚ ?
however, clarify the scope of my defence of a Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism about the 
aesthetic values of art.  My account will imply that something that we value in many works 
of art is their capacity to provide valuable aesthetic experiences, such capacity being the 
ƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂƌƚŝƐƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŽƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ƌĞůĂƚĞĚĐůĂŝŵ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ function of art is to 
provide valuable aesthetic experiences, but I will not be committed to a simple 
Functionalism about art: something may be work of art because of how it relates to art 
history, for instance, which might need to be explained in non-functional terms.  In my 
defence of the moderate objectivity of the aesthetic values of art, not much will hang on 
what the precise necessary or sufficient conditions are for something to be a work of art.  
Partly this is because, although I focus on art, my account of aesthetic values may or may 
not apply equally well to natural objects which are not works of art. 
The distinction between the aesthetics of art and of nature may be problematic since there 
are objects which do not slide comfortably into either category.  A garden, for example, is 
not sculpted with the precision with which one can sculpt a piece of marble, but nor does a 
garden develop entirely naturally insofar as the locations of different plants and other 
                                                             
33 STECKER, Robert.  Definition of Art.  In LEVINSON, Jerrold (ed.) The Oxford handbook of aesthetics. Oxford 
University Press, 2003: 136-154; p. 143. 
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components is determined by the gardener.  It seems a sculpture is a work of art, and a 
flower is not, whereas a garden is like a sculpture in some respects but is comprised of 
objects like flowers whose beauty seems to occur naturally such that it is aesthetic but not 
artistic.  That at least is how it seems to me, and I am therefore unsure whether a garden is 
ĂǁŽƌŬŽĨĂƌƚ ? DĂƌǇDŽƚŚĞƌƐŝůů ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŽďůĞŵĐĂƐĞƐ P  “ĐŽŝĨĨƵƌĞ ?ǁŝŶĚĐhimes, a 
ůĞƚƚĞƌŽĨĐŽŶĚŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ?34   
This may be a problem for my attempt to confine this dissertation to claims about art, but I 
think it is safe to assume that within the set of objects that might bear aesthetic values, 
there is at least a vague subset which contains works of art.  My claims about the objectivity 
of aesthetic values are about objects determinately within this subset, but these claims may 
or may not be applicable to some or all objects in the larger set.  For example, my claims 
about the aesthetic values of works of music may or may not be true of the aesthetic values 
of birdsong; I neither defend nor deny the truth of such claims for objects that I do not 
consider to be works of art.  
2.1.1 Art and Nature 
I acknowledge, then, that there are many things other than works of art to which we ascribe 
ƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞƐ ŽĨ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  ‘ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ? Žƌ  ‘ƵŐůǇ ? ? ďƵƚ / ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ŚĞƌĞ ƚŽ
defend the objectivity of aesthetic values outside art.  I am hesitant to simply assume that 
my claims about art extend to other sorts of aesthetic object, because my intuitions and 
perhaps folk intuitions tend to vary for different domains.  For example, it seems to me that 
                                                             
34 MOTHERSILL, Mary. Beauty and the Critic's Judgment: Remapping Aesthetics.  In KIVY, Peter (ed.) The 
Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics.  Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004, pp. 152-166; p. 158. 
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we can faultlessly disagree about the visual beauty of people in a way that we cannot 
regarding the beauty of art.   
When two people disagree about whether a human person is beautiful, I am inclined to 
assume (pending further scientific knowledge on my part) that they are quite naturally 
disposed to find different people attractive due in part to their genetic predispositions.  For 
example, heterosexual men will perhaps be more inclined to judge women rather than men 
ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ? ŝŶ Ă ŶĂƌƌŽǁ ? ƐĞǆƵĂů ƐĞŶƐĞ ? ĚƵĞ ƚŽƐĞǆƵĂů ŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ  ?/ ĂƐƐƵŵĞ ) ŝƐ
largely biologically determined.  Furthermore, it seems that our genes may determine more 
fine-grained preferences, for particular individuals with whom one would be more likely to 
produce healthy offspring.  It seems unlikely that judgments about the beauty of art are 
quite so tied to biological individuation, since it is unclear what evolutionary benefit this 
would carry.   
My intuition here is that disagreements about the sensual beauty of human persons are 
more dependent on individual genetic differences than disagreements about the aesthetic 
values of works of art.  I am of course speculating on empirical matters which speculation 
cannot settle, but suffice it to say that it is unclear to me that the aesthetic values of natural 
objects such as human bodies is objective or absolute to the same degree as the aesthetic 
values of works of art.  My guess is that aesthetic values in art are objective in a way that 
sexual attractiveness is not, but it could be that the connection to natural, genetic 
preferences renders sensual beauty more objective in some sense than the aesthetic values 
of art.  But I will set aside the aesthetics of non-art objects as something to be examined 
elsewhere.  Having limited my enquiry to the artistic, I will now say a little about what I take 
to be the limits of the artistic. 
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To the extent that the art-nature dichotomy makes sense at all, it seems to relate to the fact 
that art objects are designed to be experienced, whereas natural objects are not designed 
and if they have a primary function it is not necessarily (if ever) to be experienced by 
humans.  I assume that works in classical styles and mediums such as literature, musical 
composition, painting and sculpture are works of art, alongside works in modern styles and 
mediums such as video games, performances of stand-up comedy and feature films.  I will 
not discuss controversies regarding the inclusion of some of these kinds in any great detail 
because I do not believe that my claims depend on settling such controversies.  
2.2 Aesthetic Values in Art 
Art objects that are intended to be aesthetically valuable may come in many varieties, for 
example carved pieces of marble, distributions of paint on a canvas, sequences of words to 
be interpreted and performed, sequences of notes to be performed, strings of digital code, 
reels of film, and so on.  As I explained in §1.2, the ontology of art varies for different kinds 
of art.  I will not go beyond that rough picture of the ontology of art of different kinds; for 
present purposes I need only make it clear that when I speak of a work of art as an object I 
may refer to a concrete artefact, an abstract sequence, or any number of other sorts of 
object that artists provide for our aesthetic appreciation.  I will now look at the question of 
what the aesthetic values of such things might be.  
The paradigm aesthetic value in art and elsewhere is beauty, and perhaps also its opposite: 
ugliness.  But there are many other aesthetic value predicates that we deploy in our 
evaluations of works of art, and insofar as such evaluations are accurate there are aesthetic 
values of art corresponding to these predicates.  Aesthetic value predicates such as 
 ‘ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ? ? ‘ƵŐůǇ ? ? ‘ĞůĞŐĂŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŐĂƌŝƐŚ ?ĐĂŶďĞĚŝǀŝĚĞĚŝŶƚŽĂƚůĞĂƐƚƚǁŽĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ?ĂƐƵƐĞĚ
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for moral value predicates ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  ‘ĐƌƵĞů ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ǁƌŽŶŐ ? ? Bernard Williams distinguishes 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƚŚŝĐŬ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚŝŶ ?ǀĂůƵĞƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞƐŝŶƚŚŝĐƐ ?Thick value predicates contain both a 
descriptive and an evaluative element, whereas thin value predicates are purely 
evaluative.35   
Consider the act of giving to charity. Suppose that this is a morally good act and also a 
ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝŽƵƐĂĐƚ ? ‘Conscientiousness ? might be understood as follows: a conscientious act is 
motivated by a sensitivity to the feelings of others (descriptive component of thick concept) 
in a way that is morallǇŐŽŽĚ ?ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ) ? ‘DŽƌĂůůǇŐŽŽĚ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŽƚ ĞƌŚĂnd is a 
pure evaluative concept and implies no particular descriptive features of an act, and merely 
evaluates the act positively.  The descriptive and evaluative aspects of thick concepts are 
separable, so for instance, one might act in a way that is sensitive to the feelings of others 
but in a way that is morally bad (we might call this  ‘cruelty ? or  ‘sadism ? perhaps).   
Supposing that a conscientious act such as giving to charity has these two components ? it 
falls under a particular non-evaluative description and is also positively morally evaluable ?
this raises the question of what the connection is, if there is a connection, between these 
two components.  It seems somewhat plausible that such an act fits some non-evaluative 
description, and in virtue of fitting this description it is in this respect a morally good act.  
But the is-ought gap between its fitting this description and its being good might be difficult 
to bridge.   
Alternatively, it may be that the act is first of all (at least partially) a morally good act, but 
this is to be understood in terms of certain of its descriptive features.  This is how Stephan 
Burton suggests that thick concepts function: they evaluate something on the basis of 
                                                             
35 WILLIAMS, Bernard. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Taylor & Francis, 2011; p.144. 
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certain descriptive features of it.36  For example, giving to charity might be good partly 
because it involves a sensitivity to the feelings of others and a concern for their welfare to 
be protected or improved.  In which case it might be appropriately called a conscientious 
act.  This is as opposed to the notion that the act is conscientious because the sensitivity 
involved in it is good.   
In other words, suppose that an act A falls under thick moral concept T, the latter which 
contains two elements: TD (a descriptive component) and TE (an evaluative component).  A 
is T and is therefore both TD and TE.  One view would be that A is T because in virtue of 
being TD it is also TE.  For example, saving a baby from a fire may be courageous in the 
sense that it involves putting oneself at great personal risk in order to protect another, 
where this serves as a morally good-making feature of the act.   
But the non-evaluative descriptive feature of the act is not sufficient to warrant a positive 
evaluation of the act ? an A can be TD without being TE ? and so it seems that it would be 
false to claim that an act is conscientious if and only if it falls under a relevant TD and is 
therefore in that respect good; it might well fall under the very same TD and not be in that 
respect good.  Better instead, as Burton explains, to say that A is T because it is TE in a 
particular way identified by TD.37   
On this view, saving a baby from a fire may be courageous in the sense that it is morally 
good (ceteris paribus) partly in virtue of falling under a particular instance of the description 
ƚǇƉĞ ‘ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐƉƵƚƚŝŶŐŽŶĞƐĞůĨĂƚŐƌĞĂƚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƌŝƐŬŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?That is not 
to say that falling under such a description necessarily makes an act in that respect good; 
                                                             
36 BURTON, Stephan L.  ‘Thick' concepts revised. Analysis, 52:1, 1992: 28-32. 
37 BURTON 1992, p. 31. 
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rather, it is to say that in this case falling under the description makes the act in that respect 
good.  Having clarified the thick-thin distinction I will now apply it to aesthetic values. 
2.2.1 Thick and Thin Aesthetic Values 
In aesthetics,  ‘ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ? ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵpositive aesthetic value predicate because it is 
ǁŚŽůůǇ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞ ? ƵŶůŝŬĞ ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ŐĂƌŝƐŚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚĂƐ ĂŶ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ Ă
ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ?   ‘'ĂƌŝƐŚ ? ĐĂŶ ŵĞĂŶ  ‘ĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞůǇ ďƌŝŐŚƚ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŶŽŶ-
evaluaƚŝǀĞĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ‘ďƌŝŐŚƚ ?ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞƋƵĂůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞůǇ ? ?
/ŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐĂďƌŝŐŚƚǇĞůůŽǁƐŚŝƌƚĂƐ ‘ŐĂƌŝƐŚ ?ŽŶĞĐŽƵůĚƐĂǇŝƚŝƐ ‘ďƌŝŐŚƚĂŶĚƵŐůǇ ?Žƌ
ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ‘ƵŐůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐƐŽďƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?ĂŶĚŽŶĞǁŽƵůĚĐŽŶǀĞǇƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŝŶĨŽƌmation as if one 
ŚĂĚ ĐĂůůĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐŚŝƌƚ  ‘ŐĂƌŝƐŚ ? ? CĂůůŝŶŐ Ă ƐŚŝƌƚ  ‘ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ? ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ŝŵƉůǇ ĂŶǇ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
description of the shirt; it could be bright, dark, striped, plain, or fall under any description 
that would be consistent with its being positively aesthetically valuable.  Calling the shirt 
 ‘ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ? ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞƐ ŶŽ ƐƵĐŚ ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŵĞƌĞůǇ ǀĂůƵates the shirt aesthetically.  A 
description will apply, however: it seems there will be something about the shirt in virtue of 
which it is beautiful, assuming that it is.   
I will now explore this further and suggest that the thick and thin dichotomy may help to 
explain what it is for something to be aesthetically valuable.  A work of art which falls under 
ƚŚĞ ƚŚŝŶ ǀĂůƵĞ ƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞ  ‘ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ? ǁŝůů ? ŝƚ ƐĞĞŵs, also fall under certain thick value 
predicates, and will be beautiful in virtue of being, for example, elegant, balanced, vibrant 
or iconic.  The thin value of beauty seems to supervene on such thick values, or at least on 
the properties of the object that are described by the descriptive component of thin value 
predicates.   
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/ŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ŝƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞŶŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŽĂŶŽďũĞĐƚ ?ƐƚŚŝŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
some change to the properties in virtue of which the object falls under certain thick 
aesthetic value concepts.  For example, were an ugly shirt to be made more or less ugly, this 
would have to entail some alteration being made to the shirt such that different 
descriptions would apply to it, including those descriptions that form part of the thick 
aesthetic value concepts applicable to the shirt.   
For instance the shirt might be made less ugly by being dyed a different colour, and this 
ŵŝŐŚƚ ĂŵŽƵŶƚ ƚŽ ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ĂǁĂǇ ƚŚĞ ƐŚŝƌƚ ?Ɛ ŐĂƌŝƐŚŶĞƐƐ ƐƵch that it becomes less ugly.  A 
supervenience relation therefore seems to hold between the thin value concepts that apply 
to an object and the properties of an object picked out by the thick value concepts.  That is, 
ƚŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞŶŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŽƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ ?ƐƚŚŝŶǀĂůƵĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŽŝƚƐƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐŽƚŽ
ŵĂŬĞƚŚĞƐŚŝƌƚůĞƐƐƵŐůǇƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƐŚŝƌƚ ?ƐĂƌƌĂǇŽĨƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐŵƵƐƚďĞĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ? 
The question of whether the beauty of works of art is objective may therefore become a 
question of whether the properties, in virtue of which a work has the aesthetic values it has, 
are themselves objective.  Alternatively, aesthetic values in art might be best understood in 
terms of aesthetic experiences rather than aesthetic properties: perhaps a work is beautiful 
if and only if it can be the object of the right sorts of aesthetic experience.   
Aesthetic experiences might just be the experiences of aesthetic properties; alternatively, 
aesthetic properties might just be whatever properties cause aesthetic experiences.  There 
is a decision to be made about which of these two things, if either, is basic in the 
constitution of aesthetic values.  This will be the subject of chapter 4, but in the meantime I 
will not conceal my commitment to the view that the values of aesthetic experiences are 
ƉƌŝŽƌ ƚŽ ƚŚŽƐĞ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ Ɖƌoperties, in the constitution oĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ?
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Having introduced aesthetic value concepts and begun to consider the relation between 
descriptive features of objects and the evaluative concepts they fall under and how that 
may relate to the problem that this dissertation is an attempt to solve, I will now articulate 
the latter problem in further detail.  
2.3 The Paradox of Taste 
In the remainder of this dissertation I will attempt to address an apparent paradox in 
Aesthetics, which is that common sense would have it that beauty and ugliness and other 
ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐĂƌĞ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞĞǇĞŽĨƚŚĞďĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? ?ĂŶĚǇĞƚĐŽŵŵŽŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŝŵƉůǇ
that we can be mistaken in ascribing aesthetic values to a work of art.  It can seem on the 
one hand that if one experiences something as beautiful, then in some sense it is beautiful.  
And yet, it can also seem that some ascriptions of beauty are mistaken even when they are 
based on experiences as of beauty. 
Hume identifies two opposing and widely held views about taste in art.  The first view is that 
sentiment is at the core of taste, and so, since sentiments are non-representational, there 
can be no standard of correctness in matters of taste because one non-representational 
state cannot be more correct than another:  
dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐĂƐƉĞĐŝĞƐŽĨƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ  ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĞǀĞƌ
attaining any standard of taste. The difference, it is said, is very wide between 
judgment and sentiment. All sentiment is right; because sentiment has a 
reference to nothing beyond itself, and is always real, wherever a man is 
conscious of it. But all determinations of the understanding are not right; 
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because they have a reference to something beyond themselves, to wit, real 
matter of fact; and are not always conformable to that standard.38   
The second view that Hume identifies is the thought that some works of art or artists are 
obviously better than others.  He claims that in at least some cases the appearance is not 
only that a work is aesthetically valuable, but that compared to certain other works the 
difference in value is analogous to the difference in size between a mountain and a 
molehill.39  It seems that Hume is right to assume that some art works are much better than 
others, for example Shakespeare wrote sonnets which are much better than the following 
haiku:  
This is a poem 
Which I am writing merely 
For illustration. 
The general view that some works of art are universally better than others is widespread; as 
Railton observes: 
Bookstores bulge with guides, and newspapers and journals do a steady 
business in reviews.  We readily pay for reliable restaurant ratings, travel 
great distances to view recognised natural wonders, and freely swap 
judgments on music or movies.40  
                                                             
38 HUME 1985, pp. 229-30. 
39 HUME 1985, pp. 230-1. 
40 RAILTON 2001, p. 72. 
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These practices suggest that many people believe that there is something of universal value 
that is present in certain works of art so that critics are justified in making recommendations 
to people in general regarding what is universally calculated to please.   
Hume tries to find a principle that will settle aesthetic disputes and a theory of aesthetic 
values to replace the common sense view that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, which 
fails to justify the similarly common practices of aesthetic disagreement, argumentation and 
persuasion, and the intuition that some works of art are simply better than others.  
Conceding that sentiment is at the core of taste and is non-representational, Hume tries to 
show that sentiments of beauty can nevertheless be objectively valid.  He argues that 
sentiments, unlike determinations of the understanding, have reference to nothing beyond 
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ĂŶĚǇĞƚƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶ “ŵŝŶŐůĞƐŽŵĞůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ
ŽĨƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚ ? ?41  
One belief can be more correct than another in terms of accurately representing the facts, 
but sentiments perhaps represent nothing at all and therefore cannot be more or less 
successful at doing so.  It is commonly concluded from this that, assuming as Hume does 
that the mental states involved in aesthetic appreciation are sentiments, the aesthetic 
ǀĂůƵĞƐŽĨĂƌƚĂƌĞ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞĞǇĞŽĨƚŚĞďĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? ?
Wholly sentimental responses to art works are by definition non-descriptive and so are not 
apt for accuracy, yet they may function as reliable indications of universal aesthetic 
capacities to produce worthwhile aesthetic experiences.  Although Hume thinks that beauty 
is a quality of the sentiment rather than the object, he insists that certain qualities in objects 
are naturally fitted to produce particular sentiments:  
                                                             
41 HUME 1985. 
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A clear and distinct sentiment attends [an experienced critic] through the 
whole survey of the objects; and he discerns that very degree and kind of 
approbation or displeasure, which each part is naturally fitted to produce.42  
Hume argues that the sentiments of such experienced critics reliably correspond to a work's 
aesthetic values. 
Another way of describing the paradox is that it seems our attributions of aesthetic values 
to works of art are based on our subjective experiences, and yet when we make such 
attributions we seem to be aspiring to describe something about the work about which it is 
possible to be mistaken: in other words, something objective.  This is how Elisabeth 
Schellekens puts it: 
tŚĂƚĐŽŵĞƐ ƚŽďĞ ŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŽĨ ƚĂƐƚĞ ? ƚŚƵƐĐĞŶƚƌĞƐĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĞ
following problem: how are we to reconcile the subjective pleasure that is 
undeniably part of aesthetic experience with the objective aspirations of the 
very judgements resulting from that pleasure? How are we to account for, let 
alone overcome, this seemingly irreconcilable duality between the coincident 
subjectivity and objectivity of taste? The question arises as judgements of 
aesthetic taste do not seem to be like most judgements of taste in that they 
seem to amount to more than mere reports of subjective mental states. Yet at 
the same time, they cannot be said to pick out an objective property, at least 
as such things are conceived traditionally.43  
                                                             
42 HUME 1985, p. 237. 
43 SCHELLEKENS, Elisabeth. Taste and Objectivity: The Emergence of the Concept of the Aesthetic. Philosophy 
Compass, 4:5, 2009: 734-743; p. 738. 
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These conflicting intuitions may be the result of the objectivity of the properties of the 
objects that we ĐĂůů  ‘ǁŽƌŬƐ ŽĨ Ăƌƚ ? ŝŶ ĐŽŶũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
aesthetic experiences we have of those objects, and which are normally the basis for our 
aesthetic value judgments.  In other words, the method by which we become aware of an 
ŽďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛaesthetic values, which perhaps ƐƵƉĞƌǀĞŶĞŽŶƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ ?ƐƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ?ŵĂǇ
be that we infer from the qualities of our subjective experiences that the objects which 
cause them have certain values.  This method may be unusually indirect as compared to 
ordinary perception, as will become clearer when I begin to discuss the nature of aesthetic 
experience in §2.5.  Although we can perhaps fail by this method to correctly attribute 
values to an object, the subjectivity of the experiences on the basis of which we attribute 
aesthetic values to an object may create the false impression that we are projecting these 
values onto the object rather than being sensitive to their presence in the object. 
2.3.1 Sketching a Solution 
Common sense would have it, then, thaƚ ďĞĂƵƚǇ ŝƐ  ‘ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ĂŶĚ ǇĞƚ that errors of 
aesthetic judgment are possible due to some works of art being better than others, either 
overall or in certain respects.  How can we make sense of, or correct, this picture?  It is not 
immediately clear how a work of art can be objectively more beautiful than another, if 
beauty is a subjective quality of experience, or something that we ascribe to objects on the 
basis of subjective experience.  However, the objective features of the objects we call 
 ‘ǁŽƌŬƐŽĨĂƌƚ ?ĐĂŶ ?ĂƐǁŝƚŚĂŶǇŽďũĞĐƚŽĨĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĚƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ
we have of them.     
Works of art have objective features such as shapes, colours, and structures, and these can 
be described objectively.   This is not sufficient for the objectivity of aesthetic properties or 
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values: as I explained in §2.2.1, to fall under some aesthetic value concept it is necessary but 
not sufficient to fall under some non-evaluative description(s) such as a description of its 
shapes, colours or structure.  Furthermore, describing a work as possessing such descriptive 
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ǁŝůů ŶŽƚ ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞ ǁŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ůŝŬĞ  ‘ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞǇĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? ? ǁŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ůŝŬĞ ƚŽ
experience the work from a point of view.  But insofar as the non-evaluative properties of 
objects are capable of producing similar subjective experiences among human observers, 
just as perhaps the colours of objects can produce similar colour experiences, describing 
such objective properties as partially constituting a work's beauty (or other aesthetic values) 
does not conflict with the idea that beauty is in some sense a quality of subjective 
experience.  That is, beauty and other aesthetic values in art, as I argue in chapter 4, are 
instrumental values to produce valuable aesthetic experiences, so the source of value for 
works of art is in the values of certain kinds of subjective experience.   
The value of a sharp knife may be instrumental, for example a cheese knife may be good 
because it is good to eat cheese and a cheese knife can help one do this.  Nevertheless, the 
cheese knife is a good cheese knife because it has certain physical properties such as 
sharpness.  The aesthetic values of art, as I will argue, are instrumental values that derive 
from the values of aesthetic experiences, and at the same time supervene on ontologically 
objective properties of art objects, just as the value of the cheese knife derives from the 
value of eating cheese, and supervenes on properties of the knife. 
2.3.2 Subjectivity 
Judgments about the aesthetic values of a work ŽĨ Ăƌƚ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƌŵĂůůǇ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
subjective experiences of the work, and yet they often imply universal validity: when one 
judges a work as being aesthetically valuable, one often implies that the work possesses 
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aesthetic values which others may also experience in the work (I explain this in §2.4.1).  But 
this objective assessment of the work cannot capture the subjective character of 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŝƐŶŽƌŵĂůůǇďĂƐĞĚŽŶŽŶĞ ?ƐƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ
experiences of the work.   
Aesthetic experiences of works of art are subjective in at least the sense that there is 
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ůŝŬĞ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞŵ ?  EĂŐĞů ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ůŝŬĞ ? ďǇ
means of the example (which I have already alluded to) of what it is like to be a bat as 
something that cannot be experienced by humans who lack the ability to perceive the world 
via echolocation.44  /ŶĐŝĚĞŶƚĂůůǇ ?ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚǁĞĚŽůĂĐŬƚŚŝƐĂďŝů ƚǇ ?ďƵƚEĂŐĞů ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚ
does not depend on that assumption: the thought is that different species do of course 
perceive the world differently due to differences in sensory and cognitive apparatus, and 
this means that other beings have subjective, phenomenal experiences that we have no 
access to, certainly not from a third person point of view.45   
dŚŝƐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŝƐƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ƋƵĂůŝĂ ?ĂŶĚŝƐƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝŶŐĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ
of phenomenal consciousness, and so it is a feature of the phenomenally conscious 
aesthetic experience of a work of art.  Nagel argues that a reductive analysis of the mind 
which is compatible with the absence of qualia cannot account for the presence of qualia, 
and since an objective description of bats cannot capture the subjective character of what it 
is like to be a bat, it cannot account for bat qualia and cannot therefore be a complete 
                                                             
44 NAGEL 1974. 
45 See STROFFREGEN, Thomas A. and PITTENGER, John B. Human echolocation as a basic form of perception 
and action. Ecological psychology, 7:3, 1995: 181-216. 
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description of the nature of bats.46  Similarly, aesthetic experiences have an irreducible 
subjective character just because they are phenomenally conscious experiences.   
Just as what it is like to be a bat is something accessible only to a creature that perceives via 
echolocation, what it is like for one to aesthetically experience an art work might seem to be 
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŶŽƚĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌƉŽŝŶƚƐŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
aesthetic experience ŽĨ Ă ƚĂůĞ ŽĨ ƌŽŵĂŶĐĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů
capacities, or perhaps personal values or associations, although such things might arguably 
be a distraction from the work.   
If we judge a work to be beautiful on the basis of experiencing it in a certain way, and we 
are prone to find the way we experience art to be quite personal, we might form the view 
that the work is only beautiful in a subjective sense, and that there is nothing ontologically 
objective that might justify another subject experiencing the work in one way rather than 
another.  This may, however, be a misapprehension due to the subjectivity of aesthetic 
experience, and consistent with the objectivity of aesthetic values in art.  
One might be inclined to say that we ought not to take our subjective experiences of works 
of art to generalise and that no way of experiencing a work is more appropriate than 
another.  On the other hand, I am inclined to maintain that some aesthetic experiences of a 
work give one better access to the objective aesthetic capacities of a work than others, but 
it is unclear how this can be so given the subjectivity of aesthetic experience: how can we 
ŵĂŬĞĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐŝĨĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞ
based on subjective experiences? 
                                                             
46 NAGEL 1974, pp. 436-7. 
 61  
 
Perhaps the answer is simple: some subjective impressions of the aesthetic values of works 
ŽĨ Ăƌƚ ĂƌĞ ũƵƐƚ ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶ ? ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ďĂƐŝŶŐ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ ŽŶ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
subjective experiences of a work, one should focus only on describing the objective 
aesthetic properties of the work.  Suppose that Smith and Jones respond very differently to 
the same film: Smith laughs at the scenes that make Jones cry, and cries at the scenes that 
make Jones laugh; their aesthetic experiences are largely dissimilar.  On the basis of their 
own responses to the film, Smith and Jones will likely form contrary aesthetic value 
judgments about it.  Supposing that Smith and Jones attempt to make universally valid 
aesthetic value judgments about the film which cannot both be true, at least one of these 
ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐǁŝůůďĞŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶ ?/ĨƚŚĞƐĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶĞĂĐŚƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨ
the film then it seems that at least one of the two subjects responded incorrectly to the film.   
But this seems tŽŐŽĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞŶƐĞƉůĂƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ  ‘ďĞĂƵƚǇŝƐ ŝŶƚŚĞĞǇĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ďĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? P ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŵĂŬĞƐ ŝƚ ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚ
ƵŶƉĂůĂƚĂďůĞƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚŽŶĞ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨĂǁŽƌŬŵĂǇďĞĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? /ŶƚŚŝƐ
dissertation I argue that aesthetic experiences of works of art can be deficient and that this 
explains many cases in which subjects respond differently and form different value 
judgments about the same work of art.  And yet, I acknowledge a grain of truth in the 
common sense platitude, which is roughly that aesthetic values lie, as it were, in the 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ĞǇĞŽĨƚŚĞďĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƌƚǁŽƌŬ ?/
will now consider the judgments involved in the paradox of taste, which as I have 
mentioned seem to imply a universal validity which can seem at odds with the subjectivity 
of aesthetic experience.  
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2.4 Aesthetic Judgments 
Aesthetic values are the subject of aesthetic value judgments, and an analysis of aesthetic 
value judgments may aid the analysis of aesthetic values.  The practice of evaluating a work 
of art aesthetically involves forming judgments on the basis of experiences of the work in 
question.  In theory this might involve forming judgments on the basis of somebody else ?Ɛ
experience of the work in question, without experiencing it for oneself.  In chapter 7 I argue 
ƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůǇƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽůĞĂƌŶĂďŽƵƚĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐŝŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ ?hƐƵĂůůǇ ?
however, one will make aesthetic value judgments on the basiƐŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨ
a work. 
Hume, as I have described, suggests that our aesthetic value judgments about works of art 
are based on sentimental responses to the works.  Kant gives an account of aesthetic values 
ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƚŽ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ ǁĂǇƐ ? ŝŶ ǁhich he claims that aesthetic value judgments are 
based on cognitive and imaginative experiences.47  On both views aesthetic value judgments 
are taken to be based on some kind of experience which we may identify as aesthetic 
experience. 
Both views are attempts to reconcile the two species of common sense according to which, 
on the one hand, beauty is merely a subjective feeling that we can have, and on the other 
hand, something can be beautiful for people in general even if they do not find it to be so.48  
In other words, both Hume and Kant attempt to address the paradox of taste which I 
described in §2.3.   
                                                             
47 KANT 1951, p.51 (§9). 
48 HUME 1985, p. 229-31. 
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TŚĞůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚŝŶ<ĂŶƚ ?ƐƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇŽĨũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐŝƐĂƵƐĞĨƵů
starting point for an investigation into aesthetic value judgments and their objects.  Kant 
ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞĂďŽƵƚĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŽƌǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůƐ ‘ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ
ŽĨƚĂƐƚĞ ? ? ŝƐƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĨŽƵƌĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ PƚŚĞǇĂƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ?
they make a claim to universal validity; and they are non-conceptual.  I will now explain each 
of these features in turn to demonstrate how an understanding of aesthetic value 
judgments can aid the analysis of aesthetic values.  Following this, I will describe the other 
features of  
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&/'hZ ? ?<Ed ?^dyONOMY OF JUDGMENTS 
 
 Judgments that... ...are based on 
disinterested 
feelings 
...are based on 
non-disinterested 
feelings 
...are not based on 
feelings 
 
...make a claim to 
universal validity 
based on concepts 
  
 
Moral Judgments 
Empirical Judgments 
and Logical Judgments 
(both of which are 
Cognitive Judgments) 
 
...make a claim to 
universal validity 
not based on 
concepts 
 
Aesthetic Value 
Judgments 
 ?Žƌ ‘:ƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ
dĂƐƚĞ ? ? 
  
 
...make no claim to 
universal validity 
   
Judgments of 
Agreeableness 
  
 65  
 
Kant ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂů ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞ ?  DƵĐŚ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚ <ĂŶƚ ƐĂǇƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
judgments and experiences is plausible and can be incorporated into the Moderate 
Aesthetic Objectivism that I defend.  
/Ŷ <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇ ?  ‘ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƚĂƐƚĞ ? ĂƌĞ ũƵƐƚ ŽŶĞ ƚǇƉĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ? ? Ă
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇǁŚŝĐŚĂůƐŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞƐƵďůŝŵĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ/ǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐ ?/ǁŝůů
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ ƚŽ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉŚƌĂƐĞ  ‘ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŽ ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ ǁŚĂƚ <ĂŶƚ ĐĂůůƐ Ă
 ‘ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚĂƐƚĞ ? ?  &ŝŐƵƌĞ  ? ƐƵŵŵĂƌŝƐĞs what Kant understands these judgments to 
involve compared to other types of judgment.  I will now explain this information. 
Aesthetic value judgments are, according to Kant, based on subjective feelings of pleasure 
or displeasure.49  This is something that he claims they share in common with moral 
ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ P ŽŶĞ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞƐ ĂŶ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ŵŽƌĂůůǇ ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů Žƌ
disapproval in response to it.50  In fact it seems that one can evaluate an act morally by 
applying moral principles, without experiencing  any  particular  feelings, but  at  least  
sometimes  one  does base ŽŶĞ ?ƐŵŽƌĂůũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚŽŶĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞǁŚĞŶŽŶĞũƵĚŐĞƐ
something to be wrong because one is disgusted by it. 
2.4.1 Aesthetic Value Judgments 
Unlike moral judgments and judgments about what one finds agreeable, Kant claims that 
aesthetic value judgments are based on disinterested feelings.51  This means that the 
feelings are independent of personal desires, and they are impartial responses to objects.  
Compare judgments oĨĂŐƌĞĞĂďůĞŶĞƐƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ďŽƵŶĐǇĐĂƐƚůĞƐĂƌĞĨƵŶ ? P
                                                             
49 KANT 1951, p. 37 (§1). 
50 KANT 1951, p. 44 (§5). 
51 KANT 1951, pp. 38-43 (§§2-4). 
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this judgment is likely to be tied up with a desire to bounce up and down on an inflatable 
castle, and therefore is not a judgment that will be made by somebody who lacks this 
desire, or who has certain other desires or interests. 
So far I have mentioned aesthetic value judgments, moral judgments and judgments of 
agreeableness, all of which Kant claims are based on feelings: one judges that something is 
thus and so based on how that thing makes one feel.  Aesthetic value judgments can be 
distinguished from the other two types of judgment because the feelings they are based on 
are supposed to be disinterested.  Judgments of agreeableness can be distinguished from 
the other two because they make no claim to universal validity: when one judges something 
to be agreeable, one does not call upon others to agree.  But when one ascribes moral or 
aesthetic values to something, one does, Kant claims, call upon others to ascribe the same 
values to the same objects.52   
&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶƐĂǇŝŶŐ ‘ŝƚŝƐǁƌŽŶŐƚŽƐĞƚĨŝƌĞƚŽĐĂƚƐĨŽƌĨƵŶ ?ŽŶĞŝŵƉůŝĞƐƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞŽƚŚĞƌ
than oneself should believe this or at least act according to it by refraining from setting fire 
to cats for fun.  Similarly, Kant says that wheŶŽŶĞĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚŝƐŽďũĞĐƚŝƐďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ?ŽŶĞ
implies that others ought to find the object beautiful.  Aesthetic and moral judgments 
therefore share a normativity that is lacking in judgments of agreeableness.  Such universal 
validity is also implied by judgments made in the sciences, for example geometrical 
judgments: if one judges that something has a particular geometry, one implies that others 
ought to ascribe the very same geometry to the same object, and that if they fail to do so 
they are in a state of ignorance. 
                                                             
52 KANT 1951, pp. 46-8 (§7). 
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What separates judgments of taste from cognitive and moral judgments (apart from 
disinterested feelings), according to Kant, is that the universal validity of judgments of taste 
is non-conceptual.53  This means that they are not judgments about what kind of thing 
something is.  Claiming that X is beautiful does not involve identifying it as, for example, a 
rose, and then judging it to be a beautiful example of that kind of flower.   
Malcolm Budd takes issue with this requirement for judgments of taste, arguing that it 
ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ Ă ƌŽƐĞ ĂƐ Ă ƌŽƐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ǇĞƚ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƌŽƐĞ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌŵ
independently of its being the form of a rose.   Budd therefore charitably interprets Kant as 
saying merely that the kind of thing an object is must not figure in our reflection on its form, 
when it comes to forming aesthetic value judgments.54  I can judge that a rose is beautiful 
while being aware that it is a rose, but my judgment should be based on the feelings I get 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌŽƐĞ ?ƐĨŽƌŵ ?ĂŶĚnot from its identity as a rose.  
According to Kant, then, aesthetic value judgments are disinterested assessments of how 
the form of an object makes one feel.  In judging on the basis of this that an object is 
beautiful, one implies that others ought to find it beautiful too.  As well as locating aesthetic 
value judgments in a general taxonomy of judgments, Kant gives an account of the feelings, 
or aesthetic experiences, on which such judgments are based.  I will now briefly explain this 
view, as in chapteƌ  ? / ĚƌĂǁ ŽŶ <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞƚŽ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ŚŽǁ Ă
work may be aesthetically valuable in virtue of the values of aesthetic experiences it is apt 
to produce. 
                                                             
53 KANT 1951, p. 46 (§7). 
54 BUDD, Malcolm. The pure judgement of taste as an aesthetic reflective judgement. The British Journal of 
Aesthetics, 41:3, 2001: 247-260; p. 253. 
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2.5 Aesthetic Experience 
The pleasure of beauty, according to Kant, is a conscious awareness of the harmonious 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉůĂǇŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉůĂǇŝƐƐĂŝĚƚŽŝŶǀŽůǀĞƚŚĞ
imagination arousing the understanding, and the understanding then regulating the 
imagination: 
If the determining ground of our judgement as to this universal 
communicability of the representation is to be merely subjective, i.e. is 
conceived independently of any concept of the object, it can be 
nothing else than the state of mind, which is to be met with in the 
relation of our reprĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌƐƚŽĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ? 
The cognitive powers, which are involved by this representation, are 
here in free play, because no definite concept limits them to a 
particular rule of cognition. Hence, the state of mind in this 
representation must be a feeling of the free play of the representative 
powers in a given representation with reference to a cognition in 
general. Now a representation by which an object is given, that is to 
become a cognition in general, requires imagination, for the gathering 
together the manifold of intuition, and understanding, for the unity of 
the concept uniting the representations.55  
<ĂŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŵƉůĞǆƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇƐŝŶƚŚĞĂďŽǀĞĐĂŶďĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚ
with that of various contemporary writers on the subject (for example Kathleen Stock), who 
claim that imagination is a type of unasserted mental representation: one imagines that P 
                                                             
55 KANT 1951, p. 52 (§9). 
 69  
 
by entertaining the thought that P but not, as with a belief, assenting to the proposition that 
P.56  ĞƐƉŝƚĞ ŶŽƚ ĐĂƉƚƵƌŝŶŐ <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ Ƶnderstanding of the imagination, the notion that to 
imagine that P is to entertain, without asserting, that P, may be compatible with a certain 
Kant-inspired psychology of aesthetic experience. 
As with representations which are asserted or assented to, imaginings can generate 
experiences involving other mental states such as beliefs, emotions and quasi-perceptions.  
Roughly-speaking, the interaction between (what he calls) imagination and understanding is 
what characterises the aesthetic experience of beauty according to Kant, and it is a source 
of pleasure: 
This merely subjective (aesthetical) judging of the object, or of the 
representation by which it is given, precedes the pleasure in it, and is 
the ground of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties; 
but on the universality of the subjective conditions for judging of 
objects is alone based the universal subjective validity of the 
satisfaction bound up by us with the representation of the object that 
we call beautiful.57 
ƵĚĚ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛidea of the experience of beauty as a balance between order and 
complexity: the imagination thrives on the complexity of the beautiful object, whereas the 
understanding thrives on simple orderliness, and regulates the experiences produced by the 
imagination.58  
                                                             
56 ^dK< ?<ĂƚŚůĞĞŶ ?dŚĞZŽůĞŽĨ/ŵĂŐŝŶŝŶŐŝŶ^ĞĞŝŶŐ ?/Ŷ ?The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 66:4, 2008: 
365-380. 
57 KANT 1951, pp. 52-3 (§9). 
58 BUDD 2001, p. 258. 
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The end result of this harmony between the imagination and the understanding in the 
aesthetic experience of beauty is, Kant claims, a feeling of purposiveness without purpose: 
the form of the beautiful object is appreciated as if it had been designed to fulfil a definite 
purpose (that is, some purpose other than that of producing this feeling of purposiveness), 
when in fact it need have no definite purpose.59  As I will attempt to demonstrate, a non-
Kantian conception of imagination as unasserted mental representation can form part of a 
conception of aesthetic experience as involving something rather like what Kant seems to 
ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽŝŶŚŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƉƵƌƉŽƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ? 
Kant focuses on beauty in nature rather than in art, and so on his view this feeling of 
purposiveness might be something like the feeling that many theists claim to have upon 
apprehending objects in nature: they compare natural objects to man-made things, for 
example William Paley compares nature to a watch, arguing that it has the appearance of 
design which is best explained by it having been designed by some intelligent being, just like 
a watch.60   
Assuming, as I do, that natural objects are not designed, it may be true that our appreciation 
of their beauty nevertheless involves appreciating their form as if it were designed to 
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŐŝǀĞŶ<ĂŶƚ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞ
non-conceptual, it is unclear exactly how one might aesthetically appreciate something as if 
it were designed to fulfil a purpose, as it seems this might involve conceiving of it as having 
such a purpose.  But perhaps it need not involve this: one might have similar feelings 
occasioned by a natural object to the feelings one might have when conceiving of an object 
                                                             
59 KANT 1951, pp. 55-6 (§10). 
60 PALEY, William. Natural Theology; Or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from 
the Appearances of Nature by William Paley, Dd... FC and J. Rivington, 1819. 
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as having been designed to perform a function, without the feelings in the former case 
depending on any such conception.  Similarly, one can respond to sad music as one would 
respond to a sad person, without conceiving of the music as actually feeling anything.  Derek 
Matravers describes this as responding to music with the non-representational aspect of an 
emotion that one might have in response to something that is genuinely sad, in a way that 
abstract sounds cannot be.61  I discuss emotions in music in §4.4.5.  
2.5.1 Aesthetic Pleasure 
The judgment that something is beautiful is, according to Kant, the judgment that people in 
general ought to respond to it with a subjective feeling of purposiveness, which results from 
the harmonious interplay between our imagination and our understanding: 
 ?ŝƚŝƐƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵĞŶƚĂůƐƚĂƚĞŝŶ
the given representation which, as the subjective condition of the 
judgement of taste, must be fundamental, and must have the pleasure 
in the objĞĐƚĂƐŝƚƐĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ ? 
 ?dŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞ ŽĨ
representation in a judgement of taste, since it is to be possible 
without presupposing a definite concept, can refer to nothing else 
than the state of mind in the free play of the Imagination and the 
hŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ? 
 ?dŚĞ ƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĨĞĞů ŝƐ ? ŝŶ Ă ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚĂƐƚĞ ? ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ
imputed by us to everyone else; as if, when we call a thing beautiful, it 
                                                             
61 MATRAVERS, Derek. Art and emotion.  Oxford University Press, 1998. 
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is to be regarded as a characteristic of the object which is determined 
in it according to concepts; though beauty, without a reference to the 
ĨĞĞůŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ŝƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐďǇŝƚƐĞůĨ ? 
 ? ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĂƐƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌĂŶĚĂƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶǁŝƚŚ
others, yet has an agreement with the conditions of universality which 
it is the business of the understanding to supply, brings the cognitive 
faculties into that proportionate accord which we require for all 
ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƐŽƌĞŐĂƌĚĂƐŚŽůĚŝŶŐĨŽƌĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ?62   
<ĂŶƚ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŽƚŚĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽn of objects is rather more 
ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ƚŚĂŶ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƌĞ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƌĞ ŽĨ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ƚĂƐƚĞ ?  ŶŽƚŚĞƌ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ,ƵŵĞ ĂŶĚ <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ,ƵŵĞ
emphasizes the sentiments of the ideal critic in ideal conditions, whereas Kant claims that 
we are all similar enough that something can be beautiful if it is disposed to produce 
particular feelings in any one of us, whether or not we meet the criteria for ideal criticism.63  
On the one hand, Hume has ideas about how we can apprehend works of art objectively and 
have feelings which are based on the minute details of their forms, rather than on what our 
minds project onto them.  Kant, on the other hand, focuses largely on what is going on in 
the mind of somebody undergoing an aesthetic experience, and has a specific idea of which 
feelings are beauty experiences and which are not.    
/ǁŝůůŶŽǁŵŽǀĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶ
of the ideal critic and a Kant-inspired notion of aesthetic enjoyment, which I will argue can 
                                                             
62 KANT 1951, pp. 51-4 (§9). 
63 KANT 1951, pp. 75-6 (§21). 
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account for the conflicting intuitions that comprise the paradox of taste.  In doing so I make 
ŶŽ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŽ ďĞŝŶŐ ĨĂŝƚŚĨƵů ƚŽ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ,ƵŵĞ Žƌ <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶ
various ways are in opposition.  Rather, I merely propose an ideal observer theory which 
emphasises the importance of some form of imagination in the appreciation of the aesthetic 
values of art. 
Kant makes further remarks about aesthetic value judgments regarding what he calls their 
 ‘ƉƵƌƉŽƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ? ?  / ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ Ĩ ƉƵƌƉŽƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ŝŶ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ  ?, but 
again, /ǁŝůůŶŽƚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞŽƌĚĞĨĞŶĚ<ĂŶƚ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ
in its entirety.  As described in §2.4, the account does suggest what might distinguish 
aesthetic evaluation from other sorts of evaluation, namely that aesthetic evaluation is 
based on disinterested feelings and is non-conceptual and implies universal validity; this in 
turn may distinguish aesthetic values from other sorts of value.   
For instance, perhaps moral evaluation necessarily involves conceptual classification, for 
example classifying an act as harmful, whereas aesthetic evaluation might not.  Perhaps 
moral evaluation or the evaluation of something as agreeable or disagreeable depends on 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƐŽƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝŶĂǁĂǇƚŚĂƚĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚ ?/ƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇƐĞĞŵƐ
right that when ascribing aesthetic values to an object one should pay attention to how it 
feels to experience the object, in a way that would be inappropriate when making many 
empirical or logical judgments, for example in the sciences.  Lastly and most importantly for 
my purposes, it seems that at least some of our aesthetic value judgments, for example 
those which are expressed in critical reviews, imply a universal validity that is at odds with 
the widespread intuition that beauty is in the eye of the beholder.  I will now consider to 
what extent Kant was right in his characterization of aesthetic experience, and introduce the 
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notion that aesthetic values in art can be identified with the capacity to cause us to take 
pleasure in our aesthetic experience of a work. 
I agree with Kant at least to the extent that aesthetic experiences, roughly, are a type of 
experience that we can enjoy, involving the interaction of distinct cognitive faculties, which 
some works of art can elicit.  I will argue in chapter 4 that the involvement of the three 
elements of pleasure, understanding and some form of imagination, is an appropriate way 
to characterise the distinctiveness of (positive) aesthetic experience.  In that chapter I will 
also argue that the inclusion of pleasure in such a characterisation is not threatened by 
observations that there are good works which quite deliberately induce unpleasant feelings 
such as fear or sadness. 
We have aesthetic experiences when we engage with works of art, with parts of nature such 
as sunsets, and perhaps with other things such as mathematical proofs.  One interpretation 
of aesthetic value judgments is that they are about the instrumental values of objects to 
produce intrinsically valuable aesthetic experiences.  This is a view that Robert Stecker 
endorses and identifies as a minimal assumption of various theories of aesthetic values 
which analyse them in terms of aesthetic experiences.64Corrected thesis.docx - _ftn40  These 
ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞ:ĞƌƌŽůĚ>ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐǁŚŝĐŚ/ĚƌĂǁŽŶŝŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?and also Kendall tĂůƚŽŶ ?Ɛ 
and ZŽŐĞƌ^ĐƌƵƚŽŶ ?Ɛ, both of which I draw on in chapter 4.65  
                                                             
64 STECKER, Robert. Aesthetic experience and aesthetic value. Philosophy Compass, 1:1, 2006: 1-10; p. 4. 
65 LEVINSON, J.  The Pleasures of Aesthetics.  Cornell University Press, 1996.        
SCRUTON, Roger.  Art and Imagination: a study in the philosophy of mind.  Methuen & co. Ltd., 1974. 
WALTON, Kendall L. How marvellous! Toward a theory of aesthetic value. Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, 51:3, 1993: 499-510. 
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If aesthetic experience can be identified not as the ordinary experience of distinctively 
aesthetic properties, but rather as a distinctively aesthetic state of mind, the causes of 
which are mundane properties which (in an appropriate engagement with a valuable work 
ŽĨ Ăƌƚ ) ŵĂǇ ďĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ĂƐ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ? ? ƚŚĞŶ ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ
aesthetic values as objective in the sense that they supervene on response-independent 
properties of objects which have the instrumental value of being apt to produce valuable 
aesthetic responses.  A broad range of objects may be instrumentally valuable in this way.  A 
sunset may be beautiful because, say, its colours are capable of making a human being 
undergo a valuable aesthetic experience.   For a novel the beauty-making features may be 
themes and ideas which, when understood, can produce valuable aesthetic experiences.  
2.5.3 Combining Ideas from Kant and Hume 
Hume believes that beautiful works of art are naturally fitted to arouse sentiments of 
beauty for ideal critics in ideal conditions, and that this is what makes such works beautiful. 
In some sense, then, beauty is in the eye of the beholder because it is realised by subjective, 
sentimental experiences, or rather dependent on our capacity to respond with such 
experiences.  But the objective features of art objects are important, and not just anything 
can qualify as beautiful; not only must the work produce beauty sentiments, it must be 
naturally fitted to do so.  I attempt to make sense of this natural fit in §3.4.4.   
It seems possible to have an Ideal Observer Theory in which the relevant ideal responses are 
those that spring from a harmonious interplay between the intellect and the imagination.  
Accounts like this have been attempted.  For example, Richard Miller has a Kant-inspired 
theory of aesthetic experience as a learning-like process in which a work of art engages the 
intellect in the pursuit of some elusive goal, so that the work might be described as 
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purposive but without purpose.66  The learning-like process resembles learning in certain 
respects, but need not involve actual learning; I explain this in further detail in §4.1.3.  
Having endorsed this Kant-inspired view of aesthetic experience, Miller then appeals to 
,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨthe ideal critic in ideal conditions as the standard of taste, but for 
judgments based on these learning-like experiences.67   
For Miller, aesthetic values are dispositions to produce enjoyable learning-like experiences, 
and the standard of taste is the highest amount of pleasure that can be had from such an 
experience, by an ideal critic in ideal conditions.68  It is thought to be a matter of fact just 
how pleasurable such an experience can be for an ideal critic, and so Miller has an account 
which tries to show that aesthetic values are objective by drawing elements from both 
<ĂŶƚ ?ƐĂŶĚ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ? 
/Ŷ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ  ? / ƚĂŬĞ DŝůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ĂƐ ĂŶ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ ĂŶ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
experience might be valuable, but for now I mention it only to demonstrate that certain 
ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞ ?  <ĂŶƚ ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐ ŽŶ ǁŚĂƚ
aesthetic judgments and experiences involve, whereas Hume focuses on what standards can 
be brought to bear on aesthetic judgments and experiences, so that we might identify some 
of them as deficient and non-indicative of the aesthetic values of works of art. 
My Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism, and the extent to which it borrows from Hume and 
<ĂŶƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ?ǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞĐůĞĂƌĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚǁŽĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ ?/ŶĐŚĂpter 3 I will argue 
that aesthetic values are moderately objective in the sense that they are realized by 
                                                             
66 MILLER, Richard W. Three versions of objectivity: aesthetic, moral, and scientific.  In LEVINSON, Jerrold (ed.) 
Aesthetics and ethics: Essays at the intersection. Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 26-58. 
67 MILLER 2001, p. 40. 
68 MILLER 2001, p. 41. 
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properties naturally fitted to please human sensibilities.  In chapter 4 I will argue that the 
pleasure or displeasure of distinctively aesthetic experiences of works of art is primary in 
the constitution of the aesthetic values of those works. 
2.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have identified thick and thin varieties of aesthetic values in art and 
suggested that what is captured by the descriptive elements of thick aesthetic value 
predicates may be that in virtue of which an art work falls under not only those thick 
concepts but also the thin aesthetic value concepts of beauty and ugliness.  In other words, 
works of art may be beautiful or ugly in virtue of their properties.  However, aesthetic value 
judgments about works of art seem essentially to be based on the subjective experiences 
they cause us to have, and this suggests that a work may be aesthetically valuable insofar as 
it can make us have certain kinds of experience.  These observations are captured in the 
paradoxical common-sense understanding of taste, according to which aesthetic values in 
art are subjective and yet we can misattribute them.  Hume recognised this and offered a 
solution which can be construed as a type of Response-Dependence, and which will form 
the basis for the Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism I defend in the remaining chapters of this 
ĚŝƐƐĞƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?  / ǁŝůů ŶŽǁ ďĞŐŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ǁŝƚŚ ĂŵŽƌĞ ĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ ĞǆƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ
account. 
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3. Humean Response-Dependence  
3.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I begin to develop an account of aesthetic values in art that addresses the 
ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŽĨƚĂƐƚĞǁŚŝĐŚ/ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐƌĞǀŝƐŝŶŐ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ
of taste to account for different critics in ideal circumstances experiencing a work as having 
different aesthetic values, without this precluding the ontological objectivity of aesthetic 
ǀĂůƵĞƐŝŶĂƌƚ ?/ĂůƐŽƌĞǀŝƐĞƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ>ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶto what he 
ĐĂůůƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?69  I suggest that the standard of taste should be interpreted as a 
form of Response-Dependence, and I defend my own Humean Response-Dependence thesis 
from the charge that it is viciously circular or uninformative.  I argue that critics in ideal 
circumstances can be described as detectors of aesthetic values-as-dispositions.  I defend 
this dispositional analysis from some initial objections.   
3.1 The Standard of Taste 
/Ŷ  ? ? ? ? /ďĞŐĂŶƚŽ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂŶdard of taste, according to which a 
work of art is beautiful insofar as it produces sentiments of beauty in ideal circumstances.  
Ɛ WĂƵů ŽŐŚŽƐƐŝĂŶ ĂŶĚ ĂǀŝĚ sĞůůĞŵĂŶ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ƚŽ  “ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ?  ?Žƌ ŶŽƌŵĂů )
conditions, the dichotomy between types oĨ  ‘ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ƚǇƉĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌ ? ŝƐ
unnecessary: characteristics of an observer and of the conditions in which an observer 
stands are all circumstances relevant to whether one is a normal or ideal observer with 
                                                             
69 >s/E^KE ?:ĞƌƌŽůĚ ?,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨƚĂƐƚĞ PƚŚĞƌĞĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?The journal of aesthetics and art criticism, 
60:3, 2002: 227-238. 
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respect to that which she observes.70  I ǁŝůů ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ ƚŽ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉŚƌĂƐĞ  ‘ŝĚĞĂů
ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŽŶĞŝƐĂŶŝĚĞĂůĐƌŝƚŝĐŝŶŝĚĞĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ
(I will explain what this means shortly).   
/Ŷ ŽƵƚůŝŶŝŶŐ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ / ǁŝůů ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĐůĂƌŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ƚŚĂƚ I wish to defend, which is 
ůĂƌŐĞůǇŝŶĚĞďƚĞĚƚŽ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ?ďƵƚ/ĚŽŶŽƚǁŝƐŚƚŽďĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽĂůůĂŶĚŽŶůǇǁŚĂƚ,ƵŵĞ
claims about art and value, or even to claim to be giving an accurate interpretation of 
,ƵŵĞ ?ƐĞƐƐĂǇ ?DǇƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŚĞƌĞŝƐƐŝŵƉůǇƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂ plausible account of aesthetic values 
in art which might succeed in resolving the paradox of taste, which seems to have been 
,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶ ?  / ǁŝůů ĚƌĂǁ ŚĞĂǀŝůǇ ŽŶ ŵǇ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,ƵŵĞ ? ďƵƚ ĂŶǇŽŶĞ ǁŚŽ
disagrees with my interpretation may regard my own account simply as less derivative (of 
Hume at least) than I think it is.  I will argue that the aesthetic responses a critic would have 
ƚŽ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ Ăƌƚ ŝŶ ŝĚĞĂů ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ĂƌĞ Ă ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ
relative to human sensibilities.   
,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ŽĨ ƚĂƐƚĞ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ-Dependence 
biconditional: 
,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨdĂƐƚĞ: A work is beautiful if and only if the joint verdict of 
critics in ideal circumstances would be that the work is beautiful.71  
Such a view, being a type of Response-Dependence, seems to involve analysing the concept 
 ‘ďĞĂƵƚǇ ? ĂƐ ƐŚĂƉĞĚ ďǇ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ƚŽ ǁŽƌŬƐ ŽĨ Ăƌƚ ? ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐ ǁŚŝĐŚ
features of which works the concept falls upon (I explained this in §1.3.2).   
                                                             
70 BOGHOSSIAN & VELLEMAN 1989, p. 84. 
71 HUME 1985, p. 241. 
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A critic in ideal circumstances is an idealised human being in a state of epistemic objectivity, 
with barriers to veridical perception and objective appreciation removed, allowing her 
dispositions to respond, which constitute her sensibility, to manifest in her aesthetic 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨĂǁŽƌŬŽĨĂƌƚ ? ĞĨŽƌĞ /ĐŽŵĞƚŽ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ůŝƐƚŽĨĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞƚŽ
ƐƵĐŚĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ŚĞƌĞĂŐĂŝŶŝƐZĂŝůƚŽŶ ?ƐůŝƐƚŽĨĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶǁŚĂƚ
/ĂŵĐĂůůŝŶŐ ‘ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ?ĂƐ/ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŚem in §1.1: 
1. The ability to reliably detect things. 
2. The ability to reason well. 
3. The ability to be impartial or disinterested.72 
Hume summarises the characteristics of the ideal critic as follows: 
Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by 
comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable 
character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true 
standard of taste and beauty.73  
Hume characterises the ideal critic as having the above five characteristics.  He also claims 
that ideal circumstances will involve being in the right mood and paying attention.74   
3.1.1 Ideal Circumstances 
It seems to be an empirical question whether something is helpful in allowing observers to 
recognise and appreciate what we might suppose are aesthetically valuable works of art.  I 
believe that such questions are best answered by empirical research that I am perhaps not 
                                                             
72 RAILTON 2001, pp. 63-5. 
73 HUME 1985, p. 241. 
74 HUME 1985, pp. 232-3. 
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qualified to evaluate, let alone conduct.  But Levinson plausibly hypothesises that we should 
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ  “ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ĂŶĚ  “ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŝƐƚ ŽĨ ŝĚĞĂů ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů
characteristics.75  He suggests, however, that this should not open the floodgates to just any 
revision to the criteria: 
 ?ŝĨ ǁĞ ŽƉĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŽƌ to expanding the list, can we justifiably exclude any 
objective virtue of a cognitive or affective sort, e.g., knowing the calculus, being 
kind to those in need, being sober and reliable, being a good listener, and so on? 
The answer is that we can, from our present vantage point, exclude those, since 
although admittedly virtues of some sort, they are not ones that have been found 
particularly helpful in recognizing and appreciating great works of art in any art 
form, whereas the marks that Hume proposes, and others that we might 
reasonably add, presumably have been.76  
tŚǇƉƌĞƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ‘ǀŝƌƚƵĞƐ ?ŚĂǀĞƉƌŽǀĞĚŚĞůƉĨƵůŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨŐƌĞĂƚĂƌƚ ? dŚŝƐƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽ>ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇƐŽŵĞ
masterpieces of art, and calibrate ideal circumstances so that they are conducive to the 
recognition and appreciation of the values of such works.  I defend this proposal in §3.3.1.  
Supposing that we can identify ideal circumstances by their conduciveness to the 
appreciation of particular works, whether a circumstance is conducive to this or not will be 
an empirical matter that I will not attempt to settle. 
/ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ĂĚŽƉƚ Ă  “ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ ŝƚ ƚĂŬĞƐ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝĚĞĂů ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ P ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ
circumstances turn out to bĞ ĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞ ƚŽ ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐ Ă ŚƵŵĂŶ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ƚŽ ŚĂƌǀĞƐƚ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ
                                                             
75 LEVINSON 2002, p. 237. 
76 LEVINSON 2002, p.237. 
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capacities to produce valuable aesthetic experiences; these are the ideal circumstances for 
the aesthetic experience of that work.  I say that work rather than works of art in general 
because it seems that ideal circumstances may vary for different works:  for example, one 
should perhaps watch a Horror film in the dark, whereas one should perhaps look at a 
painting in normal lighting conditions.  Doubtless it will appear vacuous to defend an ideal 
observer theory of values according to which ideal circumstances are whatever 
circumstances put one in touch with values, but in this chapter I will attempt to show that 
ƚŚŝƐ ŶĞĞĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ ǀĂĐƵŽƵƐ ?  &Žƌ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚ /ŚĂǀĞ ĐĂůůĞĚ Ă  “ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ ŝƚ ƚĂŬĞƐ ? 
conception of ideal circumstances, see §3.6.4.   
3.1.2 Ideal Circumstances for the Detection of Aesthetic Values 
/ĚĞĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂůůŽǁƚŚĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐŽĨĂǁŽƌŬƚŽŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ ŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
experience. The evaluations of a critic in ideal circumstances should not be seen as 
authoritative commands about what we should and should not appreciate in art; rather, 
aesthetic evaluations act as evidence that a work affords certain experiences.  
The closer these evaluations are to being made in ideal circumstances, the more informative 
ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ĂďŽƵƚ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐqua capacities to produce valuable aesthetic 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŝŶŝĚĞĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ƐĂŶĂƚŚůĞƚĞ ?ƐƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĨŝƚŶĞƐƐŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƐ ?ƐŽĚŽĞƐƚŚĞŝƌ
athletic performance.  Things might get in the way of good performance, such as 
psychological barriers, but improvements in fitness will, it seems, only ever contribute to 
ďĞƚƚĞƌƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇŶĞǀĞƌŵĂŬĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞǁŽƌƐĞ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŝŶĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĂĐƌŝƚŝĐ ?Ɛ
aesthetic sensibility relative to the ideal standard, for example an improved ability to make 
fine perceptual discriminations, has an analogous effect on her ability to experience the 
ideal aesthetic responses a work has the capacity to elicit.  Of course, I need to say more to 
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establish tŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ĂŶ ŝĚĞĂů ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ĂŶĚ Ă ƐĞŶƐĞ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ĨŝƚŶĞƐƐ ĐĂŶ
improve relative to that standard, as I will in due course. 
Identifying a set of conditions and characteristics as ideal for aesthetic appreciation allows 
us, at the very least, to share information with each other about the aesthetic experiences 
offered by a work in a particular set of circumstances.  For example, one can recommend a 
film to others on the basis that, if they view it under certain circumstances, such as being in 
a particular mood and focusing on certain features of the film, they are likely to find the 
experience of viewing the film a rewarding one.  Alternatively, one might assert truthfully, 
ƚŽ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĨĞůůŽǁ ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ǁŚŽ ĂƐ ĨĞůůŽǁ ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƐŚĂƌĞ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ŶĞƵƌŽ-chemical (and 
other) similarities, that they are likely to enjoy themselves if they take LSD and watch The 
Wizard of Oz.  But this does not necessarily imply that this is something that they should do, 
or that their enjoyment would be somehow be more appropriate than some other response 
they might have to the same film in different circumstances.   
Of course, it does not seem to be the case that the experiences people in general would 
tend to have watching a film under the influence of a powerful drug is indicative of that 
Ĩŝůŵ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ?dŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐĞĞŵƚŽďĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŵŝŐŚƚďĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚƌƵŐ
ǁŽƵůĚĚŽŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?/ƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞũƵƐƚĂƐƌĞǁĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ
view Plan 9 from Outer Space under the influence of LSD, even though the latter is often 
regarded as the worst film ever made.  Therefore, more needs to be said to explain what is 
ideal about ideal circumstances, as opposed to other circumstances which might be 
conducive to rewarding experiences. 
One might ĚĞĨĞŶĚŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂŵŽĚĞƐƚĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐƚŽ
the following claim about colour: if you view object O in circumstances C, it will probably 
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look green to you; that is not to say that O is green, merely that it will probably look green in 
C.  However, on a Humean account, ideal circumstances can do more than this, just as 
identifying normal circumstances in a Response-ĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŐƌĞĞŶ ? ĐĂŶ
arguably tell us which objects are green.  It seems that we can say that an object that looks 
green to normal subjects in normal lighting conditions is a green object, and I want to 
defend a similar view of aesthetic values such that the value of experiencing an art work in a 
particular set of circumstances is its objective aesthetic value.   
Before I can defend such a Humean account, there are two main problems that I will argue 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ŽĨ ƚĂƐƚĞ ?  &ŝƌƐƚůǇ ? ŝƚ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŚĂƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ŝĚĞĂů
critics in ideal conditions might experience the same work differently (Hume seems to 
acknowledge this but the explanation I propose is not his).77  Secondly, it is unclear why we 
who are not ideal critics should be interested in what ideal critics would appreciate, rather 
than for instance in what people on LSD might appreciate.  
3.2 Equally Valid Aesthetic Experiences  
A critic in ideal circumstances is in a state of epistemic objectivity conducive to the joint 
manifestation of dispositions possessed by a work of art and by the critic herself.  For 
example, human beings are normally disposed to be moved by expressions of sadness, so at 
least some works that have the property of being expressive of sadness will likely be 
ĚŝƐƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ďĞ ŵŽǀĞĚ ďǇ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ
sadness.    
But people differ, perhaps in ways that will be manifest in individual aesthetic experiences 
had by critics in ideal circumstances: for example, one person might be naturally disposed to 
                                                             
77 HUME 1985, p. 243-4. 
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respond to sadness with feelings of pity, whereas another person might be more inclined to 
respond with feelings of despair.  It is at least possible that some such differences of 
sensibility are not ruled out by ideal circumstances.  To define ideal circumstances such that 
this would not be possible might be to inappropriately rule out certain valuable ways of 
responding to a work having understood it correctly.  This becomes plausible given certain 
cases where it appears that experiencing a work differently to others is justified. 
One example might be a family film which aims to entertain children while simultaneously 
appealing to their parents.78  Suppose the film provides children with aesthetic experiences 
involving childish wonder and excitement, and provides their parents with satirical content 
and humour.  Children it seems can be in the circumstances ideal for the aesthetic 
experience at least of this sort of film, as can adults, but the sensibilities of children may be 
such that their experiences of the film are unavoidably different in content and value to 
those of adult critics in ideal circumstances.  Furthermore, the film is designed to offer both 
of these types of aesthetic experience, which perhaps cannot be had simultaneously.  This 
might be a problem for a Humean account of aesthetic values in art, as a critic in ideal 
circumstances might judge a film to be, say, merely satirical and amusing, when in fact it is 
also exciting and dramatic as it offers experiences of that sort to other critics in ideal 
ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?,ƵŵĞĚŽĞƐƚƌǇƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨŽƌǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůƐ ‘ďůĂŵĞůĞƐƐĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ/
describe his views on this in §5.3.2. 
As well as being apt to produce differently valuable aesthetic experiences for different 
critics in ideal circumstances, the same work might offer more than one distinct aesthetic 
experience to the same critic at different times.  For example the ideal first viewing of a film 
                                                             
78 Thanks to Tom Baker for this example. 
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might involve intense emotional experiences and reactions of surprise to events on-screen, 
whereas the ideal second viewing may involve an attention to details which had to be 
overlooked upon first viewing in order for the first experience to be as intense as it was.  It 
seems at least possible for a work to not only stand up to repeated viewings in ideal 
circumstances, but to reward repeated viewings by actually offering distinct valuable 
aesthetic experiences on different occasions, which one could not access without viewing 
the work more than once.   
A critic in ideal circumstances could read Wuthering Heights twice and experience it once as 
a Romantic novel and once as a Gothic novel.  Or these experiences might be had by 
different critics in ideal circumstances due to differences between the critics that are not 
ruled out by such circumstances.  Perhaps such a case should be understood as a case 
where there is more than one equally apt interpretation of the work; Gregory Currie argues 
that this can be the case for works of Literature.79  The value of the work cannot, on a 
Humean account, correspond to any one of a number of multiple interpretative responses it 
is apt to produce if these can take place in ideal circumstances.  To accommodate this 
apparent limit to the epistemic objectivity of critics in ideal circumstances, I will now suggest 
ĂƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶƚŽ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨƚĂƐƚĞ ? 
3.2.1 Ideal Circumstances for Aesthetic Experience 
I argue in chapter 4 that a work of art is aesthetically valuable insofar as aesthetic 
experiences of the work in ideal circumstances are themselves valuable.  But it should 
already be clear that aesthetically experiencing a work in ideal circumstances will not 
necessarily give one a comprehensive overview of all of a work's capacities to produce 
                                                             
79 CURRIE, Gregory. Interpretation and objectivity. Mind, 102:407, 1993: 413-428. 
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valuable ideal aesthetic experiences.  This is because the same work may be apt to produce 
distinct aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances on different occasions, or for different 
observers.  As I explain in chapter 5, such variety in the experiences of different critics does 
not necessarily amount to disagreement, and therefore does not necessarily amount to 
ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ĨĂƵůƚůĞƐƐ ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? But whether or not it involves disagreement, the 
possibility that critics in ideal circumstances could experience the same work differently 
suggests that ideal circumstances fall short of being circumstances of infallibility regarding 
the aesthetic values of a work of art.  I will now suggest a distinction between two sets of 
ideal circumstances, to account on the one hand for the fallibility of the critic in ideal 
circumstances as understood so far, and yet on the other hand to shore up the objectivity of 
aesthetic values on my account despite this fallibility. 
To form a comprehensive assessment of a work's aesthetic values one may need to move 
beyond one's own experience of a work at a particular time, and take into account the 
work's capacities to produce ideal aesthetic experiences other than that which one is 
currently undergoing.  Experiencing a work in ideal circumstances might therefore be 
inadequate for one to form a comprehensive overview of a work's aesthetic values.  For that 
reason, it seems there should be a distinction between two different purposes for which a 
ƐĞƚŽĨ ‘ŝĚĞĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ŵĂǇďĞdefined: the appreciation of aesthetic values in art; and 
the formation of a comprehensive overview of the aesthetic values of a work.  This 
distinction will help to clarify the extent of and the limits to the objectivity of aesthetic 
values in art on the account that I am constructing and defending.  
I will refer from now on to the ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience: the 
circumstances in whiĐŚ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ƐŽŵĞŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
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values of the work. I will refer to a critic in such circumstances as an ideal aesthetic 
experiencer.  To be an ideal aesthetic experiencer is to do all one can to use art for its 
intended purpose, which is to provide valuable aesthetic experiences.  One will be in an 
ideal state of epistemic objectivity, something along the lines of the criteria for ideal 
criticism that Hume suggests, relative to the work in question.  For example, one might 
watch a film in a dark theatre, in a calm state of mind, understanding the film completely, 
noticing its details and so on.  But as I have explained, this might only give one an 
incomplete knowledge of the work's array of aesthetic values.   Nonetheless, one will be in 
the optimum attainable position for the actual appreciation of aesthetic values of the art 
work in question.   
Appreciation here should be understood as an acquaintance with valuable features of the 
work and the undergoing of the relevant aesthetic experiences, for example the feeling of 
ďĞŝŶŐ  ‘ƐǁĞƉƚ ĂǁĂǇ ? ďǇ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵůůǇ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ŽĨ ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?  ĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
appreciation should be contrasted with aesthetic judgment, the formation of beliefs about 
aesthetic values in a work, evĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚŽŶĞ ?ƐĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŵĂǇŐŝǀĞŽŶĞŐŽŽĚŐƌŽƵŶĚƐ for 
an aesthetic judgment.  This distinction between appreciation and judgment will prove 
important in chapter 7, where I will argue that acquaintance with a work, while necessary 
for appreciation, may ŶŽƚ ďĞ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ĨŽƌ ŽŶĞ ƚŽ ƌĞůŝĂďůǇ ĨŽƌŵ Žƌ ƌĞǀŝƐĞ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
judgments of a work. 
3.2.2 Ideal Circumstances for Aesthetic Judgment 
dŽ ŐĞƚ Ă ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ŽŶĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ŵŽǀĞ
beyond one's perspectival limitations.  In other words, if the same work can produce 
differently valuable aesthetic experiences for different ideal aesthetic experiencers, then 
 89  
 
the aesthetic value judgments of one ideal aesthetic experiencer might only reflect some of 
ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝc values qua capacities to produce valuable aesthetic experiences in the 
circumstances ideal for aesthetic experience.  But if one can somehow be aware of all of 
these capacities of a work relative to all possible ideal aesthetic experiencers, one could 
then have a comprehensive picture of the aesthetic values of the work.  One could then, for 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ďĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨĂŐŽŽĚĨĂŵŝůǇĨŝůŵ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐƚŽƉůĞĂƐĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶĂŶĚŝƚƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐƚŽ
please adults, even though one cannot be both an adult and a child simultaneously and 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĐĂŶŶŽƚĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞĂůůŽĨƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ? 
I will from now on refer to a hypothetical critic who has fully succeeded in being 
comprehensively aware of a work's array of aesthetic values ? where not all of those values 
are manifest in any one ideal aesthetic experience of the work ? as a critic in the ideal 
circumstances for aesthetic judgment, or an ideal aesthetic judge.   
One who is in the ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience can get on with enjoying a 
work of art (or finding it to be unpleasant if it is ugly) without reflecting on whether one is in 
the ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience.  It may be the case that paying attention 
ƚŽŚŽǁŽŶĞ ?ƐĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂůǁŝůůŚĞůƉŽŶĞŵŽǀĞcloser to the ideal for 
the purpose of gaining access to especially valuable aesthetic experiences, but being in the 
circumstances is not something that one needs to be aware of in order to enjoy.  I am 
assuming Epistemic Externalism here, which I will briefly explain.   
Epistemic Externalism says that to be in a state of knowledge that P one does not need to be 
aware of being in such a state; a knowledge relationship can hold independently of whether 
one meets any of the conditions for being in a second knowledge relationship with the fact 
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that one is in the first.80  One does not need to know that one knows that P, in order simply 
to know that P.  One can therefore know what aesthetic values a work of art has without 
knowing that one knows this, and therefore without knowing that one is in the ideal 
circumstances for aesthetic judgment.  Similarly, one does not need to be aware that one is 
in the circumstances for the aesthetic experience of an art work, in order for one to be in 
those circumstances and thus to be in a position to aesthetically appreciate aspects of the 
work.  I will now some further clarifications of my Humean account as it stands thus far. 
3.2.3 Further Clarifications 
Another important clarification is that the distinction between ideal aesthetic experiencers 
and ideal aesthetic judges is not meant to imply that ideal aesthetic experiencers do not 
make aesthetic value judgments about the works they experience.  Such judgments may 
even be necessary for one to have an ideal aesthetic experience.  For example, to appreciate 
the humour in a piece of comic prose it is possible that one would need to form a judgment 
according to which the writing has the value of being amusing; whether such cases occur I 
am not sure, but I am not them out.  But a full comprehensive awareness of a work's 
capacities to produce distinct ideal aesthetic experiences on different occasions or for 
different observers is not necessary for one to have an ideal aesthetic experience, and may 
even preclude having such an experience.  To have an ideal aesthetic experience of a work 
one may need to allow one's aesthetic sensibility to manifest itself in ways that are not 
compatible with the dispassionate process of inference required to comprehensively assess 
a work's aesthetic capacities, for instance on the basis of aesthetic testimony from people 
                                                             
80 For an explanation and defence of Epistemic Externalism see, for example, GOLDMAN, Alvin. Internalism, 
Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification, Journal of Philosophy, 106:6, 2009: 309-338. 
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ǁŝƚŚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?/ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽŝŶĨĞƌĂǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ
aesthetic values on the basis of aesthetic testimony).   
For example, the best way to appreciate sad music is, presumably, to be moved by it, but 
supposing that there are a variety of ways an ideal aesthetic experiencer might be moved by 
the music, the best way to make a comprehensive aesthetic value judgment of the music 
would be to attribute aesthetic values to it on the basis of all of its capacities to produce 
such emotional experiences.  One might not be able to have all of these different emotional 
experiences at once, or even one after the other, even in the circumstances ideal for the 
aesthetic experience of the work; perhaps normal people differ unavoidably in their 
emotional capacities.  So the comprehensive ideal evaluation of some works perhaps cannot 
be from some unified perspective as with ideal aesthetic experience.  Rather, the ideal 
aesthetic judge must judge the work according to the relations it bears to a variety of 
perspectives: the perspectives of different ideal aesthetic experiencers or of ideal aesthetic 
experiencers on different occasions or subsequent viewings. 
The omniscience of the ideal aesthetic judge may be unobtainable, but that is no objection 
to what I am claiming here: I introduce the concept of the ideal judge merely as a 
theoretical device, in an attempt to clarify in what sense I wish to claim that aesthetic values 
in art are objective.   The point here is not that such critics can exist or that such an ideal is 
ĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ? ďƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŽ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ƚŚĂŶ ĞǀĞŶ ĂŶ ŝĚĞĂů
aesthetic experiencer could be aware of, because different ideal aesthetic experiencers 
could experience the same work differently.  It may be that the best we can do in evaluating 
a work is to make accurate but not necessarily comprehensive aesthetic value judgments, 
and such judgments are available to the ideal aesthetic experiencer.  Unlike ideal aesthetic 
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judgments, ideal aesthetic experiences are both obtainable and desirable: the purpose of 
art is to provide valuable aesthetic experiences (as I argue in chapter 4), and by striving to 
undergo ideal aesthetic experiences we strive to experience the manifestation of at least 
some of a work's aesthetic values.  By having such experiences we can appreciate the 
aesthetic values of art; and on the basis of such experiences we can also make true 
judgments about those values of the work. 
In introducing the above distinction between ideal circumstances for experience and for 
judgment, I have implied that, although aesthetic values in art may be largely objective, we 
may have very limited epistemic access to them.  We may have plenty of opportunity to 
appreciate these values in our aesthetic experiences of art, but forming comprehensive and 
ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂƌƌĂǇŽĨǀĂůƵĞƐŵĂǇďĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ƵƚƚŚĞ
perspectival limitations that might be necessary for ideal circumstances for the aesthetic 
experience of a work need only preclude the comprehensiveness that an ideal judgment 
would in theory be capable of attaining.  An ideal aesthetic experiencer would be in a good 
position to form accurate judgments about values in a work, but their judgment may be far 
ĨƌŽŵĞǆŚĂƵƐƚŝǀĞŝŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐĨŽƌĂůůŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ? 
Another implication of the account I am describing is that it might be possible for the same 
descriptive property of a work to realise both positive and negative aesthetic values.  
Suppose that two critics are in the ideal circumstances for the aesthetic experience or 
appreciation of a work, but their sensibilities differ enough such that one of them finds 
property P as instantiated in the work to be ugly, and the other finds it beautiful.  P would 
then realise both positive and negative aesthetic values in the work.  I will discuss this 
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implication of my view in §5.3.3.  EŽǁ / ǁŝůů ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ŵŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ
account. 
3.3 The Real Problem 
Humean Response-ĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ƚŽ ǁŚĂƚ >ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ĐĂůůƐ  “ƚŚĞƌĞĂů ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?81  
The problem is that for all Hume says it seems that while it may be the case that in 
particular circumstances people will respond in certain ways to certain objects, it is unclear 
ŝŶǁŚĂƚƐĞŶƐĞƐŽŵĞƐƵĐŚĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂƌĞ ‘ŝĚĞĂů ?ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐĂƌĞŶŽƚ ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ
the case that the ideal critic in ideal conditions will enjoy art more than others do; rather, 
ƐŚĞŝƐƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĞŶũŽǇ ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ĂƌƚŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƐŚĞĞŶũŽǇƐ ‘ďĂĚ ?Ăƌƚ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĨĂĐƚƚŚĞƌĞǁŝůůďĞ
many works of art, perhaps most works, which she hardly enjoys if at all.  In other 
circumstances people might receive more enjoyment from their engagement with art than 
ƚŚĞǇĚŽ ŝŶ  ‘ŝĚĞĂů ? ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ĨŽƌĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝŶĐĞ ? ƐŽ ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƐŽ ŝĚĞĂůĂďŽƵƚ  ‘ŝĚĞĂů ?
circumstances? 
>ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶŝŶǀĞŶƚƐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ŝǌĞĂů ?ƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂŶĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇƐĞƚŽĨĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŽ
ideal circumstances, and notes that the izeal critic in izeal conditions will have experiences 
as of beauty when presented with some objects and not others.82  The set of works apt to 
produce valuable aesthetic experiences will be different relative to izeal circumstances than 
ƚŽ ‘ŝĚĞĂů ?ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐĞĞŵƚŽďĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ŝĚĞĂů ?
circumstances really are ideal.  Why should we strive to be in ideal circumstances, or trust 
the judgments of those who are in, or close to, ideal circumstances rather than izeal 
circumstances?   
                                                             
81 LEVINSON 2002. 
82 LEVINSON 2002, p. 229. 
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>ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐŽǁŶƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵ ŝƐ ƚŽŵŽĚŝĨǇ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ŝĚĞĂů
circumstances so that in ideal circumstances one will have whatever it takes to appreciate 
masterpieces as identified as those works which are widely appreciated within cultures, 
across cultures, and across time.83  Such widespread appreciation is best explained by 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶǁŽƌŬƐ  “ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐĂŶƵŶƵƐƵĂůƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽĂĨĨŽƌĚĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶ
beings in general.84  This unusual potential is the answer to the real problem: ideal 
circumstances are special because they are calibrated to the detection and appreciation of 
unusually marvellous works or features of works of art. 
There may be cases in which it is more enjoyable to experience a particular work outside 
ideal circumstances.  But masterpieces by definition are unusually potent as providers of 
aesthetic pleasure.  Ideal circumstances, as calibrated to the appreciation of masterpieces, 
and the features that make for a masterpiece, will give one access to the most pleasurable 
aesthetic experiences that art makes available to human sensibilities. 
Hume himself suggests that only (but not all) good artists will have a reputation that is 
durable and general, and that our admiration for his or her works will be all the more 
sincere because of this.  He claims that, unlike theories which are frequently blown out of 
ƚŚĞ ǁĂƚĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚ ?  “ũƵƐƚ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉƵďůŝĐ
applause forever.85  Mothersill interprets Hume as implying that the test of time is the true 
                                                             
83 LEVINSON 2002, pp. 233-4. 
84 LEVINSON 2002, p. 233. 
85 HUME 1985, p. 242. 
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standard of taste and that the sentiments of ideal critics in ideal conditions merely reflect 
the extent to which works have the capacity to pass the test of time.86   
dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ>ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚŵĂƐƚĞƌƉŝĞĐĞƐĐĂŶďĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞd 
by their near-universal appeal and that a critic can be more or less attuned to the value-
making features of such works so that they may detect them in works that we do not 
already know the values of.  Passing the test of time and appealing cross-culturally and 
broadly within cultures is strong evidence that something is aesthetically valuable, as I will 
explain shortly; but failing these tests is not strong evidence of aesthetic disvalue.   
When it is unknown whether a work is a masterpiece or what aesthetic values it may have, 
the standard of taste will be the responses of critics who are ideally suited to appreciate 
masterpieces in general, and who are also in whatever circumstances the work in question 
demands (for example they will understand the work, view it in daylight where appropriate, 
and so on).87  /ǁŝůůŶŽǁƐĂǇĂůŝƚƚůĞŵŽƌĞŝŶĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨ>ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ? 
3.3.1 >ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ^ŽůƵƚŝŽŶ 
An example of the sort of masterpiece that Levinson has in mind, in the above revision of 
,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨƚĂƐƚĞ ? ŵŝŐŚƚďĞ^ŚĂŬĞƐƉĞĂƌĞ ?ƐKing Lear.  This work has been read and 
performed many times over 400 years and is appreciated by large numbers of people across 
the world. The film Ran is an acclaimed 1985 Japanese film adaptation of the 17th Century 
English play, suggesting that this play is an example of what Levinson refers to: its 
appreciation is durable over time, crosses cultural and language boundaries and draws large 
                                                             
86 MOTHERSILL, Mary. Hume and the Paradox of Taste.  In DICKIE, George, SCLAFANI, Richard, and ROBLIN, 
Ronald (eds.) Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology  ? ?ŶĚĞĚ ? )^ƚ ?DĂƌƚŝŶ ?ƐWƌĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉƉ ? ? ? ? W286.
87 LEVINSON 2002, pp. 233-4. 
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audiences.  It seems likely that King Lear is in some sense worth seeing for most people: it 
has demonstrated a capacity to provide valuable aesthetic experiences independently of 
ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ cultural or personal biases.   
The convergence of judgments by disparate individuals, cultures and eras regarding 
 ‘ŵĂƐƚĞƌƉŝĞĐĞƐ ?ŽĨĂƌƚŝƐďĞƐƚĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚŽƐe works being potent providers of worthwhile 
human experiences of an aesthetic sort.  These indications that a work is a masterpiece are 
independent from the Humean standard of taste, which consists instead of critics in ideal 
circumstances responding in ways indicative of the aesthetic values of works of art.  But if 
ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience are those in which one is in a position to have 
the most valuable aesthetic experiences offered by masterpieces, this can explain why ideal 
aesthetŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐĂƌĞ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞŽĨĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ? A critic with whatever it 
takes to appreciate masterpieces will plausibly have what it takes to pick up on similar 
capacities in other works of art, and in doing so identify further reliable sources of valuable 
aesthetic experience for human beings in general. 
KŶĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ  ‘ŵĂƐƚĞƌƉŝĞĐĞƐ ? ďǇ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŵĞĂŶƐ ?  tĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ
spread aesthetic consensus without any justification, just as ideas can spread widely 
whether or not they are good ideas.  But it is not clear why we would choose what we do 
choose to spread the appreciation of.  Furthermore, an aesthetic consensus might be 
difficult to achieve if a work is not objectively excellent, as without some sort of justification, 
people might be reluctant to conform to a consensus.  The objectivity of aesthetic values 
can perhaps offer the best explanation of what convergence there appears to be about the 
aesthetic merits and defects of particular works, especially in cases of widespread 
ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐĂƐǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚǁĞŵŝŐŚƚĐĂůů ‘ŵĂƐƚĞƌƉŝĞĐĞƐ ? ?
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Calibrating ideal circumstances so that they are conducive to the detection of capacities that 
ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ ƐƵĐŚ ǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚ ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƐĞƚƐ ŝĚĞĂů ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ĂƉĂƌƚ ĨƌŽŵ ? ƐĂǇ ?  ‘ŝǌĞĂů ?
circumstances.  Ideal circumstances, not izeal circumstances, will allow critics to have 
ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĨůĞĐƚĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?ŝĨ ŝƚŚĂƐŽŶĞ )ƚŽďĞĞŶũŽǇĞĚƐŽŵƵĐŚ
and by so many people that it could be hailed as a masterpiece.  Or if a work has some of 
the sorts of features that contribute to the appeal of a masterpiece, an ideal aesthetic 
experiencer will be in a position to pick up on such features in the work.  The responses of 
such critics to works which have not passed or been subjected to these independent tests, 
of mass appeal across and within times and cultures, will act as the standard of taste for 
those works.   
dŚĞ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ŝŶ
combination with the manifestation of whatever dispositions of masterpieces cause people 
to appreciate them so much, will be ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience and we 
will have good reason to privilege them over other circumstances of aesthetic experience.  
The judgments of ideal aesthetic experiencers will help us find works that can provide us 
with the most valuable aesthetic experiences, so that we might undergo those experiences 
and reap the rewards of aesthetic value in art.   
>ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨƚĂƐƚĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů reason for us not to opt 
out of the project of seeking out valuable aesthetic experiences as an ideal critic would 
identify them, because to do so would be to overlook masterpieces which demonstrably are 
a reliable source of worthwhile aesthetic experiencĞ ? dŚŝƐ ƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨ
taste also helps address one half of the paradox of taste, which as I explained in §2.3 is the 
ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?  /ƚ ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ŵĂƐƚĞƌƉŝĞĐĞƐ ? ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ŝŶ
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value to certain other works, apparently to the extent that a mountain is larger than a 
ŵŽůĞŚŝůů ?  >ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐĞĂƐŝůǇĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĂƐ / ĂƌŐƵĞ ŝŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ  ?
this need not preclude the accommodation of our more subjectivist intuitions. 
>ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐƚandard of taste might seem to involve the presupposition that 
there are masterpieces which are substantially aesthetically valuable, and this might render 
a Humean Response-Dependence account question-begging.  But in fact, all that is 
presupposed is that certain works are regarded as masterpieces due to their widespread 
appreciation.  This is plausibly explained by such works being aesthetically valuable, but this 
is inferred rather than presupposed, and it allows us to identify critics in ideal circumstances 
as critics in whatever circumstances turn out to allow them to appreciate masterpieces.  
Such an account can therefore, although it might involve circularity, remain informative 
about the relationship between aesthetic values in art and the responses of critics in certain 
circumstances.  I will now consider whether such an account can allow us to say that 
aesthetic values are ontologically objective.  
3.4 Response-Dependence 
hŶůŝŬĞ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ-Dependence theory of aesthetic values, as I presented it in §3.1, 
my own account is not merely about beauty but aesthetic values in general, including 
beauty, ugliness and thick aesthetic values as I described them in §2.2.1.  Furthermore, in 
place of the joint verdict of ideal critics in ideal conditions, I employ the notion of ideal 
circumstances for aesthetic experience and ideal circumstances for aesthetic judgment, 
which I explained in §§3.2.1-2.  Ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience will involve 
aesthetic experiences which reflect the aesthetic values of a work, due to the relations that 
hold between human aesthetic sensibilities and the properties of works of art.  In cases 
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where a work is apt to produce more than one distinct ideal aesthetic experience, the ideal 
circumstances for aesthetic judgment (if they are attainable, which seems unlikely) will 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĂůů ŽĨ ƚŚŽƐĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐŽŶĞ ƚŽ ĨŽƌŵĂ ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ
aesthetic values relative to different sensibilities as they are manifest in ideal circumstances 
for aesthetic experience.    
The Response-Dependence thesis that I endorse in my account may be summarised by the 
following biconditional: 
Aesthetic Response-Dependence: A work W has aesthetic value V if and only if 
a critic in the circumstances ideal for the aesthetic experience of W would 
experience W as having V. 
This statement of the account is intended to allow for a work to have aesthetic values that 
only some ideal aesthetic experiencers would appreciate.  The responses of an ideal 
aesthetic experiencer are a reflection of aesthetic values possessed by a work, but not 
exhaustively, as other ideal aesthetic experiencers might pick up on further values, so if 
there is an ideal aesthetic experiencer who does not attribute V to W in ideal circumstances 
for aesthetic experience, this is not evidence that W lacks V.   
Biconditionals such as the above statement of Aesthetic Response-Dependence are circular 
just in the sense that the concept being analysed appears on both sides of the biconditional.   
I mentioned in §1.3.2 that, as Johnston explains, this is only a problem if the thesis is made 
trivial by the circularity: 
The moral of recent philosophy is that many concepts, and most 
philosophically interesting concepts, have no interesting analysis... 
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Circularity would be a vice if our aim were reductive definition.  However our 
aim is... the exhibition of conceptual connections.  In such an endeavour, 
circularity is a defect only if it implies the triviality of the biconditional.  This is 
not the general case, for circular biconditionals of the relevant form are often 
sufficiently contentful to be open to further objection...88  
WĞƚĞƌ<ŝǀǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨďĞĂƵƚǇŝƐĐŝƌĐƵůĂƌ ?ďƵƚŝƚƐĞĞŵƐŚĞ
can be interpreted as addressing whether the account is substantive, since circularity may 
only be a problem insofar as it prevents the account from being substantive.89  <ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ
ƌĞŵĂƌŬƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ďĞĂƵƚǇ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ŝƚ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ĐŝƌĐƵůĂƌ ? ŝƐ ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ
contentful to be subject to further objection. 
Kivy claims quite plausibly that the charge of vicious circularity only applies to two of the 
ĨŝǀĞ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞĂů ĐƌŝƚŝĐ ?90  The requirement that ideal critics have 
experience with beautiful works of art does presuppose a standard by which to determine 
which works of art are beautiful. This point can be illustrated if we imagine that this is the 
only requirement for ideal circumstances: to determine which works are beautiful we look 
to the judgments of critics in ideal circumstances, but to determine whether a critic is in 
ideal circumstances we look at their level of experience with beautiful works of art; this 
presupposes that we know which works are beautiful, when that is what we are attempting 
to find out.   
A similar problem arises if we consider the ability to draw comparisons between works 
according to their aesthetic values.  Were we to define ideal circumstances as those in 
                                                             
88 JOHNSTON 1989, p. 147. 
89 </sz ?WĞƚĞƌ ?,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨƚĂƐƚĞ PďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŝƌĐůĞ ?The British Journal of Aesthetics, 7:1, 1967: 57-66. 
90 KIVY 1967, pp. 60-3. 
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which one can reliably compare the relative values of different works of art, we would not 
be able to identify critics in ideal circumstances without prior knowledge of those values. 
dŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŚƌĞĞ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞĂů ĐƌŝƚŝĐ ĨĂƌĞ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞǇ ĐĂŶ ďĞ
described without mentioning anything to do with beauty, art or Aesthetics.  In fact, they 
correspond (not by accident) to the three kinds of epistemic objectivity proposed by Railton, 
which I recapped in §3.1: delicacy of sentiment can be described in terms of an ability to 
detect certain kinds of detail, such as subtle variations in colour; good sense can be 
described in terms of an ability to reason well; and freedom from prejudice might otherwise 
ďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐĞƚĂƐŝĚĞŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂŶĚďŝĂƐĞƐ ? 
These are ways of being epistemically objective in general, not merely in relation to the 
aesthetic values of art.  The claim that a work is aesthetically valuable if and only if 
epistemically objective critics would experience it as valuable appears not to be trivial given 
that epistemic objectivity need not be defined just as the ability to detect aesthetic values in 
art.  I will now proceed to consider the issue of the order of determination which, as I began 
to explain in chapter 1, arises for Response-Dependence claims such as the one I have 
presented. 
3.4.1 The Order of Determination Revisited 
As I explained in §1.3.5, analysing a concept as response-dependent raises a question about 
the order of determination: is a work of art aesthetically valuable because an ideal aesthetic 
experiencer would respond to it with valuable aesthetic experiences, or would such a critic 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ŝŶ ƐƵĐŚ Ă ǁĂǇ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ŝƐ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůůǇ ǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ?  dŚĞ  ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ?
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŝŶƐƵĐŚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƐĞĞŵƐƚŽďĞŝƌƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚŝƚĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƚŚĂƚ ‘y
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞz ?ĂŶĚ ‘zďĞĐĂƵƐĞy ? ?/ǁŝůůĂƌŐƵĞ that an ideal aesthetic experiencer would undergo 
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valuable aesthetic experiences in response to a work because that work possesses aesthetic 
values.  Aesthetic values in art are capacities to produce valuable aesthetic experiences, 
which manifest in ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience, so that such critics can 
detect that, as opposed to make it the case that, a work has certain ontologically objective 
aesthetic values. 
The order of determination dilemma can be seen as between the Realist (and therefore 
Objectivist) notion that in the right conditions we can detect the real properties of things, 
and the Anti-Objectivist (and therefore Anti-Realist) notion that the properties of things are 
constituted by our reliably-formed beliefs about them.91  Wright poses this dilemma and for 
the case of colour he suggests that reliably formed beliefs about the colour of an object 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƚŚĂƚŽďũĞĐƚ ?ƐĐŽůŽƵƌ PĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝƐƌĞĚbecause it looks red to normal observers in 
normal conditions. He suggests that shape may involve the opposite order of determination: 
normal observers in normal conditions may perceive an object as pear-shaped because it is 
pear-shaped, its shape being determined independently of sensory responses or 
dispositions to perceive it as having one shape or another.92  
This dilemma marks a distinction between that which is or is not, or perhaps is more or less, 
ontologically objective.  It may seem also to mark a distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities, given the examples I have just mentioned.  However, as I explained in 
§1.2.1, the distinction between objective and subjective seems to cut across the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities. 
The order of determination dilemma is expressed by Wright as follows: 
                                                             
91 WRIGHT 1993, p. 77. 
92 WRIGHT 1993, pp. 77-81. 
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 ?ƚŚĞ order-of-determination ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ?ŵĂƌŬƐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
classes of statements about which our best opinions ? opinions conceived by 
subjects and in circumstances which we think of as cognitively ideal for 
statements of that kind ? (partially) determine the extension of the truth-
predicate among them, and classes of statements our best opinions about 
which at most reflect an extension determined independently.93 
Critics in ideal circumstances can therefore play one of two roles in a Response-Dependence 
account.  The truth of attributions of aesthetic value to works of art may be determined by 
the opinions of ideal attributors, or such opinions may only reflect the independently-
determined truth values of such attributions.  Aesthetic value judgments may be made true 
by the responses of ideal aesthetic experiencers or such responses may merely be a source 
of information about the aesthetic values of a work, without being what makes the 
information true.  I will now defend the latter of these two options.  It is debatable whether 
Hume would agree with me, but I do not claim to be endorsing his account of aesthetic 
values in full. 
3.4.2 No Order of Determination 
I mentioned that it appears to be incoherent to embrace both directions of determination in 
a Response-Dependence biconditional, as this would seem to be a violation of the 
ŝƌƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ? ?/ŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽƌĚĞƌŽĨĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚ
ideal critics in ideal conditions detect the aesthetic values of art, I have made some remarks 
about the view that in fact those values are determined by those responses; I will return to 
this apparently subjectivist view in the next few chapters. I have not yet considered the 
                                                             
93 WRIGHT 1993, p. 77. 
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option of denying that there is an order of determination, and that will be the subject of this 
subsection. 
I have proposed the following Response-Dependence thesis: 
Aesthetic Response-Dependence: A work W has aesthetic value V if and only if 
a critic in the circumstances ideal for the aesthetic experience of W would 
experience W as having V. 
/Ĩ ŽŶĞ ĚĞŶŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐĂŶǇŽƌĚĞƌŽĨĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂ ǁŽƌŬ ?ƐǀĂůƵĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŝĚĞĂů
responses to the work, then one denies the following two claims: 
1. Aesthetic Subjectivism: W has V because an ideal aesthetic experiencer 
would experience W as having V. 
2. Aesthetic Objectivism: An ideal aesthetic experiencer would experience W 
as having V because W has V. 
It is coherent to simultaneously endorse Aesthetic Response-Dependence and deny claims 1 
and 2, but it seems that either 1 or 2 can explain Aesthetic Response-Dependence, and that 
to deny 1 and 2 is to forgo a basic explanation for Aesthetic Response-Dependence.  To 
illustrate this, I will provide an analogy. 
Like the ideal aesthetic experiencer, a chick-sexer is a type of expert.  A chick-sexer has the 
ability to discern the sex of new-born chicks, which requires intensive training.  Presumably, 
for a good chick-sexer, it will be the case more often than not that she judges a chick to be 
male because ŝƚŝƐŵĂůĞ ?/ƚǁŝůůďĞĨĂůƐĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĐhick is male because the chick-sexer thinks 
ƐŽ ? ?ƚŚĞĐŚŝĐŬ-sexer detects the sex of chicks and obviously does not make it the case that a 
chick is male or female.   
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Suppose that a chick is male if and only if a chick-sexer would judge that it is male (she is an 
ideal chick-sexer).  Suppose also that it is neither true that the chick-sexer determines sex 
nor that she detects it: it is false that a chick is only male because the ideal chick-sexer 
thinks so; and it is false that it is because a chick is male that the chick-sexer thinks it is.  This 
latter claim is significant: it would be surprising (extremely surprising, though not 
inconceivable) if a chick-sexer did not detect the sex of chicks and yet judged all and only 
male chicks to be male chicks.  This would be surprising because an ability to detect the sex 
of chicks would explain why it would be the case that the chick-sexer judges all and only 
male chicks to be male.  Even if it were unclear what this ability was precisely, positing such 
an ability would be highly explanatory.   
It would also be explanatory, though implausible, to suggest that the chick-sexer makes 
chicks either male or female by judging them to be so, perhaps in the way that one can 
ŵĂŬĞŝƚƚƌƵĞƚŚĂƚŽŶĞ ?ƐƉĞƚĐĂƚŝƐĐĂůůĞĚ ‘&Žǆ ?ďǇŐiving it that name.  Supposing that a cat is 
ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘&Žǆ ?ŝĨĂŶĚŽŶůǇŝĨƚŚĞĐĂƚ ?ƐŽǁŶĞƌĐĂůůƐŝƚ ‘&Žǆ ? ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐǁĞůůĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ
utterances determining, in certain circumstances, the proper names of things.  Without such 
order-of-determination claims, these biconditionals are quite mysterious: it seems that to 
refrain from claiming that there is an order of determination in a response-dependence 
biconditional is to refrain from accepting the most basic and plausible kind of explanation 
for thĂƚďŝĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ƐƚƌƵƚŚ ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ
an ideal observer and the state of affairs of which she is an ideal observer is merely a 
coincidence.  Aesthetic Response-Dependence is best explained by 1 or 2.  I will now further 
defend 2 as the better of the two explanations. 
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In order to defend this answer to the order of determination question, it will be necessary 
ƚŽĐůĂŝŵ ?ĂƐtƌŝŐŚƚƉƵƚƐŝƚ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůůǇǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ?
and  ‘ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ? ĂƌĞ ? Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ Ăƌƚ ? ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇ ŽĨ ŽƵƌ ŝĚĞĂů
aesthetic experiences and judgments, which merely reflect this extension.  If this can be 
done successfully, then my Hume-inspired Response-Dependence about aesthetic values in 
art can be regarded as a form of Aesthetic Objectivism: the view that works of art have 
objective aesthetic values, which in the right conditions we are able to detect.   
3.4.3 Hume on the Detection of Aesthetic Values in Art 
Although Hume may or may not have shared my objectivist take on aesthetic Response-
Dependence, further details of his account may offer some assistance in defending my own. 
It might seem that Hume is best understood as defending something like 1 (Aesthetic 
Subjectivism), since he focuses on characterising ideal circumstances and does not say much 
to suggest that there is anything independent of the responses of a critic in ideal 
circumstances that gives a work its aesthetic values.  On the other hand, the circumstance 
he puts the most emphasis on is the alleged ability for ideal critics to detect minute details 
in works of art. 
Hume is inspired by an example in which wine tasters claim to detect the taste of iron and 
leather in a particular wine.  Their audience is sceptical, but when the barrel is drained, they 
discover an iron key attached to a leather key fob.94  It is obvious that the judgments of wine 
tasters cannot make it the case that there is a key in a barrel.  Similarly, it seems that Hume 
would say that the judgments of critics in ideal circumstances do not make it the case that a 
                                                             
94 HUME 1985, pp. 234-5. 
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work of art is aesthetically valuable.  Their judgments or sentiments are caused by the 
work's values or the properties that constitute them.   
If the sentiments of critics in ideal circumstances were supposed to constitute the beauty of 
objects, then it seems that the characteristics of the ideal critic would not be limited to 
those conducive to maximally objective perception and interpretation. If their sentiments 
made works of art beautiful, as opposed to the beauty of works of art causing their 
sentiments, then we might expect Hume to describe ideal critics as people with wild 
imaginations or other characteristics that do not necessarily involve the removal of barriers 
between object and observer.   
James Shelley, however, suggests that we should interpret the case of the winetasters as 
illustrating that there are two stages to aesthetic evaluation: a perceptual stage in which the 
descriptive features of the object (such as the presence of iron in the wine) are discerned; 
and an affective stage in which one has a sentimental reaction to what one perceives.  If 
ƚŚŝƐ ?ĂƐ^ŚĞůůĞǇĐůĂŝŵƐ ?ŝƐŝŵƉůŝĞĚŝŶ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐĞƐƐĂǇ ?ƚŚĞŶƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
detection of iron or leather in wine with the detection of the features of art works should 
not be interpreted as suggesting that ideal judges detect the values of art, rather than 
merely the descriptive properties of art objects.  So it is not obvious, and indeed is disputed, 
whether Hume would claim that ideal critics reflect objective values in works of art or 
whether the joint verdict of their evaluations makes it the case that works have whatever 
values they have.  I do not aim in this dissertation to settle this matter, but I do aim to 
propose a plausible theory of the aesthetic values of art, and in doing so I will defend the 
claim that ideal critics reflect and do not determine the values of art. 
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Railton usefully suggests a clarification of ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŽĨ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐŝĚĞĂůĐƌŝƚŝĐƚŽǁŽƌŬƐŽĨ
art, with reference to the relationship between clocks and time.95  Clocks often reliably 
indicate what the time is, and this does not lead us to suppose that clocks constitute time 
itself; similarly, ideal critics in ideal conditions would act as reliable indicators of the 
dispositions of works of art, without giving works those dispositions.  If ideal circumstances 
are those in which our aesthetic experiences reliably indicate the aesthetic values of art 
works, the Response-Dependence relationship is akin to the relationship between clocks 
and time itself:  
Being a true standard of time [in the sense of corresponding perfectly with 
solar time at a fixed location on the globe] is clearly not the same as 
constituting time.96 
Rather than constituting time, clocks generally track the time.  Ideally, a clock will do this 
with high accuracy. Railton appears to be interpreting Hume as characterising ideal critics as 
trackers of aesthetic value, analogous to an accurate clock.  It seems possible, then, that 
Hume understood the ideal critic to be a detector of beauty, but what matters for present 
purposes is whether that would be the right answer to give to the order of determination 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?tŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐĂŶƐǁĞƌŝƐ ?ŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇƐƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂůĨŝƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞŵƐƚŽ 
have some relevance here, and I will now look at it more closely. 
3.4.4 Natural Fit 
Hume writes about a natural fit between objects and certain responses.  A good poem, for 
example, is "calculated to please" those who observe it.97  The poem is like a key which 
                                                             
95 RAILTON 2001, p. 69. 
96 RAILTON 2001, p. 69. 
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unlocks the appropriate response.  Perhaps another way of putting this is to say that objects 
merit certain responses.  However, Hume's naturalistic approach to aesthetic normativity 
seems to be in contrast to an approach based on merit, according to which there is some sui 
generis property which merits certain responses. 
The latter is a view attributed to David Wiggins, who defends a kind of Response-
Dependence about values according to which the following biconditional holds: 
 ?ǆŝƐŐŽŽĚŝĨĂŶĚŽŶůǇif x is the sort of thing that calls forth or makes 
appropriate a certain sentiment of approbation given the range of 
propensities we have to respond in this or that way...98  
dŚĞ ‘ĐĂůůŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚŽƌŵĂŬŝŶŐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨtŝŐŐŝŶƐ ?ǀŝĞǁƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŵĂŬĞthe above 
ĂĐůĂŝŵĂďŽƵƚǆ ?ƐŐŽŽĚŶĞƐƐŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐŝƚƐŵĞƌŝƚŝŶŐŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐŝŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽ
the view that, say, x is good if and only if in certain circumstances one would respond in a 
certain way (perhaps with a certain sentiment of approbation).  The latter is a view about 
goodness and other values as involving the capacity to cause certain responses rather than 
others, and not a view about goodness being the meriting of certain responses over others.  
This more naturalistic, causal Response-Dependence, which compares values to secondary 
ƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ  ‘ƋƵĞĞƌ ? ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞŵ  ?ĂƐ DĂĐŬŝĞ
would put it; see §6.1), may be easier to defend. 
Schellekens criticises attempts by Wiggins and Frank Sibley to improve upon the basic claim 
that aesthetic values are like secondary qualities.99  She claims that concepts of merit or 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
97 HUME 1985, p. 228. 
98 WIGGINS, David. A sensible subjectivism?  In WIGGINS, David. Needs, values, truth: Essays in the philosophy 
of value. Claredon Press, 1998: pp. 185-214; p. 206. 
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appropriateness add nothing more than a normative-seeming gloss on such theories; that is, 
such views seem to take a naturalistic Response-DependĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚƌŽǁŝŶǁŽƌĚƐůŝŬĞ ‘ŵĞƌŝƚ ?
to make the view seem to imply more normativity than it in fact does.  She claims that it 
remains unexplained on a Response-Dependence view how certain aesthetic responses are, 
and others are not, justified.100  But I will argue that a naturalistic Response-Dependence 
account can explain this.   
Hume might, in speaking of a natural fit between beauty and sentiment, be implying that 
ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐĂ ŵĞƌŝƚŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ,Ğ ĚŽĞƐ ƚĂůŬŽĨďĞĂƵƚǇŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶ  “ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ
ŵŝŶĚƐŽĨŵĞŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŵŝŐŚƚďĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚĂƐďĞĂƵƚǇŵĞƌŝƚŝŶŐŽƌƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƉƌĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
responses, in a way that can be difficult to explain.101   
/Ŷ ? ? ? ? ? ?/ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ ?ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ŽŶƚŚĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ/ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐŶĞĞĚ
not be interpreted as prescriptive.  Hume may have agreed with this, as it seems that his 
 ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂůĨŝƚ ?ŵĂǇďĞŵĞƌĞůǇĂĐĂƵƐĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ P 
 ?ďĞĂƵƚŝĞƐ ?ĂƌĞŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇĨŝƚƚĞĚƚŽĞǆĐŝƚĞĂŐƌĞĞĂďůĞƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐ ?102 
 ?dŚŽƵŐŚ ŝƚ ďĞ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ? ƚŚĂƚ ďeauty and deformity, more than sweet and 
bitter, are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, 
internal or external; it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in 
objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.103  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
99 See SIBLEY, Frank. Objectivity and Aesthetics.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
volume 42, 1968: 31-54. 
100 SCHELLEKENS 2006, p. 171. 
101 HUME 1985, p. 233. 
102 HUME 1985, p. 233. 
103 HUME 1985, p. 235. 
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,ƵŵĞŵĂǇŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚďĞĂƵƚǇŝƐƐŝŵƉůǇƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌĂŶŽďũĞĐƚ ?ƐƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐƚŽĐĂƵƐĞƵƐƚŽ
respond with agreeable sentiments.  Such a view may be preferable to a theory involving 
merit, insofar as it succeeds in giving a naturalistic explanation of value which can explain 
the same things as can a concept of merit: namely, the possibility of error and expertise in 
aesthetic evaluations of art.  As Schellekens has argued, it is unclear what a concept of 
meriting can add to a Response-Dependence account of aesthetic values; indeed, it seems 
that such a concept makes a naturalistic explanation of value more difficult, without 
providing any further explanation as to what it is for a work to be aesthetically valuable.104   
3.4.5 Human Sensibilities 
ThĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů Ĩŝƚ ŝŶ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ƐĞĞŵƐ ŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ƚŽ ďĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ
human sensibilities.  Ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience are conducive to the 
manifestation of the aesthetic capacities of a work as well as dispositions which are given to 
us by human nature.  In being response-dependent, aesthetic value concepts are correctly 
applied to works of art depending on the dispositions of works to produce aesthetic 
experiences, and dispositions of observers to undergo these experiences in response to the 
works.   
Certain properties are naturally fitted to please human beings, who have evolved to find 
them enjoyable, and art is the attempt to infuse objects with some such properties, 
specifically those conducive to valuable aesthetic experience.  The ideal circumstances for 
aesthetic experience include the possession of all of the capacities a person needs to make 
them sensitive to the natural fit between the properties of art works and human 
                                                             
104 SCHELLEKENS, Elisabeth. Towards a reasonable objectivism for aesthetic judgements. The British Journal of 
Aesthetics, 46:2, 2006: 163-177. 
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sensibilities.  In other words, the circumstances ideal for the aesthetic experience of a work 
are the manifestation conditions for its aesthetic values. 
Our propensity to respond to works in certain ways partly determines their values, but this 
is different from responses themselves determining values. The dispositions of ideal 
aesthetic experiencers to find aesthetic experiences of a work rewarding and therefore 
judge the work to be aesthetically valuable can be said to determine the work's aesthetic 
values.  But this is not the same as their experiences or judgments themselves determining 
the work's value; for that to be the case, the responses of an ideal aesthetic experiencer 
would have to determine her propensity to respond in certain ways, or determine the 
work's propensity to produce these responses.  
For example, suppose that people are generally disposed ? when in a position to pay close 
attention and when not subject to certain biases, and so on ? to find many of the paintings 
of Van Gogh to be beautiful.  In a sense, the paintings will thus be beautiful because people 
are generally disposed to find certain features of the painting to be beautiful.  In other 
words, our tendency to find certain features of the paintings beautiful (in appropriate 
circumstances) will make it the case that those features make the paintings beautiful.  But 
our judgments about the paintings will not make them beautiful, and nor will our aesthetic 
experiences; rather, our propensity to respond to certain features the paintings with 
experiences of a certain sort will render the paintings beautiful in virtue of possessing those 
features, and this may lead us to form certain aesthetic value judgments about the 
paintings. 
Ideal aesthetic experiences do not determine the capacity for humans to have valuable 
aesthetic experiences of art, or the capacity for art to produce such experiences.  What 
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determines these things is the relation between the properties of art works and human 
sensibilities.  This appears to be what Hume is saying when he characterises beauty as that 
which would please critics in ideal circumstances. The features of a work and their 
relationship to human sensibilities constitute the aesthetic values of the work.  
The relationship between the properties of art works and human sensibilities constitute a 
 ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů Ĩŝƚ ? ŝŶ Ă ƐĞŶƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ,ƵŵĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƵŶĂǁĂƌĞ ŽĨ P ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ĞǀŽůǀĞĚ ĂƐ Ă
species to find the experience of certain features of objects to be not only enjoyable but 
deeply rewarding in their engagement of our imagination and understanding.  Culture too 
influences our enjoyment of art; in chapter 5 I consider the extent to which cultural 
influences interfere with or enable the proper appreciation of art.  Art works at their best 
are the infusion of objects, be they physical artefacts or whatever else can be a work of art, 
with features which human beings have the propensity to find the experience of to be 
rewarding.  These features are naturally fitted to excite human sensibilities, partly because 
the adaptation of human sensibilities to the environment through natural selection has 
resulted in this rewarding aesthetic sensitivity to objects.  The standard of taste is derived 
from this natural fit between sensible properties and human sensibilities.   
The uniformity of human nature is not total, but nor are individuals different enough that 
aesthetic values have a fine-grained relativity to individual subjects; I argue for this in 
chapter 5.    Cases in which the same work can be experienced as having an aesthetic value 
only by some ideal aesthetic experiencers may occur if we are sufficiently different, but in 
many cases such differences are exaggerated or imagined and such aesthetic disputes are in 
ĨĂĐƚĚƵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞƐŚŽƌƚĐŽŵŝŶŐƐǁŚŝĐŚƌĞƐƵůƚ ĨƌŽŵďĂƐŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐŽŶŶŽŶ-
ideal experiences of a work.  I will now clarify that the answer to the order of determination 
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question that I have been defending leads to a dispositional analysis of aesthetic values in 
art. 
3.5 Dispositionalism 
On my account, responses under ideal circumstances are reliable indications of the aesthetic 
values of art works, and do not give a work its aesthetic values, however, the values of the 
experiences offered by the work determine that the properties giving rise to them 
constitute the work's aesthetic values (I defend this latter claim in chapter 4).  Ideal 
aesthetic experiencers prefer works because of their objective aesthetic values, but they are 
only objectively aesthetically valuable because they can give rise to the aesthetic 
experiences on which ideal aesthetic experiencers base their aesthetic value judgments ?
experiences which are themselves valuable.   
A critic outside the ideal circumstances for the aesthetic experience of a work will have less 
success, if any, in reflecting the qualities of the work.  That does not necessarily mean that 
the aesthetic experiences they have of the work will be of less value, but as I explained in 
§3.3.1, ideal circumstances should be defined in relation to the most potent sources of 
valuable aesthetic experience (masterpieces), so experiencing a work in ideal circumstances 
is more likely to give one access to the most valuable aesthetic experiences.    
Consider a view that I have already mentioned which is analogous to the analysis of 
aesthetic values I have been outlining.  Take Response-Dependence about colour to be the 
view that, roughly, an object O has colour C if and only if an observer in normal 
circumstances would experience O has having C.   
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Now suppose that the order of determination in this biconditional is such that an observer 
in normal circumstances would experience O as having C because O has C.  In other words, 
objects normally look red because they are red.  Colour Dispositionalism seems to capture 
this view: if O is C if and only if O normally looks C, and furthermore it looks C because it is, 
it seems that C might be a disposition to look C in normal circumstances.105  If such an order 
of determination in a Response-Dependence theory of colour leads to Colour 
Dispositionalism, it would seem that the claim about the order of determination in Aesthetic 
Response-Dependence may imply Aesthetic Dispositionalism, which I will now describe. 
3.5.1 Aesthetic Dispositionalism 
,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚcould be interpreted as implying that aesthetic values are dispositions to 
produce aesthetic sentiments, which form the basis of aesthetic value judgments.  This is 
because he defends an ideal observer theory according to which a work of art is beautiful if 
and only if an ideal observer in ideal conditions would judge it to be beautiful based on her 
sentimental responses.  The order of determination in this account may or may not be such 
that the ideal observer detects beauty, which would therefore seem to be constituted by 
features of the work which dispose it to cause aesthetic sentiments in ideal circumstances.  
My account at least has this basic structure, but it implies the more general claim that 
aesthetic values are dispositions or capacities to produce valuable aesthetic experiences in 
the circumstances ideal for the aesthetic experience of a given work of art.  This can include, 
but is not limited to, the aesthetic value of beauty disposing a work to cause ideal aesthetic 
experiencers to respond in a sentimental or emotional way. 
                                                             
105 Colour Dispositionalism is controversial, but for a defence see LEVIN, Janet. Dispositional theories of color 
and the claims of common sense. Philosophical Studies, 100:2, 2000: 151-174. 
 116  
 
Levinson claims that a work of art is aesthetically valuable in virtue of possessing certain 
capacities or dispositions which we may identify as its aesthetic properties or values: 
[An aesthetic property is] a disposition to afford a certain global impression to 
ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞƌƐ ?106 
Clearly the objectivity for aesthetic properties defended in this essay is not 
one that accords them a transcendent status, independent of human 
reactions.  What has been defended is rather objectivity as contingent but 
stable intersubjective convergence in judgments among qualified 
perceivers.107  
Insofar as an ideal aesthetic experiencer would experience a work in a certain way, such a 
critic is disposed to respond in this way, and the work is disposed to prompt the 
manifestation of this disposition on the part of the critic.  In other words, the work is 
disposed to produce certain experiences in ideal circumstances, and a critic in ideal 
circumstances is disposed to prompt the manifestation of these dispositions of the work.  If 
this dispositional analysis of my Humean Response-Dependence account is correct, the ideal 
aesthetic experiencer can be characterised as a detector rather than a projector of the 
aesthetic values of works of art, since she is best placed to respond in ways that reflect the 
dispositions possessed by a work.   
Settling the Metaphysics of dispositions is of course beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
but insofar as the type of objectivist Response-Dependence I wish to endorse does imply 
                                                             
106 LEVINSON, Jerrold. Aesthetic Properties, Evaluative Force, and Differences of Sensibility.  In BRADY, Emily, 
and LEVINSON, Jerrold (eds.) Aesthetic concepts: Essays after Sibley, 2001; p. 66. 
107 LEVINSON 2001, p. 80. 
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that aesthetic values are dispositions realised by the properties of works of art, I must 
acknowledge certain relevant controversies in the Metaphysics literature.  I will now defend 
my Humean account from a type of objection which is widely discussed in the literature on 
dispositions in general. 
3.6 Anti-Dispositionalism 
An objection to Response-Dependence about colour has been extended to Response-
Dependence theories of aesthetic value, and to introduce the objection I will first consider it 
in relation to the above analysis of colour.  The construal of colour as a disposition of objects 
seems to make the objection vulnerable to responses offered in the literature on the 
Metaphysics of dispositions. 
James Shelley and Michael Watkins give the example of a shy chameleon who changes from 
green to white whenever light sufficient for it to be seen strikes its skin, whereas in the dark 
the chameleon remains green.  It might seem that Response-Dependence about colour 
cannot say that the chameleon is green in the dark, since were a normal observer in normal 
conditions to see the chameleon it would look white, because normal conditions would 
involve light sufficient for the chameleon to be seen, and this would cause the chameleon to 
turn white.108   
Supposing not only that colour concepts are Response-Dependent, but also that colours 
themselves are dispositions, the shy chameleon case can, it seems, be interpreted in terms 
of what has been called a finkish disposition or a fink: a disposition where the conditions for 
an object acquiring or losing the disposition are the same as the conditions for the 
                                                             
108 WATKINS, Michael, and SHELLEY, James. Response-dependence about aesthetic value. Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly, 93:3, 2012: 338-352; p. 341. 
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manifestation of the disposition.109  For example, one might invent a type of glass 
microphysically identical to the usual fragile kind, except that it possesses an intrinsic fink 
which is activated by anything which might cause the glass to break.  If one, say, hits the 
glass with a hammer, the fink activates instantaneously and the glass ceases to be fragile 
and therefore does not break.   
In the chameleon case, a colour dispositionalist may say that the chameleon is disposed to 
appear green (in normal circumstances), and yet its shyness acts as a fink which causes it to 
lose its green disposition as soon as light reaches it.  This does pose a problem for a simple 
conditional analysis of colour dispositions: it seems in the example that the chameleon is 
green at night, but were a normal observer in normal conditions to look at the chameleon it 
would appear white; it is therefore false that an object is green if and only if it would appear 
green to a normal observer in normal conditions.  But there are more sophisticated 
conditional analyses of dispositions available which deal with finkish cases.    
3.6.1 Ceteris Paribus Clauses 
One strategy for supplying a conditional analysis of dispositions which deals with finkish 
cases is to supply a ceteris paribus clause: for instance, an object is disposed to appear green 
in daylight if and only if it would appear green in daylight, ceteris paribus (or all other things 
being equal).110  dŚĞĐůĂƵƐĞǁŽƵůĚŶĞĞĚƚŽƐĂǇŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ  ‘ĞǆĐĞƉƚ ŝŶĐĂƐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞ ŝƚǁŽƵůĚ
noƚ ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ŐƌĞĞŶ ? ? ĂƐ ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ĐŽůŽƵƌ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ǀĂĐƵŽƵƐ ? ĂƐ ĨŽůůŽǁƐ P ĂŶ
object is disposed to appear green in daylight if and only if it would appear green in daylight 
                                                             
109 See, for example, BIRD, Alexander. Dispositions and antidotes. The Philosophical Quarterly 48:191, 1998: 
227-234. 
110 See, for example, STEINBERG, Jesse R. Dispositions and subjunctives. Philosophical studies, 148:3, 2010: 
323-341. 
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in the conditions in which it would appear green in daylight.111  But as Jesse Steinberg 
argues, ceteris paribus clauses do not lend themselves to that analysis: they merely imply 
that there is a disjunction of circumstances which are not occurring.112  Steinberg argues 
that this is commonplace in science and everyday life and that we need to make such claims 
in order to make predictions that are likely to be accurate.113   
For example, human behaviour is to some extent predictable on the basis of claims 
supported by evidence in experimental psychology and related sciences, claims which imply 
a ceteris paribus clause, for example the claim that physical exercise is an effective 
treatment for depression.114  For instance it is quite possible that exercise in the form of 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇ ůŽƐŝŶŐ ŝŶ ďŽǆŝŶŐ ŵĂƚĐŚĞƐ ƚŽ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ƐĐŚŽŽů ďƵůůŝĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ǁŽƌƐĞŶ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
depression.  So the informative, interesting claim that exercise is an effective treatment for 
depression must be qualified with something like a ceteris paribus clause, ruling out such 
cases in which exercise would be counter-productive or ineffective. 
Furthermore, ceteris paribus clauses may not be, and need not be, fully articulated: we can 
make accurate predictions on the basis of ceteris paribus claims without enumerating all of 
the circumstances that they must rule out.115   For example it seems that there is no need 
for doctors or sufferers from depression to consider cases of misery-inducing boxing when 
considering whether exercise in general, or as a rule-of-thumb, is an appropriate treatment 
for depression.   
                                                             
111 STEINBERG 2010, p. 327. 
112 STEINBERG 2010, p. 329. 
113 STEINBERG 2010, p. 331. 
114 See RIMER, Jane, et al. Exercise for depression. Cochrane Database Syst Rev, 7, 2012. 
115 STEINBER 2010, pp. 239-40. 
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I find this method of responding to cases of interference, such as finkish cases, quite 
plausible, but it is controversial and subject to a debate that I can only briefly refer to here.  
Other attempts to defend a simple conditional analysis of dispositions are available.116  It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation for me to go into much more detail about forms of 
Dispositionalism or about how to deal with finkish dispositions or other interference cases, 
ďƵƚ / ǁŝůů ŶŽǁ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ tĂƚŬŝŶƐ ĂŶĚ ^ŚĞůůĞǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ZĞƐƉŽnse-
Dependence which are analogous to the shy chameleon case. 
3.6.2 Dealing with Finks 
Watkins and Shelley translate their objection to Colour Response-Dependence into two 
attempts to refute Response-Dependence theories of aesthetic value.  The aesthetic 
examples they suggest are that of an angel who intervenes to prevent anyone from seeing 
one of Picasso's masterpieces, and of a type of yellow paint used by Da Vinci which instantly 
kills anyone who is about to observe it.117  The worry is that if a painting by Picasso or Da 
Vinci is aesthetically valuable if and only if it would be experienced as such by an ideal 
observer, then its being unobservable in practice is sufficient to prevent it from being 
aesthetically valuable.  This might have happened with, say, Guernica or The Last Supper, 
which we hail as masterpieces, and so it seems that works of art must not be aesthetically 
valuable in virtue of being disposed to produce certain responses.  I will now offer two 
responses and apply them to each of these cases, and these responses will be available for 
many other attempts to provide counterexamples to Aesthetic Dispositionalism or Aesthetic 
Response-Dependence. 
                                                             
116 See, for example, CONTESSA, Gabriele. Dispositions and interferences. Philosophical studies, 165:2, 2013: 
401-419. 
117 WATKINS & SHELLEY 2012, pp. 341-2. 
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The first available response to Shelley and Watkins is as follows.  Perhaps it can be taken for 
granted that ideal circumstances do not permit being prevented from seeing things by a 
miracle or by death.  If a painting cannot be seen at all because any attempts to observe it 
will result in death, then unless it is some sort of homicidal performance piece, the painting 
may be as beautiful as it would seem to an ideal aesthetic experiencer were the painting 
comprised of normal yellow paint rather than killer yellow paint.  
Supposing that The Last Supper can have the aesthetic dispositions that it does, with the 
addition of a disposition to kill potential observers of it before they can observe it, it seems 
that this is a finkish case.  That is, partly in virtue of the use of yellow paint, the work is 
disposed to produce worthwhile aesthetic experiences in certain observational conditions, 
but the very same yellow paint will in the very same observational conditions remove the 
ǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ?construed as relational properties to the responses of relevant 
observers ? by making the work unobservable.   
The Da Vinci case is analogous to glass containing a finkish disposition which, when the glass 
is hit with a hammer, renders the glass unbreakable and therefore takes away the 
disposition of fragility.  One can analyse the fragility of such a substance by saying that it 
would break if (for example) hit by a hammer, ceteris paribus, where this implies (among 
other things) that this would occur were it not for the finkish disposition which would, under 
such circumstances, remove the fragility of the glass.  The ceteris paribus clause will also 
imply that, for example, nor would the fragile glass break if the chosen hammer were made 
of a very soft substance or if an angel changed the laws of physics, and so on. 
By making this first kind of response I can agree with Shelley and Watkins' assumption that 
Ă sŝŶĐŝ ?Ɛ ƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐ ŝƐ Ă ŐŽŽĚ ŽŶĞ ? ĂŶĚ / ĐĂŶ ŽĨĨĞƌ ŵǇ ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ
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aesthetic values-as-capacities, according to which ideal circumstances for aesthetic 
experience preclude being instantaneously killed by the work of art in question.  The work is 
beautiful because were an ideal aesthetic experiencer to observe it they would find it to be 
so, even though this cannot occur because nobody could survive viewing the killer yellow 
paint. 
A second available response is, at least in the Da Vinci case, to bite the bullet and say that 
the painting lacks aesthetic value.  Whereas it does seem that a chameleon can be green 
even though the lights are currently off, it does not seem very plausible that something 
permanently unobservable to the human eye could really be a great piece of visual art.  Da 
Vinci may have applied his technique with great skill and inspiration and produced 
something that, were it different in just one respect, would be as great as The Last Supper.  
ƵƚďǇŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐŚĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĚŽƚŚĂƚ PǁŚĂƚŚĞĚŝĚĚŽǁĂƐĂƉƉůǇ ?ĂůďĞŝƚǁŝƚŚŐƌĞĂƚƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?Ă
type of paint that causes one to die before they can see it.   
If one were to design a sophisticated machine with a built-ŝŶ ‘ĞůĞĐƚƌŽ-ĨŝŶŬ ?ǁhich means that 
whenever one attempts to turn on the machine it is prevented from working, then one 
would plausibly have gone to great lengths to design a useless machine.  Similarly, it seems 
ƚŚĂƚĂsŝŶĐŝ ?ƐŬŝůůĞƌƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐŵŝŐŚƚďĞĂƵƐĞůĞƐƐǁŽƌŬŽĨĂƌƚ P that is, one that is devoid of 
aesthetic value.  Had the killer yellow paint been used by accident this might make a 
difference, in which case I think the case would be similar to the Picasso one in which, 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞĂƌƚŝƐƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬďĞĐomes unobservable.  I will now return to that 
type of case. 
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3.6.3 Dealing with Masks 
WŝĐĂƐƐŽ ?ƐƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĂďŽǀĞĐĂƐĞŚĂƐŶŽĨŝŶŬŝƐŚĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŽŶĞĨƌŽŵƐĞĞŝŶŐŝƚ ?
rather, an angel intervenes to prevent it from being seen.  This type of interference has 
been termed an antidote or (as I prefer) a mask.118  One might argue that the case of killer 
yellow paint is also a mask rather than a fink, in which case the remarks in the present 
section will be applicable to that case as well, and the previous section will remain 
applicable to finkish cases. 
If an object made of fragile glass is packaged so that it does not break when struck with a 
hammer, it seems that the glass itself has not ceased to be fragile; its fragility has been 
masked.  Similarly, ƚŚĞWŝĐĂƐƐŽƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐŝŶ^ŚĞůůĞǇĂŶĚtĂƚŬŝŶƐ ?ĂďŽǀĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝƐ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ?
exactly as beautiful as it would be were the angel to stop masking it from the gaze of 
potential observers.  The first response I mentioned, according to which ideal circumstances 
imply a ceteris paribus clause sufficient to render finkish cases irrelevant, is also available to 
deal with these extrinsic cases where the dispositions of the object remain present but are 
masked so as to prevent them from manifesting.  Ideal circumstances for aesthetic 
experience can be taken to imply that there is no angel masking the manifestation of the 
ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ? ŶŽƌ ĂŶǇ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƐŽƌƚ ŽĨ ĂďŶŽƌŵĂů ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŽƵůĚ
ŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ďŽƚŚ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĐĂƉĐŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ƉůĞĂse human aesthetic 
sensibilities in ideal circumstances, and of the dispositions comprising such sensibilities.   
/ŶƚŚĞWŝĐĂƐƐŽĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŝƐĂůƐŽĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂŐĂŝŶ ?WĞƌŚĂƉƐWŝĐĂƐƐŽ ?ƐƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐ ?
again, would just be a case of bad or valueless art, albeit produced with great effort by a 
genius.  If an artist is not able to communicate with his audience due to some external 
                                                             
118 See, for example, EVERETT, Anthony. Intrinsic finks, masks, and mimics. Erkenntnis, 71:2, 2009: 191-203. 
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circumstance, perhaps the artist will fail, blamelessly, to make great art.  Whether 
Response-Dependence commits me to ceteris paribus clauses, or to the view that these 
tricky cases are ones in which what might have been great works are simply ruined, it seems 
that Shelley and Watkins have not posed a serious challenge to Response-Dependence.  
Insofar as the notion of a disposition is coherent and the dispositional analysis of certain 
properties is viable, which I can only assume for the purposes of this dissertation, it seems 
that a dispositional analysis of aesthetic values in art can at least survive the objections I 
have considered thus far.  But one might worry that at least the first proposed response to 
these cases, according to which ideal circumstances imply some kind of ceteris paribus 
clause, is rather ad hoc.  I will now address this concern. 
3.6.4 Ideal Circumstances Revisited 
I have suggested that an appeal to normal or ideal circumstances may imply a ceteris 
paribus clause such that they rule out interferences such as finks and masks.  One might 
argue that defining ideal circumstances so that they rule out all interferences renders a 
Response-Dependence account of aesthetic values vacuous, as I discussed in §3.4.  But this 
is just to misunderstand the view: it is not that ideal circumstances rule out all interferences 
de dicto, just as one might desire to eat everything on a menu whatever it might be.   
Rather, as Pettit explains, there is a discounting practice relevant to our aesthetic value 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ? ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ĂƌĞ ŝĚĞĂů ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ
aesthetic values when all interferences de re are absent: that is, there are no masks, no 
finks, and so on.119 
                                                             
119 PETTIT 1993, p. 603. 
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Pettit suggests that normal conditions in a Response-Dependence analysis of redness can be 
defined as follows: 
 ?ŝŶĂŚŝŐŚĞƌ-level way as those conditions, whatever they are, which survive 
the relevant discounting practice.  Under this definition of normal conditions, 
the biconditional tells us something substantial.   It does not say that 
something is red if and only if it looks red in conditions which ensure that red 
things look red; it says that something is red if and only if it answers in a 
certain way to the sensations and practices of those who use the concept.  
But what the biconditional tells us is still plausibly a priori.  Knowledge of the 
practices current among those who use the concept is sufficient to give 
knowledge of the truth of the proposition; we do not have to know in detail 
about which conditions actually pass the discounting test.120  
Pettit is claiming here that we can know, for example, that: something falls under the 
cŽŶĐĞƉƚ  ‘ƌĞĚ ?  “ŝĨĂŶĚŽŶůǇ ŝĨ ŝƚĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ ŝŶĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶǁĂǇƚŽƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐŽĨ
ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ? ?  tĞ ĐĂŶ ŬŶŽǁ ƚŚŝƐ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů
information about those sensations and practices, or about tŚĞ ‘ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶǁĂǇ ?ŝŶƋƵĞstion. 
What Pettit and I endorse here is the view that it is not necessary to answer impossible 
questions about the exact details of an indefinite disjunction of relevant or irrelevant 
circumstances to the application of a concept, in order to have said something substantive 
about the concept.  This  ‘ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌŝƚƚĂŬĞƐ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŶŐŝĚĞĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŝŶĂ
Response-Dependence analysis of a concept does not render the analysis vacuous.  Consider 
the following analogy. 
                                                             
120 PETTIT 1993, p. 603. 
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We can know that exercise is generally good for patients with depression without knowing 
that in some particular circumstances exercise can worsen depression.  Similarly, we can 
know that redness is connected to human propensities to have experiences as of redness in 
normal circumstances, without being able to give a complete articulation of what normal 
circumstances include or exclude.  All we need to say is that normal circumstances are those 
that will survive the relevant discounting practice.   
However long the list of circumstances that do or do not pass the relevant discounting 
practice might be, the account can remain informative.  If I desire de re to eat everything on 
a menu, this says something about the sorts of foods that I directly desire, whereas if I only 
desire de dicto to eat everything on the menu, this merely suggests that I have a menu 
fetish.  In both cases, I will desire to eat something if and only if it is on the menu, but only 
in the latter case does this fail to impart information about what food I would properly 
appreciate.  That a critic in ideal circumstances would enjoy a work provides us with 
information about how the properties of that work relate to human sensibilities.  It does not 
merely tell us that a work is good if and if it would seem good in the circumstances in which 
good works seem good.  
We can make claims such as the following: an object is red if and only if it looks red in 
ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ? ?ĞƚĐ ?ĂŶĚƉƌĞĐůƵĚĞy ?z ?ĞƚĐ ? ‘ƚĐ ? ?ŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƚĂĨĂŝůƵƌĞ
to make substantive and accurate claims about a concept; it is the acknowledgement that 
no mortal could ever finish writing such a list when it is reflective of the whole environment 
and the intricate details of how we have evolved to respond to it.  My stance here when 
applied to Aesthetic Response-Dependence may have something in common with 
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tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ claim that  “ƚŽ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ǁŚĂƚ  ?ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐ ŝŶ ǁĞ ǁŽƵůĚ
ŚĂǀĞƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?.121 
To recap, it seems the circumstances ideal for the aesthetic experience of an art work can 
be defined in a higher-level way such that they rule out interferences such as finks and 
masks.  This should be read in a de re sense: the circumstances rule out interferences X, Y, Z 
and so on, and not just whatever happens to interfere.  On the account of aesthetic values in 
art that I am developing, according to which they are dispositions picked out by response-
dependent concepts, ideal circumstances can be taken to imply the absence of interferences 
such as finks and masks, and this may be possible without rendering the account vacuous 
and without requiring the enumeration of all possible interferences.   
Furthermore, Ideal circumstances involve abilities of epistemic objectivity conducive to the 
appreciation of masterpieces as identified by independent measures including the test of 
time.  Being in an ideal epistemic relation to the properties of a work of art on this account 
can imply the absence of a great many interferences, not merely because they prevent the 
experience of W as having V, but because they are inconsistent with being in a state of 
epistemic objectivity conducive to the appreciation of masterpieces.   
Another important clarification here is that I am not claiming that ideal circumstances for 
aesthetic experience give one the ability to detect interferences such as finks and masks.  
Rather, I am claiming that such circumstances, which involve both traits on the part of the 
critic and external circumstances such as lighting conditions and so on, will preclude 
interferences such as finks and masks.  If such an interference is present when one 
                                                             
121 WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig.  Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief, ed. 
Cyril Barrett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 1966: 7. 
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experiences a work of art, then one will not be in the ideal circumstances for the aesthetic 
experience of that work.  Unlike the ideal circumstances for aesthetic judgment, the ideal 
circumstances for the aesthetic experience of a work are likely to be obtainable, and need 
not involve the ability to detect metaphysical interferences. 
3.7 Conclusions 
/ŶƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ/ŚĂǀĞďĞŐƵŶƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ-Dependence theory 
of aesthetic values in art.  Like Hume I regard the responses of critics in ideal circumstances 
ĂƐĂŶŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂƌĞŝĚĞĂůŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐƚŚĞǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞ
epistemic objectivity and allow one to appreciate what the tests of time, cross-cultural and 
cross-individual appeal would suggest are masterpieces of art.  Ideal circumstances are not 
necessary for one to have valuable aesthetic experiences caused by works of art, but such 
experiences are similar to knowledge or moral behaviour in that they can be a matter of 
luck or they can be a matter of the application of reliable standards, and ideal circumstances 
provide such a standard. 
Ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience allow one to detect the capacities a work has 
to provide valuable aesthetic experiences for human beings, and this is why it is the case 
that a work is valuable if and only if an ideal aesthetic experiencer would find it to be so.  A 
ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů Ĩŝt between human sensibilities and 
salient properties such that, just as we find sugar to be sweet, we find good art to have 
features that we naturally find rewarding.  In the next chapter I will explain and defend in 
greater detail the notion that it is the values of these appreciative experiences that are the 
source of the values of works of art, even though, as I have claimed, we detect rather than 
make it the case that a work is aesthetically valuable. 
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4. Aesthetic Value Empiricism 
4.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that the aesthetic values of works of art are instrumental values, and 
that the values of aesthetic experience are non-aesthetic values.  Works are aesthetically 
valuable insofar as they are instrumental to experiences which are both aesthetic and 
valuable, but not themselves necessarily aesthetically valuable.  Instead, their value where 
positive is pleasure, and where negative is displeasure. 
I begin by summarising the two main claims I have made so far: that the aesthetic values of 
art works fall under response-dependent concepts and that they are ontologically objective. 
I then introduce Aesthetic Value Empiricism, the view that works of art are aesthetically 
valuable because the aesthetic experiences they are apt to produce are themselves 
valuable. I explain how this is consistent with these previous claims, and consider what sorts 
of value aesthetic experiences might have in virtue of which the art works with the capacity 
to produce them in ideal circumstances will themselves be aesthetically valuable.   
/ ŽƉƉŽƐĞ ǁŚĂƚ / ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ ĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ KďũĞĐƚ dŚĞŽƌǇ ? P ƚŚĞ ǀŝ ǁ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ǀĂůĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
experiences of an art work is determined by the antecedent aesthetic values of the work.  I 
defend Aesthetic Value Empiricism from the objection that it implies a heresy: that 
something other than a work of art could have the same values as the work by being apt to 
produce a similar response.    I consider this objection and the response I give to it in 
relation to various cases in which the activity of the imagination seems to bestow value 
upon a work.  I clarify that on my account the hedonic values of aesthetic experiences are 
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primary in the constitution of the aesthetic values of works of art, but are not themselves 
necessarily aesthetic values.  I defend my hedonistic theory of the value of aesthetic 
experiences from supposed counterexamples including works of Horror and Tragedy.  I 
conclude that the element of Aesthetic Value Empiricism in my account of aesthetic values 
in art does not imply the aforementioned heresy and does explain what is good about good 
art (and bad about bad art) better than the Object Theory can.  
4.1 Aesthetic Value Empiricism 
The claim that this chapter defends is that the aesthetic values of works of art qua objects ?
their object values, as it were ? depend on experience values: the values of aesthetic 
experiences offered by a work.  Works of art are objects with properties, and we have 
experiences of works of art.  To the extent that works of art can have aesthetic values, this 
must have something to do with at least some of the properties of said works.  But the 
experiences we have of the properties of works of art are also relevant to the aesthetic 
values of works of art.  At the very least, even if aesthetic values of works are entirely 
determined by properties of art objects, experiences of works of art are the means by which 
we reap the aesthetic values of works of art: the function of art objects is to produce certain 
experiences.   
The account I have been defending so far can be summarised by the following two claims: 
Aesthetic Response-Dependence: An art work W has aesthetic value V if and 
only if an ideal aesthetic experiencer IE would experience W as having V. 
Aesthetic Objectivism: IE would experience W as having V because W has V. 
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In this chapter I explain that although aesthetic values determine valuable aesthetic 
experiences in ideal circumstances, art objects are only valuable in virtue of the values of 
these experiences.  That is, valuable aesthetic experiences are not valuable because they are 
of aesthetic values; rather, aesthetic values are values because the experiences they are apt 
to produce are themselves valuable.   
This is known as Aesthetic Value Empiricism: the view that the aesthetic values of objects 
are instrumental values to produce valuable experiences, with the values of the experiences 
being primary in the constitution of the values of the objects.122  In this chapter I defend this 
claim for aesthetic values in art and explain how it is consistent with Aesthetic Response-
Dependence and Aesthetic Objectivism.   
It may seem that aesthetic values cannot be objective features of objects if they are 
dependent on our responses to them, but I argue that the standard of taste is merely a tool 
for resolvinŐĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐĂďŽƵƚĂŶŽďũĞĐƚ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ŝƚĐĂŶƚĞůůƵƐĂďŽƵƚĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ
just as a tape-measure can tell us about length without being what gives an object its 
length.  In virtue of being 10 centimetres long, an object will be found to be this long when 
held up against an accurate tape-measure.  In virtue of having the capacity to produce 
valuable aesthetic experiences for human persons in ideal circumstances, we will find that 
aesthetic evaluations formed in those circumstances reflect those objective aesthetic 
capacities, those capacities being what is aesthetically valuable in works of art.   
As I will continue to explain, aesthetic properties are properties of objects in virtue of which 
those objects are apt to provide us with aesthetic experiences.  Aesthetic values are the 
                                                             
122 SHELLEY, James. Against Value Empiricism in Aesthetics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88.4 (2010): 
707-720. 
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propensities of objects to provide us with positively or negatively valenced aesthetic 
experiences in ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience.  Thick aesthetic values such as 
elegance are descriptive properties of objects apt to produce pleasurable (or displeasurable) 
aesthetic experiences in ideal experiential circumstances.  Thin aesthetic values such as 
beauty are realised by properties which may be picked out by thick aesthetic value 
concepts.  For example, an elegant vase is one which has a certain kind of descriptive 
property which disposes the vase to produce positively valuable aesthetic experiences of 
that property.  This renders the property a beauty-making feature of the object.  The 
presence of certain thick ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ĞŶƚĂŝůƐ ĂŶ ŽďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚŝŶ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ?  &Žƌ
example a vase may be beautiful because it is elegant.  I will now further explain Aesthetic 
Value Empiricism.= 
4.1.1 Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism 
To clarify the compatibility of Aesthetic Objectivism and Value Empiricism, it is useful to see 
these views as answering two separate questions of the order of determination, 
corresponding to two distinct but compatible biconditionals: 
1. ^ƵƉƉŽƐĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝĨĂŶĚŽŶůǇŝĨ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌ ǁŽrk W has 
aesthetic value V, and A states that the aesthetic experiences an ideal 
aesthetic experiencer would have of W are themselves valuable in the 
relevant ways and to the corresponding degrees.  What is the order of 
determination between A and B? 
2. SuppoƐĞƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝĨĂŶĚŽŶůǇ ŝĨ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌƚǁŽƌŬtŚĂƐ
aesthetic value V, and C states that an ideal aesthetic experiencer 
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would experience W as having V.  What is the order of determination 
between B and C? 
1 is, at present, somewhat vague, and in this chapter I will explain it in detail.  1 is, however, 
clearly not the same as 2, and it is consistent to say that the suppositions in both 1 and 2 are 
true, and that A makes it the case that B which makes it the case that C.  Aesthetic values 
are discoverable dispositions of objects, not things we project onto objects.  But they are 
only values because of how good or bad it is to experience them. 
Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism can be understood as the conjunction of the following two 
claims: 
Aesthetic Value Empiricism: A work of art is aesthetically valuable because of 
the values of the aesthetic experiences it would produce for critics in 
circumstances ideal for aesthetic experience. 
Objectivist Aesthetic Response-Dependence: The aesthetic experiences of a 
work of art had by critics in ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience are 
experiences of what is aesthetically valuable in that work. 
The aesthetic values of art are only values because they are instrumental to valuable 
aesthetic experiences.  Some of the properties of a work may constitute aesthetic values 
because the aesthetic experiences which these properties of the work are apt to produce 
are themselves valuable.  So the values of aesthetic experiences determine the aesthetic 
values of art works.  This is distinct from aesthetic experiences determining aesthetic values, 
and consistent with aesthetic values determining aesthetic experiences.  Ideal aesthetic 
experiencers would have valuable aesthetic experiences of W because some of the 
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properties of W constitute aesthetic values because aesthetic experiences which these 
properties of W are apt to produce are themselves valuable.  Ideal aesthetic experiencers 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞƐ ůŝŬĞ  ‘ďĞĂƵƚǇ ? ? ƚŚĂƚ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ďĞŝŶŐ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇ 
determined by the dispositions of the object to produce valuable aesthetic experiences in 
ideal circumstances.   
The order of determination in 1 may be such that A because B, or that B because A.  
Aesthetic Value Empiricism implies that A is so because B is so: a work is aesthetically 
valuable because it is apt to produce valuable aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances.  
I will call the opposite view the Object Theory, after Shelley who defends such a view by 
claiming that aesthetic experiences are only valuable because they are experiences of 
aesthetically valuable objects.123   
An important difference between Aesthetic Value Empiricism and the Object Theory is that 
only the former needs to be accompanied by some theory of the value of aesthetic 
experiences.  This is because on the Object Theory aesthetic experiences may be accounted 
for as ordinary experiences of extraordinary objects: objects with aesthetic values.  
Aesthetic Value Empiricism, however, says that objects only have aesthetic values because 
the aesthetic experiences they are apt to produce are themselves valuable.  This raises the 
question: what exactly is valuable about such aesthetic experiences?  I will now consider 
some possible answers. 
4.1.2 Instrumental Aesthetic Values 
One thing that seems valuable about some aesthetic experiences is the apparent richness of 
the sensations involved, for example the experience of a good piece of music seems often to 
                                                             
123 SHELLEY 2010, p. 715. 
 135  
 
involve complexity, whether of rhythm or instrumentation or some other aspect.  Even a 
solo voice singing a simple melody may be rich in expressiveness or tone.  Some experiences 
of art seem not to involve direct perception, such as reading a novel where one uses sight 
not to view the work of art itself but rather to interpret symbols which conjure up the work 
in one's understanding and imagination.  But even these somewhat non-sensory 
experiences can have a sensory component, for instance the words may be sounded out in 
one's mind at times, especially when the writing has certain poetic qualities.   
Richness of sensation may be at least one of the things that can make an aesthetic 
experience valuable.  But in order to characterise the aesthetic values of art works in terms 
of the independently characterised values of aesthetic experiences, perception cannot be 
the focus, since it is the perception of features of artworks, which would suggest that 
making sense of the values of aesthetic experience may depend on making sense of the 
features of objects that make them aesthetically valuable.  That would seem to lead to the 
Object Theory. Instead, I will defend an account of the values of aesthetic experience from 
which we can derive an account of aesthetic properties as those things which are apt to 
produce valuable aesthetic experiences.   
As capacities of works, the aesthetic values of art are a type of instrumental value: a work is 
aesthetically valuable insofar as it is instrumental to the production of valuable aesthetic 
experiences in ideal circumstances.  Levinson describes Aesthetic Value Empiricism as the 
view that the experiences an art work can engender are primary in the constitution of the 
aesthetic values of art.124  For example, the values of listening to a great song primarily 
constitute the aesthetic values of that song, as opposed to the values of the song as an 
                                                             
124 LEVINSON, Jerrold (forthcoming).  Artistic Achievement, Appreciative Experience, and Artistic Value, 2012; 
p. 1. 
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object being primary and the values of the listening experience being derived from those of 
the song.  Aesthetic value empiricists, then, are committed to Instrumentalism about the 
aesthetic values of art, because the claim that experience values are primary in the 
constitution of object values is the claim that the object is valuable insofar as it is 
instrumental to valuable experiences. 
If the aesthetic values of art works are a type of instrumental value, we can conceive of art 
as the practice of trying to create objects which are aesthetically valuable, in the sense that 
the artist attempts to make something which is instrumental to valuable aesthetic 
experiences.  A successful work of art will be a work that has such instrumental capacities, 
or rather the degrees to which a work is aesthetically valuable in various ways will be a 
matter of the degrees to which it has such capacities.  I will now consider some 
instrumentalist theories of aesthetic value that may help to clarify the view I wish to defend. 
4.1.3 Aesthetic Values and Aesthetic Experiences 
There are a number of contemporary theories of aesthetic values which analyse them in 
terms of aesthetic experiences.  Miller claims that a work has aesthetic value if and only if it 
is capable of prompting somebody to enjoy a learning-like experience.125  Walton claims 
that an object has aesthetic value when it warrants a certain kind of response: pleasure 
taken in having an attitude such as admiration towards an aspect of the object.126  Budd 
claims that a work of art is as aesthetically valuable as the experiences it offers to those who 
understand it.127  An experiential analysis of aesthetic values seems to be orthodox in 
contemporary aesthetics, and this can perhaps be traced back to Kant's claim that objects 
                                                             
125 MILLER 2001. 
126 WALTON 1993. 
127 BUDD, Malcolm. Values of art. Allen Lane, 1995. 
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are aesthetically valuable insofar as they produce pleasurable experiences involving the 
harmonious interplay of the understanding and the imagination.128   
DŝůůĞƌ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĚƌĂǁƐŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůƐĂ “ŐƌĂŝŶŽĨƚƌƵƚŚ ?ŝŶ<ĂŶƚ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ
of aesthetic judgment: that an aesthetic value judgment is an enjoyable response based on 
experiences like those of learning, even though its goal is one with which we would not 
ordinarily associate learning (or as Kant puts it, judgments of taste have purposiveness 
without purpose).129  I will explain these ideas further in answering the following question: If 
works of art are aesthetically valuable because they can produce experiences which are 
valuable, what is it about those experiences that is so valuable?   
As Levinson explains, rewarding experiences are an essential product of artistic 
achievements, unlike other sorts of achievements.130  The achievement of an athlete in 
breaking a world record does not seem to depend on her actions being experienced in one 
way or another.  The achievement of a scientist in discovering a new type of carbon might 
depend in some way on his experience of discovery but the achievement takes place 
regardless of the values of this experience.   The achievements of art, however, seem 
necessarily to involve works of art having the capacity to produce experiences that we 
value, and this may be what makes an achievement artistic. 
A further consideration favouring the approach of Aesthetic Value Empiricism is a 
comparison between aesthetic experience and moral experience.  Moral experience, for 
example the experience of disapproving morally of the act of setting fire to cats just for fun, 
is perhaps an indication of independently-constituted moral values such as harmfulness or 
                                                             
128 KANT 1951, p. 52 (§9). 
129 MILLER 2001, p. 38. 
130 LEVINSON 2012, p. 8. 
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cruelty.131  A good moral agent or evaluator perhaps should care about such things and can 
be expected to have experiences indicative of them, which are useful for making true moral 
claims but which have no intrinsic worth: the point of morality is ultimately to do the right 
things and refrain from doing the wrong things, and moral experience may at most be a 
means to these ends.   
Of course, doing the right thing could involve undergoing experiences indicative of the 
moral valence of acts such as burning cats: the act of experiencing something in one way or 
another could conceivably be voluntary and, like any voluntary act, have a moral valence.  
But what matters in moral practice is how we behave, and this may or may not include acts 
of experiencing something in a certain way.  The appreciation of art, on the other hand, just 
is the practice of experiencing art in certain ways.  There may, therefore, be nothing beyond 
their capacity to produce certain experiences to be valued about works of art as works of 
art.  I will now attempt to defend this idea, starting with an initial appeal to intuition that I 
will then follow with a detailed response to an important objection. 
4.1.4 Empiricism and the Object Theory 
The question of what is good about good art becomes, for the aesthetic value empiricist, the 
question of what makes an aesthetic experience rewarding.  An object theorist can say that 
aesthetic experiences are rewarding or valuable when, and because, they are experiences of 
valuable objects.  Experiencing an elegant vase might be rewarding just because the vase 
has the property of being elegant independently of any disposition to respond to this 
property. 
                                                             
131 This example comes from HARMAN, Gilbert. Ethics and observation. In SHAFER-LANDAU, Russ (ed.) Ethical 
Theory: An Anthology. John Wiley & Sons, 2012: pp. 31-43. 
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Recall that, as I explained in §2.2.1, there are thick and thin aesthetic value predicates, and 
 ‘ĞůĞŐĂŶƚ ? ŝƐ ĂŶ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ Ă ƚŚŝĐŬ ƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞ P ŝƚ ĐŽŵďŝŶĞƐ Ă ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ĂŶ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞ
element.  The non-ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞ ĂƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ĞůĞŐĂŶƚ ? ǁŚĞŶ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ƚŽ Ă ǀĂƐĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ
ƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞǀĂƐĞ ?ƐƐŚĂƉĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǀĂƐĞ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĐertain responses.  But 
the object theorist will also want to say that the evaluative aspect of the term refers simply 
to the elegance of the vase, where that is a value possessed by the object, not a capacity to 
produce a valuable experience.  They might concede that an elegant vase in virtue of being 
elegant has the capacity to produce valuable aesthetic experiences, but they would 
maintain that the value of those experiences would derive from the apprehension of the 
response-independent elegance of the vase. 
But it seems to me that what is good about an elegant vase must come from its aptness to 
be appreciated as elegant.  Consider the vase and its properties in isolation from the 
capacity of those properties to produce valuable aesthetic experiences.  What value could 
such properties have, such that the vase not only falls under the descriptive component of 
ƚŚĞƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞ ‘ĞůĞŐĂŶƚ ? ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽŝƚƐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ?dŚĞƐŚĂƉĞŽĨĂŶĞůĞŐĂŶƚǀĂƐĞŝƐ
perhaps partly what makes it elegant, if the descriptive cŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ĞůĞŐĂŶƚ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŝƚƐ
ƐŚĂƉĞ ?ďƵƚŝƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƚŚŝĐŬĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ‘ĞůĞŐĂŶƚ ?ŝƐƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
concept only applies to an object if it is disposed to produce experiences of elegance.   
According to Aesthetic Value Empiricism, elegance is a value because it is a quality of things 
that we value the experience of, and this seems to offer an explanation of what is valuable 
about elegance that is lacking in the Object Theory.  Nevertheless, I will now respond to an 
argument favouring the Object Theory.  
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4.2 The Heresy of the Separable Value 
Aesthetic Value Empiricism is vulnerable to an objection endorsed by Shelley called the 
heresy of the separable value.132  The objection is that Aesthetic Value Empiricism implies 
that something other than a work of art, such as a drug, could have the same aesthetic 
values as the work, so long as it has the capacity to produce either the same aesthetic 
experiences or aesthetic experiences with the same values.  It seems wrong to say that a 
drug could have the same aesthetic values as a work of art, and so Shelley argues that 
Aesthetic Value Empiricism ought to be replaced with the Object Theory.133  
For a drug to produce indistinguishable experiences from those of a work of art, the drug 
would need to produce hallucinations as of the work of art, for example a visual 
hallucination of the Mona Lisa.  For a drug to produce experiences which are distinguishable 
and yet have exactly the same values as aesthetic experiences of the Mona Lisa, it may also 
need to be the case that the drug induces a hallucination of the painting.  One response to 
^ŚĞůůĞǇ ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŽďŝƚĞƚŚĞďƵůůĞƚand say that a drug that could produce such a 
hallucination would indeed be as aesthetically valuable as the Mona Lisa; this is not so 
costly, given how farfetched it is that such a drug could exist.  It is unlikely that in making 
this response I would commit myself to any actual drugs being the bearers of aesthetic 
values comparable to those of masterpieces of art. 
Perhaps it is merely contingent that such aesthetic masterpiece pharmaceuticals do not 
exist, but I acknowledge that the aesthetic superiority of great art works compared to drugs 
is contingent.  It may be merely contingent that enslaving racial minorities fails to maximise 
                                                             
132 SHELLEY 2010, p. 708. 
133 SHELLEY 2010, pp.719-20. 
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utility, and one might reject Utilitarianism because it cannot say that slavery is necessarily 
immoral.  But many Utilitarians are not unsettled by the mere possibility of unlikely 
circumstances in which slavery maximises good consequences, and nor do I think they need 
to be.134  But a stronger defence of Aesthetic Value Empiricism is available and may be 
preferable to biting the bullet.   
The implication that a non-existent drug would have aesthetic values might not be a great 
cost to the value empiricist, but it would be a cost to go against the orthodox view that 
forgeries of paintings, no matter how similar they might be to the originals, are usually of 
less aesthetic value than their corresponding originals.  If Aesthetic Value Empiricism implies 
the heresy of the separable value, it may do so in the case of perfect forgeries: a forgery will 
be as valuable as a masterpiece so long as it has the capacity to produce indistinguishable 
aesthetic experiences from that of the masterpiece. 
How, then, should the aesthetic value empiricist respond?  The solution may be an 
externalist theory of aesthetic experiences.  Shelley takes the aesthetic value empiricist to 
be committed to the view that aesthetic experiences are valuable because of their 
phenomenal quality.135  But Aesthetic Value Empiricism does not imply this.  Aesthetic Value 
Empiricism is consistent with the values of aesthetic experiences being partly relational: that 
is, partly due to what the aesthetic experiences are of.  Shelley seems to regard this as a 
retreat to his preferred Object Theory, but it is not clear that this is so, as I shall now 
explain.136  
                                                             
134 See HARE, Richard M. What is wrong with slavery? Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1979: 103-121. 
135 SHELLEY 2010, pp. 709-10. 
136 SHELLEY 2010, p. 710. 
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4.2.1 Externalism about Aesthetic Experiences 
The role of the understanding in aesthetic experience suggests an understanding of the 
object of the aesthetic experience: the work of art.  If we take an externalist approach to 
aesthetic experience, the work of art which is the object of an aesthetic experience can form 
part of the content of the experience: the aesthetic experience of a work of art will be the 
experience it is partly because it is an experience of that work of art.   
The Externalism I employ here is Externalism about Mental Content: the view that 
intentional states are partially constituted by their objects.  This view is developed by Colin 
DĐ'ŝŶŶ ĨƌŽŵ ,ŝůĂƌǇ WƵƚŶĂŵ ?Ɛ ^ĞŵĂŶƚŝĐ ǆƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐŵ, as I shall now briefly explain.137   
Putnam presents a thought experiment in which there is a place called  ‘dǁŝŶ-ĂƌƚŚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ
people ůŝŬĞƵƐƚĂůŬĂďŽƵƚ ‘ǁĂƚĞƌ ? ?ďƵƚǁŚĞƌĞthat term refers to the substance XYZ instead of 
H2O.  XYZ and H2O are perceptually indistinguishable in every way, but are distinct natural 
kinds.  An Earthling and a Twin-Earthling may, under exactly the same internal 
ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ƉŽŝŶƚ ƚŽ Ă ůĂŬĞ ĂŶĚ ƐĂǇ  “ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ǁĂƚĞƌ ? ? But, according to Semantic 
Externalism, the imperceptible difference in external circumstances will determine that the 
ĂƌƚŚůŝŶŐŵĞĂŶƐ ‘ƚŚĂƚŝƐ, ?K ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞdǁŝŶ-ĂƌƚŚůŝŶŐŵĞĂŶƐ ‘ƚŚĂƚŝƐyz ? ?
McGinn suggests that we should not assume that, because the experiences of H2O and of 
XYZ are indistinguishable to the speakers, they must also be indistinct.138  Which substance 
ĨŝůůƐĂůĂŬĞĐĂŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽŶĞ ?ƐŵĞŶƚĂůƐƚĂƚĞƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞůĂŬĞŚĂǀĞŽŶĞ
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ PŽŶĂƌƚŚŽŶĞ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨƐĂďŽƵƚlakes may be about H2O even though one 
does not know that water is H2O, and on Twin-Earth those beliefs may be about XYZ even 
                                                             
137 PUTNAM, Hilary. Meaning and reference. The Journal of Philosophy, 70:19, 1973: 699-711. 
MCGINN, Colin.  Charity, Interpretation, and Belief.  The Journal of Philosophy, 74:9. 1977: 521-35. 
138 MCGINN 1977, p. 531. 
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though, as far as the subject can tell, Twin-Earth lakes are no different to Earth lakes.  Thus 
McGinn arrives at Externalism about Mental Content P ƚŚĞ ǀŝĞǁ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
intentional mental states is partly determined by the environment.  I do not have space to 
thoroughly defend this view, but I endorse it and it can inform the present discussion of 
aesthetic experiences.  
On an Externalist view of aesthetic experiences (which involve intentional mental states), an 
aesthetic experience which for example involves a thought, the object of which is the Mona 
Lisa, could not occur without the Mona Lisa existing, as the painting itself is a constituent of 
the thought.  As in Externalism about Mental Content, the extension of our terms is 
determined partly by the real world, so that the content of an aesthetic experience may be 
partly constituted by the object of the aesthetic experience: the painting itself.  This will at 
least be the case for ideal aesthetic experiencers who experience works with the degree of 
epistemic objectivity required for the appreciation of masterpieces (see §3.3.1).  An 
indistinguishable aesthetic experience of something other than the work will, because it is 
not of the work, be a different aesthetic experience. 
Suppose for example that you are staring at the Mona Lisa in circumstances ideal for the 
aesthetic experience of that work and experiencing (at least some of) its aesthetic values by 
undergoing the aesthetic experiences it offers.  Suppose that you blink, and before you re-
open your eyes the painting is speedily replaced by an indistinguishable forgery.  You will 
notice no change and continue to experience what you are seeing as before, except that, 
unbeknownst to you, you will now be undergoing a different aesthetic experience, because 
the identity conditions of an aesthetic experience are partly external, and the relevant 
external circumstances have changed radically, as the work you think you are seeing is 
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nowhere to be seen.  This may help Aesthetic Value Empiricism avoid the heresy of implying 
that a perfect forgery will be as aesthetically valuable as an original; I will now explore this 
further. 
4.2.2 Externalism and Forgeries 
Externalism might not completely solve the above version of the heresy of the separable 
value challenge to Aesthetic Value Empiricism ?ĂƐŽŶĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŐĞƌǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ
they are distinct from those of the original, might be equally valuable to the experiences of 
the original.  But there are good arguments to the effect that, even if a forgery is 
indistinguishable from the original, it is aesthetically relevant that it is a forgery rather than 
the original work, and this fact should inform a proper aesthetic evaluation of the work.  If 
ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƚƌƵĞ ? Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂƌƌĂǇ ŽĨ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ǁŝůů ŶŽƚ ďĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĐĂů ƚŽ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ĂŶ
indistinguishable forgery of the work.  Nelson Goodman argues that the knowledge that one 
paintŝŶŐŝƐĂĨŽƌŐĞƌǇŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƚĂŬĞŶŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĚŝƐĐĞƌŶƚŚĞ
values of the two paintings, as this knowledge indicates that one might come to perceive 
aesthetically relevant differences between the two paintings.139   
Even if the forgery is so good that it is near-impossible to tell the two paintings apart, it is 
not the case that the forgery is just as aesthetically valuable as the original, as the fact that 
one of the paintings is (visibly or not) different in certain respects from the other is still 
ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůůǇƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ PĞǀĞŶŝĨƚŚŝƐĨĂĐƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐŚŽǁƵƉŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ
the paintings, it is relevant more generally to aesthetic practice, which includes the 
                                                             
139 GOODMAN, Nelson. Languages of art: An approach to a theory of symbols. Hackett publishing, 1968; pp. 
99-112. 
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categorisation of works as part of one or another artisƚ ?ƐĐĂŶŽŶ ?ŽƌƉĂƌƚŽĨŽŶĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶŽƌ
culture or another, and so on.   
Another example of an aesthetically relevant feature of a work, about which one is ignorant 
if one is fooled by a forgery, is the achievement a work represents.  A forgery can be difficult 
to produce, but this has never been sufficient for a work to be a substantial source of 
aesthetic pleasure.  What a forgery cannot be is an original achievement, in the sense of 
ďĞŝŶŐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĂƌƚŝƐƚ ?ƐŽǁŶĂƌƚŝƐƚŝĐǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?<ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞthat something is a 
forgery can cause us to find it to be less aesthetically valuable due to its lack of originality, 
and so an aesthetic experience of a forgery which is equal in value to an aesthetic 
experience of the original will presumably be an experience based on the misapprehension 
that one is viewing an original work.  Such a misapprehension is precluded by ideal 
circumstances, in which one would be aware of aesthetically relevant properties of a work 
such as who has authored it and when, and therefore aware of whether it is a forgery.  In 
ŝĚĞĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŝƐƐĞĞŝŶŐĂĨŽƌŐĞƌǇ ?ŽŶĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞǁŝůůŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌďĞ
indistinguishable from that of the original, and may therefore differ in value.  So much for 
forgeries, but I will now return to the original thought experiment of a drug which, 
according to Aesthetic Value Empiricism, might be capable of having the same aesthetic 
values as a work of art. 
4.2.3 Inseparable Appreciation 
As well as ruling out forgeries, ideal circumstances may also preclude being caused to 
hallucinate by mind-altering substances.  But suppose for the sake of argument that they 
would not: that there could be a drug which causes an ideal aesthetic experiencer to have 
hallucinatory experiences indistinguishable from their aesthetic experiences of a particular 
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work of art.  Externalism will not allow such experiences to be the very same experiences 
occasioned by the work, but perhaps they could realise the same values.  As I argue in the 
following sections, this would require that the experiences caused by the drug have the 
same imaginative content as the experiences caused by the work.  I argue that this can 
ŝŶǀŽůǀĞ Ă ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬĂŶĚŽĨ ŝƚƐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽŶŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ
ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚive capacities.  A hallucinogenic might only have the capacity to produce 
experiences which are more passive than this, lacking in the distinctive imaginative quality 
of aesthetic experiences.   
More generally, the passivity of an experience might prevent it from qualifying as an 
experience of aesthetic appreciation.  Levinson suggests that appreciation involves being 
actively engaged in experiencing what one appreciates.140  ,ĞĚĞĨŝŶĞƐ ‘ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐƚŚĞ
experience of something as having positive value, and explains how this is distinct from 
other relationships one might have to a work of art.  Firstly, to appreciate a work is not 
merely to perceive it, as one can perceive something without responding positively.  
Second, appreciation is distinct from merely regarding something positively, as one could do 
this without presently being acquainted with the work.  Thirdly, appreciation is distinct from 
evaluation, as the latter is a type of judgment whereas the former is a response which is not 
merely (if at all) cognitive in the way that a judgment-ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ?  /Ŷ >ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
words:  
                                                             
140 LEVINSON, Jerrold. The aesthetic appreciation of music. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 49:4, 2009: 415-
425; p. 417. 
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...evaluation misses out the essentially sympathetic tenor of appreciation, 
which seeks to avail itself of whatever value some music has to offer, rather 
than to arrive at a precise assessment of that value.141  
Levinson focuses on music here since that is the subject of his paper, but his definition of 
 ‘ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƚŚĞƌĂƌƚĨŽƌŵƐ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?>ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ
distinguishes appreciation from merely taking pleasure in the experience of a work.  
Suppose that some music starts playing inside an elevator as one attempts to reach the top 
floor of a building, and without paying much attention, perhaps without even forming the 
belief that music is playing, one starts to enjoy the music; perhaps it is relaxing.  Levinson 
would claim, rightly it seems, that this is distinct from (but possibly just as worthwhile as) 
the appreciation of music (or other art), which is a more attentive and less passive 
engagement with a work.  I will now apply this idea to the case of a drug which causes one 
to hallucinate a valuable work of art. 
4.2.4 Heretical Hallucination 
If appreciation involves actively rather than passively experiencing and enjoying something, 
and if appreciation involves experiencing something as positively valuable, this may support 
my response to the charge of the heresy of the separable value.  The problem that value 
empiricism faces is that it seems it would imply that, were a drug to create an experience 
indistinguishable from the experience of a work of art, then the drug would have the same 
aesthetic values as that work of art.  But it seems that this indistinguishable experience 
would need to be a hallucination as of the work, but perhaps hallucinatory experiences 
cannot qualify as appreciative experiences because they are too passive.  So it might simply 
                                                             
141 LEVINSON 2009, p.415. 
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be false that a drug could produce an experience of aesthetic appreciation indistinguishable 
from that of the aesthetic appreciation of a work of art. 
But suppose the drug does induce a more active experience: what then?  Hallucinations 
need not be passive if we consider dreams to be a type of hallucination: lucid dreams often 
involve not just lucidity but the apparent ability to change the course of a dream by 
performing actions within the dream, for example I once had a lucid dream in which I 
decided to explore the contents of a kitchen by opening all of the cupboard doors.  Suppose 
a drug could create an opportunity to imaginatively explore a hallucination of the Mona Lisa 
just as well as one could imaginatively explore the Mona Lisa.  Perhaps in such a scenario 
biting the bullet is the only option for the aesthetic value empiricist.   
But the scenario specifically involves a perfect hallucination of a work with which an ideal 
aesthetic experiencer is able to actively engage his imagination and understanding exactly 
as he would in response to the real work of art.  Of course, Aesthetic Value Empiricism may 
be false, but if it is true, then perhaps in such a scenario (almost certainly a scenario that will 
never occur) the drug that produces the hallucination is exactly as aesthetically valuable as 
the painting.  It is, after all, merely contingent that the Mona Lisa does not have exactly the 
same aesthetic values as other objects.   
It seems, then, that Value Empiricism can survive the objection from the heresy of the 
separable value.  That is, the values of aesthetic experiences can be primary in the 
constitution of the values of works of art, without this implying that something other than a 
work of art, such as a forgery or a drug, could have the same aesthetic values as the work, 
except perhaps in extremely farfetched circumstances.  But one might argue that the Object 
Theory nevertheless wins out because it can rule out separable values with greater ease.  
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But the apparent role of the imagination in aesthetic experience can, I think, be accounted 
for more easily by Aesthetic Value Empiricism.  I will now begin to say more about how the 
imaginative ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĂŶ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƚŚĞ ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
vales. 
4.3 Aesthetic Experience 
As I will explain, the appropriate aesthetic experiences of a work can involve the imagination 
of features that the work itself does not possess, for example a sad piece of music cannot 
literally be sad, but an appropriate experience of it may involve imagining that it is.  A good 
piece of sad music may be successful partly insofar as the aesthetic experiences an ideal 
aesthetic experiencer would have of the music would involve sad feelings or the imagination 
of sadness, and this suggests that the value of the work is derivative of the qualities of ideal 
aesthetic experiences of the work. 
The imagination allows our experiences of works of art to have contents which depart in 
certain ways from the works themselves and are plausibly the source of the values of 
aesthetic experience.  A work of art may be aesthetically valuable because it is instrumental 
to the production of aesthetic experiences which have a valuable content.  The content of 
my experience of the song I am currently listening to seems to include emotions and 
imaginings among other things, and it is plausible that these things have value in virtue of 
which the song is perhaps a good work of art.  One might argue that it is the song that is 
valuably emotional and imaginative, and that this is the right way to account for the song as 
being aesthetically valuable independently of how it is experienced.  But I will now attempt 
to demonstrate that it is better to identify the content of the experiences a good work 
produces as the source of their value.   
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In §2.5 I suggested that a Kant-inspired theory of aesthetic experience according to which it 
involves enjoying the harmonious interplay of the imagination and the understanding may 
capture what is distinctively valuable about some aesthetic experiences.  I will now begin to 
apply this view to various artistic examples, in order to demonstrate that aesthetic 
experiences can be primary in the constitution of the aesthetic values of art, without the 
objection from the heresy of the separable value rendering Aesthetic Value Empiricism 
implausible.   
I will first try to clarify my Kant-inspired psychology of aesthetic experience.  This will allow 
me to claim that properties of art objects that realise dispositions to produce experiences 
which are distinctively aesthetic are aesthetic properties.  Furthermore, insofar as the 
distinctive qualities of such experiences produce pleasure or displeasure, those aesthetic 
properties realise aesthetic values (positive or negative) because they are capacities to 
produce experiences which are both aesthetic and valuable (or disvaluable).   
/ǁŝůůďƌŝĞĨůǇĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞ<ĂŶƚ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůǀŝĞǁĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŚĂƌŵŽŶŝŽƵƐŝŶƚĞƌƉůĂǇof the faculties of 
imagination and understanding as what characterises aesthetic pleasure.  But I will retreat 
from this view to suggest that aesthetic experiences may be distinguished by their 
involvement of asserted and unasserted mental states in a playful manner.  This is inspired 
ďǇ<ĂŶƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁĂŶĚŚĂƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƐƵƉĞƌĨŝĐŝĂůůǇŝŶĐŽŵŵŽŶǁŝƚŚŝƚ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?ďƵƚ/ĚŽŶŽƚĐŽŵŵŝƚ
ŵǇƐĞůĨƚŽ<ĂŶƚ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚŽƐĞƚĞƌŵƐ ?There may be better ways to characterise what is 
distinctive about aesthetic experiences, but my goal here is just to demonstrate that an 
account of such distinctiveness is available and that it is not necessary to give an account of 
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the distinctiveness of aesthetic properties independently of how we experience them, in 
order to defend a moderate Aesthetic Objectivism. 
4.3.1 Harmonious Free Play 
The interplay between the imagination and the understanding is what Kant identified as the 
character of aesthetic ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
imaginative experiences by a proper understanding of the work.  I endorse a somewhat 
similar view of aesthetic experience, according to which it involves both asserted and 
unasserted mental representations, which conspire to generate a complex cognitive, 
perceptual and emotional experience which has the potential to be substantially 
pleasurable.   
For example, one who understands the tricky dialogue of The Wire and follows the detailed 
threads of the story will, ideally, be able to imagine what it is like to be part of an underclass 
in the city of Baltimore.  Watching a fictional television series will not be a good way of 
learning about the goings on of a real city, but it will nevertheless conjure up an imaginative 
experience of a fictional Baltimore, and this work in particular is praised for its ability to 
cause the viewer to imagine such things with an unusual level of detail and an integration 
between different aspects of society depicted in the series, for example, street gangs, 
politics, law enforcement and the working classes.  The fuel this particular work provides for 
imaginative experiences, and the constraints it places on those experiences in its attempts 
ƚŽďĞ ‘ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?ǁŚŝůĞ remaining a work of fiction, seem to make it a valuable work of art.  
Kant describes the interaction between the faculties of imagination and understanding in 
ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂƐĂƐŽƌƚŽĨ ‘ƉůĂǇ ? ?/ǁŝƐŚƚŽƉƌ ŽƐĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝŶĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐŝŶŐ 
aesthetic experience as involving asserted and unasserted thoughts.  Suspension of disbelief 
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in appreciating a fiction, for example, is a sort of make-believe and is often enjoyable for the 
same reason that children enjoy playing make-believe.142  Other imaginative experiences of 
other sorts of work are similarly playful: one can escape from the world or recreationally 
ĂůƚĞƌ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŝƚ ďǇ ƵŶĚĞƌŐŽŝŶŐ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?  Ɛ tĂůƚŽŶ ŚĂƐ ƐŚŽǁŶ ?
games of make-believe are an apt comparison with appreciation of representational art in 
general.143  
OŶDŝůůĞƌ ?Ɛ Kant-inspired view (which I introduced in §2.5.3), with certain works of art one 
can have an enjoyable, perhaps somewhat therapeutic experience, by allowing oneself to 
play in a way that the serious pursuit of learning or a moral life cannot necessarily allow.   
Miller suggests that genuine learning is an arduous thing and that recreating a similar 
experience in which there is no pressure to get things right can bring someone who pursues 
such an arduous task into an enjoyable state of release.144  I will now explore this idea of 
aesthetic experience as a playful process a little further, before considering other ways in 
which it might be valuable. 
4.3.2 Imagination and Representational Art 
The role of the imagination in aesthetic experience makes the values of certain experiences 
a better explanation of what is valuable in art than works of art by themselves.  Imagining 
might even be a necessary condition for valuable aesthetic experience.  If works of art are 
aesthetically valuable because they give us access to valuable imaginative experiences, one 
instance of this might be a work which gives us access to a fictional world.   
                                                             
142 KANT 1951, p. 52 (§9). 
143 See, for example, WALTON, Kendall L.  Mimesis as make-believe: On the foundations of the representational 
arts. Harvard University Press, 1990. 
144 MILLER 2001, p. 51. 
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James Harold argues that some works of art have values which are present only in the 
fictional worlds that the works give us access to, so that the work might have low aesthetic 
value even though it gives us access to highly valuable aesthetic experiences.145  This may, 
ĂƐ /ǁŝůů ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ƐŚŽƌƚůǇ ?ďĞ ĂŶ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDŝůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ that pursuing an intellectually 
and morally serious life can cause us to acquire a need for the experiences offered by 
certain works of art.  He claims that human intelligence seeks the enjoyment of learning, 
which can be abstracted from learning itself: one can undergo an enjoyable learning-like 
experience in which one need learn nothing, and Miller suggests that art can offer such 
experiences.146 As I have said, this idea is developed from Kant who, as I described in §2.5, 
also regards aesthetic experience ĂƐŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ‘ƉƵƌƉŽƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? ?
An example of what Kant and Miller have in mind might be an aesthetic experience that 
involves a sort of quasi-exploration: for instance, reading The Lord of the Rings, looking at 
dŽůŬŝĞŶ ?ƐŵĂƉƐŽĨDŝĚĚůĞĂƌƚŚĂŶĚĞǆĞƌĐŝƐŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĂŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ
ĂƐŽĨĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐdŽůŬŝĞŶ ?ƐĨŝĐƚŝŽŶĂůǁŽƌůĚŽĨDŝĚĚůĞĂƌƚŚ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚThe Lord of the Rings is set.  
Of course, there is no such world to explore, and there may even be no such fictional world.  
Currie has argued that so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ĨŝĐƚŝŽŶĂů ǁŽƌůĚƐ ? ĂƌĞ ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ĂŶĚǁŚĞƌĞ
possible they correspond to no possible world in particular, so there is no clear sense in 
which there are fictional worlds.147  But it is difficult to deny that it can seem as if one is 
imaginatively exploring another world whilst experiencing something like The Lord of the 
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Rings, and that this can be enjoyable, and Miller might say it is enjoyable and rewarding 
precisely because it resembles exploration without involving any genuine exploration.   
In the case of The Lord of the Rings and similar works, Harold suggests that the work may be 
to some extent valuable as a means by which to engage imaginatively with a fictional world 
which is itself aesthetically valuable, in ways that the work antecedently is not.148  Such 
cases may involve aesthetic experiences with an imaginative content that departs from the 
features of the work, for example one imagines, as Tolkien may have intended, the world of 
Middle Earth in greater detail than TolŬŝĞŶ ?ƐƚĞǆƚƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƐƉĞĐŝĨǇ ?dŚŝƐŝƐǁĞůůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĞĚĨŽƌ
on the instrumentalist or value empiricist account that I defend. 
The Fantasy genre is a good example of this because works in this genre tend to imply vast 
worlds that cannot be fully captured in the works but which the audience is expected to 
imagine.  But a work need not even have a narrative or a descriptive or pictorial content, let 
alone be a work of Fantasy, in order to justify these sorts of imaginative experiences which 
go beyond what is present in the work and yet remain appropriate to the work 
4.3.3 Imagination and Pure Music 
Imaginative experiences of fiction, pictures and other representational works of art can be 
more easily explained and justified than in cases of abstract art: to experience a novel one 
must imagine the scenes that it describes; to appreciate a painting of a landscape one must 
see a landscape in the painting, even though one is really only looking at paint.  In these 
cases, the imaginative content of the aesthetic experiences offered by the work can help to 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŚŽǁƚŚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐĂƌĞƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŝƚ
offers, and not the other way around. 
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But the imagination also seems to play an important role in non-narrative or perhaps even 
non-representational art.  Furthermore, the role of the imagination in the appreciation of 
the aesthetic values of art may explain how the content of the aesthetic experience of a 
work can involve qualities such as sadness even when the abstract, non-representational 
object of the experience is not genuinely sad   
In the case of apparently expressive abstract art such as pure music, it seems plausible that 
the imagination of emotion or expression is justified in response to the work.  Certain 
features of a piece of music, although they might not represent anything, can nevertheless 
resemble expressions of emotion, and in virtue of this have an emotional impact on the 
listener which contributes to the value of his aesthetic experience.  Other kinds of abstract 
art might do something similar. 
Pure music is thoroughly abstract and features no lyrics, no title, and seems to be comprised 
entirely of non-representational sounds.  Scruton considers such works when he states that 
imaginative aesthetic experience must remain grounded in and appropriate to the object.  
His view is that aesthetic appreciation is the appropriate enjoyment of an object for its own 
sake, with neither free-floating fantasies nor purely intellectual cognitions qualifying.149   
Scruton says, for example, that in judging that a piece of pure music is sad we imagine that it 
is sad in the way that people are: 
 ?ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂĚŶĞƐƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŵƵƐŝĐ ŝƐ ŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ ŝƌƌĞĚƵĐŝďůĞ
way analogous to hearing the expression of sadness ? say, iŶĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐǀŽŝĐĞ ? 
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 ?ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ƐĂĚ ? ŚĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ǁŚĞŶ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ƚŽ ŵƵƐŝĐ ĂŶĚ ǁŚĞŶ
ĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽŵĞŶ ?150 
I do not entirely agree with this, as it seems that we imagine the sadness in pure music as if 
ǁĞĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂƐĂĚƐƚĂƚĞŽĨĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?/ƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ response to sad music should not be 
one of pity, as it might be for a sad person, but something resembling how one might feel 
about a sad event having occurred.  Nevertheless, it seems that since abstract sounds 
cannot literally be sad, that to appreciate ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĂĚŶĞƐƐ ? ŽĨ ƐŽŵĞpieces of pure music we 
must imagine sadness of some kind.  I will now suggest another possible role for the 
imagination in the aesthetic appreciation of pure music which may suggest how abstract art 
in general may, along with representational art, engage our imaginations such that our 
aesthetic experiences may have a valuable content which departs in appropriate ways from 
the work itself.  If this is how we ought to appreciate much that is aesthetically valuable in 
art, Aesthetic Value Empiricism may account for this better than the Object Theory can. 
I will return to the case of sad music in §4.4.5 in relation to the paradox of Tragedy.  But it 
seems there is more to abstract music than just the expression of emotions.  Perhaps, when 
one listens to pure music, another appropriate way to respond is as if one is stepping into an 
imaginary world whose landscape or imaginary events match the sound of the music, in the 
same way that the ambient sounds of a room fit the physical make-up of the room or the 
events taking place in or near the room.  We almost always can hear ambient sounds that 
indicate to us features of our environment.  For example, wind whistling through the trees, 
or the echo of a voice.  Perhaps we listen to pure music in a similar way, such that we 
imagine being in an alien environment that has features that correspond to the abstract 
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sounds we can hear.  This thought is inspired by, but as far as I know not held by, Walton 
who says: 
To the extent that what we "think in" music is unthinkable otherwise, the 
listener feels in a different realm, a different world ? one that is "purely 
musical" in the sense that it is accessible to him only through music.151  
What Walton seems to be describing is analogous to the way that there are things we can 
 ‘ƐĞĞŝŶ ?ĂƉŝĐƚŽƌŝĂůƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
As Stock argues, it seems that when we appreciate a representational work of visual art we 
imagine seeing what is represented, when of course all we see is the representation.152  
Similarly, when we appreciate a non-representational work of music it is at least conceivable 
that the imagination produces a similar experience: one imagines being in a purely musical 
realm just as one might, upon hearing the sounds of traffic, understand that one is at the 
side ŽĨĂďƵƐǇƌŽĂĚ ?tĞŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚƚŚŝŶŬĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨƚŚŝƐ ‘ƌĞĂůŵ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞ ?
but nevertheless feel as though, or imagine that, our surroundings are different during the 
musical experience.   
4.3.4 Imagination and Abstract Art 
Abstract paintings may produce imaginative experiences similar to those that are produced 
by pure music, for example the appropriate way to experience a painting by Jackson Pollock 
might be to imagine that the painting is not a purely abstract distribution of paint but a 
depiction of something, just not something that one is familiar with or that one can identify.  
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Or perhaps, rather than treating such paintings as pictures, which is perhaps just to 
misunderstand them, one ought rather to feel as if one is being confronted with something 
ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ƉĂŝŶƚ ŽŶ Ă ĐĂŶǀĂƐ ? ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
imagination. 
For instance, suppose an abstract painting happens by accident to resemble light passing 
through the branches of trees: it is perhaps too much to appreciate the painting as if it is a 
picture of this, but perhaps one ought to feel a similar way to the way one would feel upon 
appreciating the beauty of light passing through the branches of trees, and other natural 
phenomena with similar qualities.  Perhaps such an experience is not especially imaginative 
and simply involves enjoying sensations that happen to resemble those that would be 
produced by aspects of nature, or perhaps there is an element of imagining that one is 
experiencing something more than paint on a canvas.   
To further illustrate what I am gesturing towards, consider the abstract painter Piet 
Mondrian, whose artistic vision might be summarised as follows: take some of the basic 
components of our visual experience of the world ? horizontal and vertical lines and primary 
colours ? and combine them in abstraction from nature but in a manner that produces a 
similar response to that produced by beauty in nature.  It may be that in appreciating a 
Mondrian we imagine that we are seeing these colours and shapes in the natural world.  Or 
it may be that the paintings, even though they do not depict anything for us to see in the 
painting, nevertheless cause us to respond as we might respond to similar colours and 
shapes in nature, without our having to imagine that the painting is a picture of something.  
For example, whatever one would feel upon encountering a certain kind of beautiful 
 159  
 
landscape, that feeling may be occasioned by some abstract work that resembles the 
landscape, and that may be how the work manages to function as a beautiful object.   
IƚĚŽĞƐƐĞĞŵƚŚĂƚŽŶĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨĂŶĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐĐĂŶŚĂǀĞĂŶŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ
which does not correspond to a simple veridical perception of the paint on canvas, and this 
content may be the source of the value of the experience without the object itself being the 
source of this value.   
As I mentioned in §4.2, Shelley assumes that Aesthetic Value Empiricism is committed to the 
view that aesthetic experiences are valuable in virtue of their phenomenal character.  I have 
attempted to show that this assumption is false with examples of what seem to be valuable 
aesthetic experiences which are valuable in virtue of their content.  Works of art are, as 
Shelley puts it, antecedently valueless, but the mystery of how such things can produce 
aesthetic experiences, which are valuable not simply because of what it is like to have them, 
can be solved by clarifying that the content of the aesthetic experience of a work can, due 
to the role of the imagination, apprŽƉƌŝĂƚĞůǇĚĞƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵĂŵĞƌĞĂƉƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ
appearance.153  
Aesthetic experiences are valuable because of the way they are, rather than because of 
what they are of.  The imagination is integral to the pleasures of aesthetic experience: we 
imagine the unfolding of fictional events or the sensible properties of fictional scenes, we 
allow two dimensions to appear as if they are three, and even abstract art, which does not 
depict anything for us to imagine, can give one an experience akin to that of being in some 
other realm or perceiving something other than what is actually present.  However, 
imaginative aesthetic experiences are inappropriate when they float free of the constraints 
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set by the work, so for example looking for a pictorial content in a purely abstract painting 
ǁŝůů ŶŽƚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ?
because such an experience is too much an experience of the content of personal 
imaginings rather than an experience of the object.  Having argued that Aesthetic Value 
Empiricism gives a plausible explanation of what is good about good works of art, which the 
Object Theory seems unable to offer, I will now argue against a construal of Aesthetic Value 
Empiricism according to which the values of aesthetic experiences are aesthetic values. 
4.4 The Non-Aesthetic Values of Aesthetic Experiences 
As should now be clear, Aesthetic Value Empiricism essentially characterises aesthetic value 
as a type of instrumental value: the value of being instrumental to the production of 
valuable aesthetic experiences.  A spanner, perhaps, is instrumentally valuable in the sense 
that it is valuable only insofar as it allows one to do things which are themselves valuable, 
such as mend a car.  Works of art are tools for the production of worthwhile experiences, 
and some such tools can be used to perform this function with greater success than others.  
On my account, art is the practice of trying to produce an object infused with capacities to 
produce valuable aesthetic expeƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌďĞŝŶŐĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƉĂǇ-off.  But what exactly 
ŝƐ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ƉĂǇ-ŽĨĨ ? ?  tŚĂƚ ƐŽƌƚƐ ŽĨ ǀĂůƵĞ ĚŽ ƐŽŵĞ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ Ăƌƚ ŚĂǀĞ ? The 
answer I wish to give is simple: aesthetic experiences can, in virtue of their aesthetic 
character, be pleasant or unpleasant to various degrees.  I will defend this claim at the end 
of the present chapter from the objection that it cannot account for the aesthetic values of 
apparently unpleasant works such as horror, tragedy or sad music.   
The pleasure I refer to is ordinary pleasure, taken in somewhat extraordinary experiences 
which involve asserted and unasserted thoughts about wor
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experiences of them.  The experiences have a distinctive aesthetic character as I have been 
explaining, but the pleasure itself is ordinary and does not constitute distinctively aesthetic 
pleasure and, as I will now explain, is not an aesthetic value of aesthetic experiences, but 
rather an ordinary hedonic valence. 
Aesthetic Value Empiricism says that the aesthetic values of art works depend on experience 
values: values of the aesthetic experiences that works have the capacity to produce.  If 
these experience values are aesthetic values, there could be a problem.  If Aesthetic Value 
Empiricism says that aesthetic values are capacities to produce valuable aesthetic 
experiences, then for an aesthetic experience E1 to be aesthetically valuable it would need 
to have a capacity to produce a further valuable aesthetic experience E2.  If the aesthetic 
values of things derive from the aesthetic values of the aesthetic experiences those things 
have the capacity to produce, then it seems that in order for E1 to have the aesthetic values 
/ Ăŵ ƐƵƉƉŽƐŝŶŐ ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ?  ? ?Ɛ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ĂůƐŽ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ.  This 
seems to lead to an infinite regress: E1 is aesthetically valuable in virtue of having the 
capacity to produce E2 which must be aesthetically valuable in virtue of having the capacity 
to produce E3, and so on for every En. 
There are two ways the value empiricist might halt this regress.  Firstly, Aesthetic Value 
Empiricism can be interpreted as saying that only the aesthetic values of works of art are 
instrumental values to produce valuable aesthetic experiences.  The aesthetic values of 
aesthetic experiences need not be analysed in the same way.  But if aesthetic experiences, 
as well as objects such as works of art, can be the bearers of aesthetic values, then it seems 
they would be subject to aesthetic evaluation.  It seems that if works of art can be 
aesthetically valuable then this can justify the practice of forming aesthetic value judgments 
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about them.  But is there any practice of forming aesthetic judgments about aesthetic 
experience?   
Perhaps we do sometimes form such judgments, but in cases in which we aesthetically 
evaluate works but not the aesthetic experiences we have of them, it seems that we 
attribute aesthetic values to the work in question but not to the aesthetic experiences it 
produces.  If works of art are aesthetically valuable in virtue of the aesthetic values of the 
(ideal) aesthetic experiences they can produce, then to properly evaluate works we must 
aesthetically evaluate the experiences they produce (in ideal circumstances), and it seems 
that this is not the proper way to evaluate all works of art. 
The second option for the Aesthetic Value Empiricist is to say that the values of aesthetic 
experiences, in virtue of which what has the capacity to produce them is aesthetically 
valuable, are non-aesthetic values.  This halts the infinite regress because Value Empiricism 
only says that aesthetic values are instrumental, not that the values of aesthetic experiences 
are instrumental.  However, this option need not rule out possible cases in which aesthetic 
experiences are aesthetically valuable and instrumental to further aesthetic experiences 
which are in some sense valuable.  This point is illustrated by the following analogy. 
4.4.1 An Analogy with Higher-Order Thoughts 
The Higher-Order Thought theory of consciousness says, roughly, that a mental state is 
conscious if and only if there is a higher-order mental state which represents it.154  There is 
no infinite regress of higher-order thoughts on this view because the view does not claim 
that all mental states are conscious states.155  TŚĞ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŵĞŶƚĂů
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states are about others, and the mental states which are represented by others are 
conscious, and the ones that are not represented by others are unconscious.  However, just 
because no infinite regress follows from this theory of consciousness, this does not mean 
that there cannot be any conscious higher-order thoughts.   
For mental state M1 to be conscious, there must be a mental state M2 which represents 
M1.  M2 may or may not itself be conscious; if it is conscious this will be because there is a 
mental state M3 which represents M2.  M3 also might be conscious, and in theory this 
regress of conscious higher-order thoughts can go on for as long as the finite capacity of the 
mind will allow.  It is perhaps unlikely that the regress will extend far, but the point is that 
the Higher-Order Thought theory is neither committed to an infinite regress nor to a 
bottoming-out (for want of a better term) of higher-order thoughts at any level in particular.   
Similarly, the Aesthetic Value Empiricist can say that for a work of art to be aesthetically 
valuable, it must have the capacity to produce a valuable aesthetic experience E1.  If the 
value of E1 is aesthetic value, then E1 will have the capacity to produce the valuable 
aesthetic experience E2.  The value of E1 could be non-aesthetic, and then there need be no 
capacity to cause E2, and there is no regress.  But just because there is no infinite regress, 
this does not mean there can be no finite regress.  Aesthetically valuable aesthetic 
experiences may sometimes occur, so long as there is a bottoming-out at some level where 
there is a non-aesthetically valuable aesthetic experience which requires no further 
aesthetic experiences to explain its value.   
For example, a work might be aesthetically valuable because of its capacity to cause E1 
which is aesthetically valuable because of its capacity to cause E2 which is aesthetically 
valuable because of its capacity to cause E3, and so on until we reach E17 which is non-
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aesthetically valuable.  This would be a theoretical possibility, but of course I cannot imagine 
a work of art ever having the capacity to produce, in ideal circumstances, seventeen layers 
of valuable aesthetic meta-experience.  As with the Higher-Order Thought theory, it is likely 
that the regress of aesthetically valuable aesthetic experiences does not extend far, if at all, 
but the point is that the Aesthetic Value Empiricist is committed neither to an infinite 
regress, nor to a bottoming-out of valuable aesthetic experiences at any one level.   
Aesthetically valuable aesthetic experiences are not ruled out on my account, but nor is my 
account committed to them, and certainly not an infinite series of them.  If there are 
aesthetically valuable aesthetic experiences, perhaps an example would be the post-
mortem, as it were, that one might go through after having appreciated a work of narrative 
fiction.  Suppose you see a film and find the experience very rewarding.  Days later, having 
found the film so interesting, you might find yourself thinking about key moments in the 
film, or themes or ideas that it embodied, and you might find yourself relishing the 
experience of imagining the world in which the fiction is set, or what might occur within that 
world after the film has ended.  Perhaps this experience is itself aesthetic and is an 
enjoyable aesthetic experience appropriate to its object, where the object is not the film 
itself, but rather an appropriate aesthetic appreciation of the film which one can recall 
experiencing.  This might render the aesthetic experience E1 of the film ? in virtue of which 
the film is aesthetically valuable qua capable of producing E1 ? aesthetically valuable qua 
capable of producing E2, this being the subsequent aesthetic appreciation of E1. 
But I remain neutral as to whether the above would ever be ĂŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
psychological processes following an experience of art.  Perhaps no aesthetic experiences 
are themselves bearers of aesthetic value.  That would be no objection to my claim that 
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works of art are aesthetically valuable in virtue of the non-aesthetic valence of ideal 
aesthetic experiences of them.  To object to my claim here one must argue that there is 
some problem with the aesthetic values of works deriving from the hedonic value of 
aesthetic experiences of those works.  I will shortly discuss what seems to be the main 
objection to that hedonistic element of my account. 
One could alternatively say that there are two kinds of aesthetic value: the kind that 
attaches to works of art and other objects; and the kind that attaches to experiences of 
those objects, in virtue of which the objects have the aesthetic values they have.  But the 
option of introducing non-aesthetic values seems preferable to introducing two kinds of 
aesthetic value, one for works of art and one for aesthetic experiences.  This is because the 
ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ŝŵƉůǇ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
aesthetic values one must always form aesthetic value judgments about aesthetic 
experiences.  At least in some cases it seems we can simply have a valuable aesthetic 
experience that a work has the capacity to produce, and evaluate the work on the basis of 
this, without also evaluating the experience itself.   
If I am wrong about this then the other option may suffice: aesthetic experiences may be 
aesthetically valuable, just not in the instrumental sense in which the works that cause the 
experiences in ideal circumstances are aesthetically valuable.  If I am right and the values of 
aesthetic experiences are not aesthetic values, it seems that their value can be hedonic 
since, as I will argue shortly, it seems plausible that positively valuable aesthetic experiences 
are always pleasurable at some level.  This hedonic value may even be a type of moral value, 
for example according to Utilitarianism which combines a hedonistic theory of value with 
Consequentialism, or just because as Miller argues we can develop a need for the pleasures 
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of aesthetic experience, and the value of being instrumental to the satisfaction of a need 
may be construed as a moral value.  But I do not need to be committed to this idea for the 
purposes of this dissertation.   
Suffice it to say that it seems that there is a distinctive source of pleasure in the aesthetic 
experience of good art, involving something like the harmonious interplay of the 
imagination and understanding, and works may be aesthetically valuable insofar as they are 
instrumental to the production of such aesthetic pleasure in ideal circumstances for 
aesthetic experience.  Similarly a work may be aesthetically disvaluable insofar as it is apt to 
produce unpleasant aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances.  The hedonic valence of 
aesthetic experiences of works is primary in the constitution of the instrumental aesthetic 
values of those works. 
4.4.2 The Paradox of Horror and Tragedy 
I have suggested that the values of aesthetic experiences ? in virtue of which what is apt to 
produce them is aesthetically valuable ? are not themselves aesthetic values but instead are 
values of pleasure or displeasure, taken in distinctively aesthetic experiences.  The thought 
is roughly that, insofar as appropriate aesthetic experiences of a work are pleasant or 
unpleasant, the work is aesthetically good or bad respectively.  But, contrary to this, it often 
seems that the appropriate appreciative experience of a good work of art is quite 
unpleasant.  Consider this extract from Wuthering Heights: 
The intense horror of nightmare came over me: I tried to draw back 
my arm, but the hand clung to it, and a most melancholy voice 
sobbed, 'Let me in - let me in!' 'Who are you?' I asked, struggling, 
meanwhile, to disengage myself. 'Catherine Linton,' it replied, 
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shiveringly (why did I think of Linton? I had read Earnshaw twenty 
times for Linton) - 'I'm come home: I'd lost my way on the moor!' As it 
spoke, I discerned, obscurely, a child's face looking through the 
window. 
Terror made me cruel; and finding it useless to attempt shaking the 
creature off, I pulled its wrist on to the broken pane, and rubbed it to 
and fro till the blood ran down and soaked the bedclothes...156  
This is a revolting scene from which there is no obvious pleasure to be taken.  Yet it is a 
good part of the book, or so I and many other readers would claim, and one can undergo an 
ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŝƚ ?/ƚƐĞĞŵƐ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ƚŚĂƚĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĞǀĞŶ ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?
aesthetic experience, might not necessarily be pleasurable.   
But this is at odds with our behaviour towards such apparently unpleasant works: ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚ 
just endure works of Horror or Tragedy, we seek them out, spend money on them, and treat 
them as recreation.  Take the film 12 Years a Slave, which depicts the true horrors of slavery 
in the 19th century, in a very vivid and shocking way (all the more shocking given the 
knowledge that the film is a re-enactment of real events).  One hesitates to use words such 
ĂƐ ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ŽƌƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚŽŶĞĞŶũŽǇĞĚŝƚ ?ďƵƚŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐƚŚĞĨŝůŵǁĂƐ
shown at cinemas where people chose to pay money see it, often (as with any film) as a 
social outing with friends or family.  It is implausible that this behaviour can be entirely 
explained without reference to some kind of enjoyment of the work, as it seems people do 
not ordinarily engage in behaviour that will merely upset and horrify them, especially not as 
a way of spending leisure time with friends. 
                                                             
156 BRONTE, Emily. Wuthering Heights.  Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1992; pp. 28-9. 
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Furthermore, it is not as though the film contains new revelations about slavery that are not 
common knowledge already, or that the anti-slavery arguments advanced in parts of the 
film and implied in other parts are in any way controversial to the average viewer.  Currie 
has persuasively defended a scepticism about fiction as a reliable source of moral 
instruction.157  It might be that we falsely believe in such reliability and seek out works of 
tragedy or horror for such instruction, but it seems rather implausible that the average 
cinema-goer would invite his friends out for an evening of moral instruction, rather than an 
evening of aesthetic experience.   
4.4.3 Addressing the Paradox 
A simple available explanation as to the popularity and apparent aesthetic value of works of 
horror and tragedy is that we do actually enjoy the act of appreciating such works.  Hume 
attempts to explain how this is so with a theory according to which imaginative and other 
responses to something which also elicits unpleasant feelings can, in some cases and not 
ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŶǀĞƌƚ ?ĂƐŝƚǁĞƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƵŶƉůĞĂƐĂŶƚŶĞƐƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŝŶƚŽĂƉůĞĂƐƵƌĂďůĞ
aesthetic experience.  So a good work of tragedy might make you feel sad, but those 
feelings are overshadowed by the overall appreciative experience of the work.  On the other 
hand, a bad work of tragedy might fail to produce an appreciative experience which can 
outweigh the negative feelinŐƐ ŝƚ ĞůŝĐŝƚƐ ?  Ƶƚ ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁ ŝƐ ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚ ŽďƐĐƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ŚĂƐ
fallen out of favour.   
More recently, Berys Gaut suggests, roughly, that there is no paradox of horror (and 
presumably the same can be said of the paradox of tragedy) because negative emotions are 
                                                             
157 See, for example, CURRIE, Gregory. The moral psychology of fiction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
73:2, 1995: 250-259. 
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not intrinsically unpleasant: they are typically unpleasant due to the evaluations they tend 
to involve, but in the context of aesthetic experience one might feel, for example, fear, 
without forming the kinds of negative evaluations that would make this an unpleasant 
sensation (as it would be if you took yourself or those you care about to be in genuine 
danger).158 
Alternatively, Susan Feagin suggests that the paradox of tragedy (or of horror or other kinds 
of deliberately somewhat unpleasant art) can be solved by acknowledging that we have 
unpleasant reactions to certain works of art that we enjoy, but that this is compatible with 
having a pleasurable reaction to the situation that this puts us in.159  For example, one might 
cry at a film about the holocaust due to genuine feelings of sadness, and at the same time 
ďĞŐůĂĚ ƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŚĂƐƐƵĐŚĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ Ĩŝůŵ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŽĞůŝĐŝƚ
them in creative ways.   
The above attempts to solve the paradox of Tragedy or Horror are not in any obvious 
conflict with one another.  I will not attempt to defend any one of them in particular, but it 
seems we are well-stocked in solutions to this problem: the burden of proof, I think, is on 
one who wishes to claim that there is some kind of problem with positive aesthetic value 
necessarily involving pleasure.  But I will consider one more solution to the apparent 
paradoxes in a little more detail, as it follows from a theory of aesthetic appreciation which 
can explain much more than just the values of Horror and Tragedy. 
                                                             
158 GAUT, Berys. The Paradox of Horror.  British Journal of Aesthetics, 33:4, 1993: 332-46. 
159 FEAGIN, Susan.  The Pleasures of Tragedy.  American Philosophical Quarterly, 20:1, 1983: 95-104. 
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Walton seems to offer a similar solution to Feagin in the course of describing his general 
theory of aesthetic value.160  In his terms, we are inclined to find a work to be marvellous 
and take delight in this, even when what we are admiring is its capacity to elicit what in 
other contexts we would prefer not to experience.  Unpleasant responses may be pleasant 
ĂƚĂŚŝŐŚĞƌůĞǀĞůŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚǁĞĞŶũŽǇĂĚŵŝƌŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƚŚĞŵ ?
Or as Walton puts it:   
 ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚŽŶĞĞnjoys being revolted or judging a work negatively, one 
might at the same time admire it for its capacity to produce revulsion or to 
elicit a negative judgment, and one might enjoy admiring it for this.  If we 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƌƚŝƐƚ ?Ɛ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŽ ĚŝƐŐust the appreciator or to 
provoke negative judgments, we may admire with pleasure his achievement 
in accomplishing this end.  The kind of aesthetic value that consists in a 
ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŽĞůŝĐŝƚƉůĞĂƐƵƌĂďůĞĂĚŵŝƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĐĂŶƚŚƵƐĐŽĞǆŝƐƚǁŝƚŚ ?ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚĞĞĚ
depend on, a capacity to disgust or irritate or evoke negative judgments.  And 
we may, accordingly, judge the work positively.161 
Walton claims that in aesthetic experience we do not merely enjoy pieces of art.  We take 
delight in judging them to be good; we appreciate them.162 His theory of aesthetic values is 
ƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽDŝůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚŚĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐĂƐĂŶĂƉƚŶĞƐƐƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ
rewarding aesthetic experiences.  Walton claims that an object has aesthetic value when it 
warrants a certain kind of response: pleasure taken in having an attitude such as admiration 
                                                             
160 WALTON 1993. 
161 WALTON 1993, p. 508. 
162 WALTON 1993, p.505. 
 171  
 
towards an aspect of the object.163  /ĚŽŶŽƚĞŶĚŽƌƐĞtĂůƚŽŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐŝŶ
full, but it offers an interesting general notion: that the aesthetic experiences on which 
aesthetic values may depend could involve admiring an artist's achievement in producing a 
work of art, rather than simply admiring features of the work such as brushstrokes and key 
changes. The aesthetic experience of works of art can sometimes involve admiring the 
artist's achievement.  Sometimes, though, the artist is not consciously a part of our 
experience.  Perhaps in such a case our attitude is not always one of admiration, or perhaps 
we take no attitude at all and simply have a pleasurable response occasioned by the work.   
It seems that the question of how a work of art can be good in virtue of its capacity to 
induce unpleasant feelings can be answered broadly according to a Waltonean view that we 
take a pleasurable attitude towards some of the capacities of some works of art and this 
may include their capacities to make us have unpleasant feelings.  The paradigm valuable 
aesthetic experience of a work of art is one of pleasure: one enjoys the way the music 
sounds, or the way an artefact looks, or the content of the story being told, or whatever one 
is acquainted with by experiencing a work of art.  There are apparent counterexamples to a 
principle that states that a work is good insofar as it elicits pleasure: for example a good film 
about the horrors of the Second World War should not, it seems, elicit pleasure throughout 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨŝƚ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐĞĞŵƐƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞŐŽŽĚǁŽƌŬƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĞŶũŽǇĞĚ
at all.  However, Walton and others demonstrate that we need not enjoy the content or 
features of a work of art in order to enjoy the achievements that they represent.   
                                                             
163 WALTON, 1993, pp. 504-5. 
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A good war film is an achievement in, for example, moving an audience to tears in a way 
that reflects not an overly sentimental or fictionalised understanding of historical events but 
something like a realistic reproduction of how it can feel to be part of that sort of event.   
A recent television drama called Amber achieves a similar thing, in my opinion: the 
empathetic viewer cannot help but imagine what it is like to experience what the characters 
experience, namely, losing a child and not knowing if she is alive or dead or where or why 
she has gone, and never finding the answer to any of these questions.  This is, of course, the 
imaginative reconstruction of a horrible experience, so it might seem odd that viewers are 
drawn to such things or that they represent a valuable achievement.  But the fact is that, for 
whatever reason, we are drawn to such works, perhaps because we do take pleasure in 
ĂĚŵŝƌŝŶŐ ĂŶ ĂƌƚŝƐƚ ?Ɛ ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝǀĞ ƌĞĐƌĞĂƚion of a horrible experience, and this need not be 
explained by some sort of masochism, but simply by our tendency to take pleasure in 
valuing the achievements of artists.  It seems likely that valuable aesthetic experiences 
necessarily involve pleasure, even in cases of Horror or Tragedy, since pleasure can act as an 
incentive to seek out experiences of such works, which of course we often do. 
4.4.5 Sad Music Revisited 
As well as works of Horror and Tragedy, which tend usually to be depictions of one kind or 
another of something horrific or tragic, there are also abstract works of art which can have 
intense emotional effects when properly appreciated.  As I explained in §4.3.3, Scruton says 
that the sadness involved in some pieces of pure music is imaginary given the fact that 
abstract sequences of sound are incapable of genuinely being sad.164  More specifically, 
perhaps what sadness in pure music amounts is that an appropriate aesthetic experience of 
                                                             
164 SCRUTON 1974, p. 122. 
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some pure music will involve one or more of the following: imagining that the music feels 
sad; imagining that the music is a sad event; feeling sad; feeling sympathy; or having some 
other kind of sadness-related experience.   
Appropriate experiences of sad music, then, may feature sadness or something related to 
sadness, whereas the music itself is abstract and only sad insofar as appropriate experiences 
of it are as described.  It may be that the imaginative quality of aesthetic experiences is 
what supplies such abstract works with their derivative sadness, but the imaginative 
experience of the work must be appropriate to it.  Furthermore, for the experience of sad 
music to be valuable, so that works of sad music can themselves be aesthetically valuable, 
there must be more to the experience than unpleasant emotions: one must take pleasure in 
appreciating the music, perhaps as an achievement in moving the listener emotionally. 
tĂŐŶĞƌ ?ƐWƌĞůƵĚĞƚŽTristan und Isolde is famously expressive of certain emotions which can 
be extremely unpleasant, such as yearning and despair.  It is also, I assume, an excellent 
piece of music, and this is plausibly because an appropriate experience of it, while it might 
resemble or reflect the unpleasant emotions expressed, nevertheless involves a certain 
satisfaction taken in experiencing what seems to be a masterful artistic expression of 
emotion.   
In defending Aesthetic Value Empiricism, and identifying the hedonic valence of aesthetic 
experiences as primary in the constitution of the aesthetic values of works of art, I have 
needed to offer an explanation of how we may take pleasure in aesthetically valuable works 
of Horror and Tragedy and other apparently unpleasant kinds of art.  It seems that there is 
no real paradox in our appreciation of these things, and so this is not a problem for the 
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claim that works of art are positively valuable in virtue of the positive values of the 
experiences they offer, including experiences that involve negative feelings.   
Furthermore, no concession to the Object Theory is made in my claim that the unpleasant 
content of an aesthetic experience need not necessarily render the work apt to produce the 
experience negatively valuable in that respect.  This is because it is not the antecedent 
values of the object which make up for the unpleasantness of the experience; rather, it is 
the additional pleasantness of the experience that renders the experience positive despite 
having a negative component.  For example, one may feel fear at a Horror film, which may 
be unpleasant, but one may also feel pleasure in admiƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĞůŝĐŝƚƐƵĐŚ
fear just by the use of sound and vision presented in a safe environment.  
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have explained the notion of Aesthetic Value Empiricism which forms part 
of my account of aesthetic values in art.  I have argued that aesthetic values in art are 
instrumental values to produce valuable aesthetic experiences.  Valuable aesthetic 
experiences are enjoyable at some level in a way that involves imagination and 
understanding.  The value of aesthetic experiences in virtue of which art works apt to 
produce them are aesthetically valuable may not itself be aesthetic value.  In the following 
three chapters of this dissertation I will defend Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism from 
various objections and rival theories, starting with a discussion of apparently faultless 
disagreements, which pose a challenge to forms of Aesthetic Objectivism. 
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5. Relativism and Faultless Disagreements 
5.0 Introduction 
In the previous four chapters I have argued that our apparently conflicting intuitions about 
the objectivity or subjectivity of aesthetic values in art can be reconciled by what I am calling 
Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism.  The account combines the following three claims (where V 
is a positive aesthetic value such as beauty or elegance): 
Humean Response-Dependence: An art work W has aesthetic value V if and 
only if an ideal aesthetic experiencer IE would experience W as having V. 
Aesthetic Objectivism: IE would experience W as having V because W has V. 
Aesthetic Value Empiricism: W has V because the above experience is itself 
valuable in virtue of being pleasurable in a complex manner involving 
imagination and understanding. 
Where V is a negative aesthetic value such as ugliness or garishness, instead of being 
pleasurable the latter experience will have a negative hedonic valence.   
The aesthetic values of works of art are capacities to elicit valuable aesthetic experiences in 
ideal circumstances.  Those aesthetic experiences are subjective in the sense that what they 
are like can only be known from the inside, but whether a work has the capacity to produce 
such an experience is objective in the sense that it supervenes on features, such as 
distributions of paint or sequences of notes, that the work has independently of how it is 
experienced or how we are disposed to experience it. 
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In this chapter I argue that apparent cases of faultless aesthetic disagreement can be 
explained on the above account as faultless variations in aesthetic experience.  I also argue 
that the account can accommodate other considerations that might be seen to favour a 
more fine-grained sort of Aesthetic Relativism.  I consider various shades of Aesthetic 
Relativism in relation to disagreements and differences of interpretation and suggest that 
my view can account for these phenomena more successfully than other relativistic 
theories. 
5.1 Aesthetic Relativism 
Relativism is a type of view that involves identifying a reference class and claiming that the 
nature of something is relative to this class.  For example, Cultural Relativism in aesthetics 
states that the aesthetic values of an object are relative to cultures, so that the same object 
can have an aesthetic value relative to some cultures and lack that same value for different 
cultures.  An example of this might be the London 2012 Olympic opening ceremony which 
included a comedy sketch that was received differently by the media in different nations. 
The sketch was themed after the James Bond film franchise and included a man dressed to 
look like Queen Elizabeth II, skydiving into the Olympic Stadium.  Many viewers in Britain 
and elsewhere found the sketch amusing, but it was reported that in China, for example, 
ƐŽŵĞ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƚŽƌƐ ƐĞĞŵĞĚ  “ƐƚƵŶŶĞĚ ƚŽ ŶĞĂƌ-ƐŝůĞŶĐĞ ? ?165   They might have not 
understood that it was intended to be funny, or they may have understood this but not 
found it funny due to cultural differences between their nation and others in which viewers 
did find the sketch amusing.   
                                                             
165 TOPPING, Alexandra.  Olympics opening ceremony: the view from abroad [online].  The Guardian, 2012 
[viewed 25 August 2014].  Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2012/jul/27/olympics-opening-
ceremony-view-from-abroad. 
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Perhaps being part of a community which does not find such things funny amounts to not 
being in the circumstances ideal for the aesthetic experience of this comedy sketch.  Or 
perhaps a work which is funny to competent critics in one culture and not funny to 
competent critics in another is funny relative to some cultures and not others.  Certainly 
there are works of art with which this phenomenon occurs: they are generally liked by some 
cultures and disliked by others.  Supposing that this is the case with the Olympic sketch, a 
cultural relativist can say that the sketch was funny relative to British culture, and not funny 
relative to, for example, Chinese culture.   
I should clarify that I am simplifying for the sake of argument: obviously there is no single 
Chinese or British culture, and one person can presumably belong to many cultures.  But 
supposing that we have a situation where two separate cultures form different judgments 
about the comedy value of a sketch, the cultural relativist can say that the comedy value of 
the sketch really did vary from culture to culture.  
On my account, aesthetic values are anthropocentric, and this might be understood as a 
kind of Aesthetic Relativism, with human beings as a reference class relative to which works 
of art can be aesthetically valuable in various ways.  This would be a coarse-grained form of 
Aesthetic Relativism, as the reference class is large.  Relativism to individual subjects at 
particular times would be an example of a very fine-grained type of Aesthetic Relativism.  
There are various other degrees to which a type of Relativism may be coarse- or fine-
grained: potential reference classes include subcultures, social classes and levels of 
maturity.   
What all forms of Aesthetic Relativism have in common is the claim that not only do 
different types of critic prefer different works of art, but works of art really are aesthetically 
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valuable or disvaluable for some groups or individuals and not others, so that faultless 
disagreement is possible: two critics can form contrary aesthetic value judgments about the 
same object without any possibility of either critic making an epistemic improvement by 
revising her judgment.  I will now consider the extent to which Moderate Aesthetic 
Objectivism involves Relativism. 
5.2 Aesthetic Sensibilities  
In §3.2.3 I suggested that, according to my own Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism, disparate 
aesthetic experiences may occur in ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience, due to 
variations of sensibility.  Sensibilities can vary between individuals, species, and other 
groupings of individuals.  The sensibilities of members of the human species have a degree 
of similarity partly in virtue of which they can be identified as members of the same species.  
For example human perceptual, emotional, cognitive and other faculties can be regarded as 
features of a human sensibility type, and my own set of dispositions to respond to the 
world, insofar as I have them because I am a human being, constitute a particular token of 
that type.  But human sensibilities do, of course, vary between individuals and between 
groups.    
There are sensibility abnormalities of various kinds: for example, most of us perceive colour 
approximately the same way, so far as we can tell, but of course there is such a thing as 
colour-blindness; there is also such a thing as amusia, which involves an abnormal 
insensitivity to pitch leading to the inability to appreciate music in the way that most human 
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beings are able to.166  Apart from such conditions we also vary in subtler ways and in ways 
that we do not regard as deficiencies. 
Within a type, sensibility tokens can vary in terms of refinement, as in the refinement of the 
ideal aesthetic experiencer who has a human-type sensibility of great refinement relative to 
the standard of taste that I described in chapter 3.  Crucially, the ideal aesthetic 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƌ ?ƐƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŝƐƌĞĨŝŶĞĚƐŽĂƐƚŽďĞĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĂƐƚĞƌƉŝĞĐĞƐ
of art which are identifiable by measures such as the test of time.   
Aesthetic values are relative to sensibility types, and not to differently refined tokens of a 
sensibility type: the aesthetic values of art are anthropocentric and therefore relative to 
human sensibilities, but they are not relative in a more fine-grained way to human 
sensibilities of different degrees of refinement.  This means that, contrary to the claims of a 
more individualistic Aesthetic Relativism, or a strong form of Aesthetic Subjectivism, there is 
ƐƵĐŚĂƚŚŝŶŐĂƐĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞŝŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŽŶĞ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨ
ideal circumstances are less valid in the sense that they do not function as reliable 
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ?  DǇ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ĐĂŶ ƚŚƵƐ ďĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ƚǇƉĞ ŽĨ
Relativism which I will call Sensibility Relativism, which makes room for expertise and error 
in aesthetic evaluation to a greater extent than more fine-grained forms of Relativism, to an 
extent that may justify our objectivist intuitions about aesthetic values in art.  To clarify how 
Sensibility Relativism differs from more fine-grained forms of Aesthetic Relativism, I will now 
describe an analogy, which I alluded to in §2.1.1.   
                                                             
166 PERETZ, Isabelle, et al. Congenital amusia: a disorder of fine-grained pitch discrimination. Neuron, 33:2, 
2002: 185-191. 
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5.2.1 Sensibility Relativism 
^ƵƉƉŽƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĞǆƵĂů ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ Ă ŚƵŵĂŶ ďĞŝŶŐ ŝƐ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŽ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƐĞǆƵĂů
orientation, which perhaps can be construed as a type of sensibility.  For the sake of 
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂŶĂƌƌŽǁĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĂůŽĨƐĞǆƵĂůĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐĂƐǀŝƐƵĂůůǇĂƉƉĞĂůŝŶŐƚŽŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
sexual desires, and a simple binary model of sexual orientation.  A heterosexual man is not 
in error if his sexual orientation leads him to find another man unattractive, one who (let us 
suppose) any heterosexual woman or homosexual man would regard as highly attractive.  
EŽǁĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŚŽǁŽŶĞ ?ƐƐĞǆƵĂůƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŵŝŐŚƚďĞŵŽƌĞŽƌůĞƐƐƌĞĨŝŶĞĚ ? 
KŶĞ ?ƐƐĞǆƵĂůƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŵŝŐŚƚďĞƌĞĨŝŶĞĚƉĂƌƚůǇ ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂs one is able to see with a normal 
degree of clarity.  The ideal aesthetic experiencer too is one with the ability to make fine 
perceptual discriminations, and a critic who cannot is a critic whose aesthetic sensibility is 
not as well refined.  Good eyesight will make one better at finding a mate to whom one is 
disposed to be sexually attracted in the narrow visual sense, and so this will be a variable 
ĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŽǀĞƌĂůů ƌĞĨŝŶĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƐĞǆƵĂů ƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽŬĞŶ ?  KŶĞ ?Ɛ ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐ ŽĨ
eyesight might ďĞ ĂƐ ƉƌĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ĂƐ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƐĞǆƵĂů ŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ďƵƚ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƐĞǆƵĂů
dispositions are, perhaps, attuned to what one would perceive under normal circumstances.   
Suppose that as a short-sighted person I judge the sexual attractiveness of people, who are 
some distance away, differently depending on whether I am wearing my glasses.  It is clearly 
false that facts about the sexual attractiveness of people relative to my sexual sensibility 
vary according to whether or not I am wearing my glasses.  Rather, the effect of leaving my 
glasses off is that I am more likely to misascribe sexual attractiveness (relative to my sexual 
sensibility): I might, for example, misidentify a man as someone to whom I am disposed to 
be sexually attracted, because my blurry vision leads me to see them as an attractive 
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woman; were I to see that person clearly I would not, as a heterosexual male, be attracted 
to them.   
The sexual attractiveness of a person in this narrow visual sense, then, may be relative to 
ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƐĞǆƵĂů ƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨŝŶĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƐĞǆƵĂů ƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?  dŚĂƚ ŝƐ ?
broadly speaking, for homosexual men and heterosexual women, men are attractive and 
women are not (at least according to the simplified model of sexuality that I am using here 
to serve the analogy), and in that sense attractiveness is relative to orientation.  But the 
class of people who are attractive relative to my sexual sensibility cannot be altered by 
changes to the refinement of my sexual sensibility, but it could be altered by a change to the 
type of sexual sensibility I have, so supposing it were possible to alter my brain so that I 
became homosexual, there would be a de dicto shift in the class of people to whom I am 
disposed to be visually attracted.  Therefore, although attractiveness or indeed aesthetic 
values might be relative to sensibilities, there can still be room for refinement of sensibility 
allowing for expertise in the detection of that to which one is disposed to respond with 
appreciation of some kind.  Plenty of judgments will turn out to be mistaken given 
Sensibility Relativism. 
Aesthetic values are relative to aesthetic sensibilities rather than to ideal circumstances, the 
latter being the circumstances in which whatever aesthetic sensibility one has is fully 
manifest in the production of aesthetic experiences in response to the aesthetic capacities 
of works of art.  A critic with non-human sensibilities (a Martian, for instance) would be such 
that the aesthetic values of objects may be different to them, but a critic with an unrefined 
human sensibility is not part of a different aesthetic community to whom different things 
are beautiful; such a critic is merely insensitive to anthropocentric aesthetic values in art.  In 
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that respect Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism, while it might be construed as involving 
Sensibility Relativism, differs from certain other forms of Aesthetic Relativism: in particular, 
it better accounts for the objectivist intuitions I described in §2.3.  I will now return to the 
issue of the apparent possibility of faultless disagreement and consider whether my account 
can explain this adequately. 
5.3 Faultless Disagreements 
If faultless disagreements about the aesthetic values of works of art can occur, this might, as 
Max Kölbel argues, be best explained by the truth value of aesthetic value judgments being 
relative to a reference class, so that two aesthetic value judgments, which express 
incompatible propositions, can both be true.167  This is not quite what I claim: as I explained 
in §3.2, my account allows for the possibility that different ideal aesthetic experiencers 
might experience the same work differently and correctly ascribe different values to it.  One 
might regard this as faultless disagreement, in which case my account can accommodate 
faultless disagreement, but it actually seems to be a faultless difference in aesthetic 
experience, on the basis of which one can make aesthetic value judgments reflecting 
different aspects of a work and its array of aesthetic values, without contradiction or 
genuine disagreement. 
Perhaps, then, Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism does not allow for genuine faultless 
disagreement, and instead allows for faultless, merely apparent disagreement.  If faultless 
ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ƚŚŝƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞďĞƚƚĞƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇ<ƂůďĞů ?Ɛgenuine Relativism or 
                                                             
167 KÖLBEL, Max. III ? Faultless disagreement. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 104:1, 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2004. 
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by some other account.  Before I consider such options, I will say a bit more about what 
faultless disagreement is supposed to be 
It is sometimes claimed that it is possible to faultlessly disagree over certain matters, usually 
matters of taste, whether gustatory or aesthetic.168  A faultless disagreement is a case of 
ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽtƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƐĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚǁŚŝĐŚ/
described in §1.4, no participant in the disagreement is at fault in believing or asserting that 
with which the other disagrees.  For example, consider the following discussion of cheese:   
^ŵŝƚŚ P “ŚĞĞƐĞŝƐŶŝĐĞ ? ?
:ŽŶĞƐ P “EŽ ?ĐŚĞĞƐĞŝƐŶŽƚŶŝĐĞ ? ? 
There appears to be a disagreement here, because Smith appears to have claimed that P, 
where P is the proposition that cheese has the property of being nice, whereas Jones 
appears to have claimed that not-P.  Furthermore, Jones precedes his apparent claim that 
not-WǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ŶŽ ? ?ƐĞĞŵŝŶŐƚŽŝŵƉůǇƚŚĂƚ^ŵŝƚŚŝƐǁƌŽŶŐĂďŽƵƚĐŚĞĞƐĞ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞthe 
apparent contradiction, it is tempting to say that such claims about matters of taste cannot 
ďĞŵĂĚĞŝŶĞƌƌŽƌƐŽ ůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞǇƌĞĨůĞĐƚŽŶĞ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ? /ĨWǁĞƌĞƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
 ‘ƚǁŽƉůƵƐƚǁŽĞƋƵĂůƐĨŽƵƌ ? ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ:ŽŶĞƐ ?ŝŶĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ ‘ŶŽƚ-W ? ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞŵĂŬŝŶŐ
a false claim, so there are some discourses in which faultless disagreements appear to be 
possible, and others in which they appear not to be. 
The appearance of faultless disagreement can be found in aesthetic matters of artistic taste 
also, such as the following: 
^ŵŝƚŚ P “dŚĞZŽůůŝŶŐ^ƚŽŶĞƐĂƌĞďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĞĂƚůĞƐ ? ?
                                                             
168 See, for example, KÖLBEL 2004. 
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:ŽŶĞƐ P “EŽ ?dŚĞĞĂƚůĞƐĂƌĞďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶdŚĞZŽůůŝŶŐ^ƚŽŶĞƐ ? ?
Again, it looks as though Smith and Jones are flat-out contradicting one another, and yet if 
Smith prefers the Stones while Jones prefers the Beatles, it is tempting to say that they both 
make true claims. 
Kölbel provides a useful taxonomy of answers to the following questions:  Are faultless 
disagreements possible?  If so, how?  If not, are the apparent cases not disagreements or 
not faultless? I will now briefly defend my answers to these questions, and defend the type 
of position that Kölbel identifies as resulting from my answers.169  In doing so I will resist the 
move from apparent faultless disagreement to a fine-grained Aesthetic Relativism.   
I am sympathetic to the view that faultless disagreements are simply not possible:  If there is 
a disagreement then someone involved is mistaken, and therefore if no one is mistaken 
then there can be no disagreement.170  But I will now consider the options available in 
accounting for cases in which faultless disagreements do seem to occur. 
5.3.1 Indexical Relativism 
Apparent cases of faultless disagreement about the aesthetic values of art might not be 
genuine disagreements, and as Kölbel suggests, this would imply a form of Indexical 
Relativism.171  Ɛ Ăƌů ĂŬĞƌ ƉƵƚƐ ŝƚ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ Ă  “ŚŝĚĚĞŶ ŝŶĚĞǆŝĐĂů ƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌ ? ŝŶ
aesthetic value judgments such that Smith and Jones each pick out their own evaluative 
standards when they make utterances such as those in the previous section, and in doing so 
                                                             
169 KÖLBEL 2004, p. 57. 
170 This view is defended by STOJANOVIC, Isidora. Talking about taste: disagreement, implicit arguments, and 
relative truth. Linguistics and Philosophy. 30:6, 2007: 691-706. 
171 KÖLBEL 2004, p. 57. 
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they could express true propositions in the form of sentences which prima facie contradict 
each other.172   
Indexical Relativism is distinct from the type of Relativism that Kölbel defends, according to 
which there is no hidden indexicality in aesthetic value judgments, but rather their truth 
value is relative to frames of reference, so that disagreements can be faultless because it is 
possible for two contradictory judgments to each be true relative to different 
perspectives.173  This view is motivated to explain the possibility of faultless disagreement, 
but for now I will continue to review the options for denying such a possibility. 
Returning to the option of Indexical Relativism, it is plausible that, at least sometimes, one 
confuses what one likes or dislikes with what is good or bad, or vice versa, such that an 
apparent disagreement about whether something is good may turn out not to be a 
disagreement.  I therefore acknowledge that sometimes what seems prima facie to be an 
aesthetic disagreement might just turn out to be a pair of what Kant would have called 
judgments of agreeableness, which are judgments about what one likes or dislikes and 
cannot contradict judgments about what someone else likes or dislikes.  
But leaving aside cases in which one confuses what one likes or dislikes with what is good or 
bad, Indexical Relativism begins to seem implausible.  Kölbel rejects it on the grounds that it 
cannot properly explain a case in which one starts out consciously not liking something and 
judging it to be bad, then begins consciously to like it and judges it to be good.  One ought 
ƚŚĞŶ ƚŽ ƐĂǇ ? ŝƚ ƐĞĞŵƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶĞ ǁĂƐ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ŝŶ ďĞůŝĞǀŝŶŐ  ‘/ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ůŝŬĞ ƚŚŝƐ ? ? ďƵƚ
incorrect ŝŶďĞůŝĞǀŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐŶŽƚŐŽŽĚ ? ? Ƶƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚĞǆŝĐĂůƌĞůĂƚŝǀŝƐƚ ŝƐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽƐĂǇŝŶŐ
                                                             
172 BAKER, Carl. Indexical contextualism and the challenges from disagreement. Philosophical Studies, 157:1, 
2012: 107-123; p. 109. 
173 KÖLBEL 2004, p. 72. 
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that one was correct in previously judging the thing not to be good, given that at the time 
one did not like it.174  The indexical relativist may bite this bullet but it seems implausible 
ƚŚĂƚ ?ǁŚĞŶŽŶĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŽŶĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚĂďŽƵƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ŝƐŐŽŽĚ ?ŽŶĞƐŚŽƵůĚ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ
oneself as having been right all along. 
On my account the situation in the artistic case of the previous section is as follows.  Either 
the music of the Beatles or the music of the Stones, or neither, has the greater overall 
capacity to produce valuable aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances for aesthetic 
experience.  Aesthetic value judgments are judgments about such aesthetic capacities, and 
so at least one of the aesthetic value judgments made by Smith and Jones is false.  Asserting 
or believing something false is a mistake, and so the disagreement is one in which at least 
one participant is at fault just in the sense that they are mistaken.  Leaving aside cases 
which I acknowledge as non-disagreements that might be mistaken for faultless 
disagreements, it seems that the remaining apparent cases of faultless disagreement may 
not really be faultless on my account. 
Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism may faůůŝŶƚŽ<ƂůďĞů ?ƐĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇŽĨMitigated Realism, which 
states that the aesthetic values of art are objective and that this implies that faultless 
disagreements about them are impossible, but which also suggests an explanation as to why 
it can nevertheless appear that critics faultlessly disagree.175Corrected thesis1.docx - _ftn11  I 
ǁŝůůŶŽǁĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚŝƐ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ
 “ďůĂŵĞůĞƐƐ ?ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? 
                                                             
174 KÖLBEL 2004, pp. 63-4. 
175 KÖLBEL 2004, p. 59. 
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5.3.2 Blameless Disagreements 
Hume claims that some aesthetic disagreements are due to blameless variations in 
preference.  He gives the example of age-related preferences and suggests that one is not 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶ ŝĨ ?ĚƵĞ ƚŽďĞŝŶŐŽŶĞĂŐĞŽƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŽŶĞ ?ƐƉƌĞferences, even in ideal 
circumstances, differ to those of other ages.176   
Suppose we have two ideal aesthetic experiencers, one aged 25 and one aged 65.  The 25-
year-old prefers the film Withnail & I to the film About Schmidt, and the 65-year-old has the 
opposite preference.  It is plausible that the former film ought to appeal more to a younger 
audience given that it is about relatively young men without jobs or families.  It is also 
plausible that the latter film ought to appeal more to an older audience since it is about a 
retired widower with an adult daughter.  The preferences of the two critics appear to be 
blameless, but if the cognitive command constraint were at play (see §1.4), it would seem 
that if the two critics disagree about which is the better film, at least one of them must be 
subject to some kind of cognitive shortcoming. 
One possibility, as before, is that the two critics do not actually disagree: they prefer to 
watch different films, but when it comes to making judgments about their merits and 
defects they are in agreement with each other.  I believe that the works of Beethoven are 
objectively superior to those of the glam rock band The New York Dolls, and yet I spend 
much more time listening to the latter and for some reason prefer to do so.  More 
importantly, I seem not to be alone in this: whether rational or not, it seems to be 
commonplace to prefer something without judging it to be better.   
                                                             
176 HUME 1985, p. 244. 
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A second possibility is that two ideal aesthetic experiencers may blamelessly disagree but 
cannot faultlessly disagree.  Suppose that this sentence contains a typing error; this is a 
shortcoming and a fault of sorts, and yet I am perhaps not to blame: perhaps one of the 
keys on my laptop has suddenly stopped working due to a manufacturing fault, or perhaps 
some typing errors are so easy to make and difficult to spot that one who makes such an 
error is not blameworthy for doing so.  Perhaps either the 25-year-old or the 65-year-old 
critic is mistaken in claiming that one film is better than the other, and yet ought not to be 
blamed for this mistake.   
A third possible explanation, of a case where two critics of different ages are in ideal 
circumstances for aesthetic experience and yet have opposite preferences regarding two 
works of art, is that age chaŶŐĞƐ Ă ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƐƵĐŚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ
meeting the conditions for ideal circumstances can vary with age (among other factors).  
The 25-year-old or the 65-year-old is not culpable if her aesthetic judgments fail to reflect 
the aptness of works to produce valuable aesthetic experiences for human beings in 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƵƚŽŶĞ ?ƐĂŐĞ ?ůŝŬĞĂŶǇǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŵĂǇŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐĐŽƵŶƚĂƐ
Ă ŬŝŶĚ ŽĨ ƐŚŽƌƚĐŽŵŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶĞ ŝƐ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ďǇ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŽĨ ǀŝĞǁ ĂŶĚ
sensibŝůŝƚǇ ŝŶ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ?  KŶĞ ŝƐ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ďǇ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŽĨ
view, and insofar as aesthetic experiences of the same work can differ when had by 
different ideal aesthetic experiencers, or by the same ideal aesthetic experiencer on 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐ ?ŽŶĞ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĚŽĞƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞĂƐŚŽƌƚĐŽŵŝŶŐ ? 
In that sense, then, perhaps ideal aesthetic disagreements are always faulty.  Other 
aesthetic disagreements may be faulty in a more obvious sense: at least one participant has 
fallen short of ideal circumstances.  Nevertheless it can seem that faultless disagreements 
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occur, within or without ideal circumstances, for various reasons, three of which I have 
described: (1) we can confuse judgments of agreeableness with aesthetic value judgments; 
(2) we can disagree without being culpable for our mistakes; (3) we can faultlessly differ in 
our aesthetic experiences of a work.  I will now consider what my account can say if there 
are genuine faultless aesthetic disagreements. 
5.3.3 Ideal Disagreements 
As I explained in §3.2.2, critics in the ideal circumstances for aesthetic judgment could not 
disagree because by definition they would perform perfect inferences on the basis of full 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂďŽƵƚ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂƌƌĂǇ ŽĨ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ƌĞůĂƚŝve to the variety of human 
ƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶĂĨĨĞĐƚŽŶĞ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŝŶŝĚĞĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĨŽƌĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
experience.  For instance, an ideal aesthetic judge would be aware of the capacities of 
Wuthering Heights to be experienced, perhaps, as a Gothic tale of doomed lovers and as a 
Romantic tale of true love in a difficult world.   
The situation is reminiscent of ZƵďŝŶ ?ƐsĂƐĞ: the optical illusion which can either look like a 
picture of two faces or a vase, but normally only one of these two things at a given moment 
ŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚ ?177  The picture is of a vase and it is of two faces, but when one sees 
it as of two faces one does not normally see it as of a vase, and vice versa.  Consider now 
the following apparent disagreement: 
Smith P “dŚŝƐŝƐĂƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨũƵƐƚĂǀĂƐĞ ? ?
:ŽŶĞƐ P “EŽ ?ŝƚŝƐĂƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨũƵƐƚƚǁŽĨĂĐĞƐ ? ? 
                                                             
177 RUBIN, Edgar. Synsoplevede Figurer (Visually Experienced Figures). Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1915. 
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This seems to me to be a faulty disagreement: both Smith and Jones have failed to notice 
ƚŚĂƚZƵďŝŶ ?ƐsĂƐĞŝƐĂƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨĂǀĂƐĞĂŶĚƚǁŽĨĂĐĞƐ ? 
Supposing that disagreements can be faultless, however, this might be the sort of situation 
in which they could occur: two critics see two different things in the same object without 
being subject to any cognitive shortcoming, but on the basis of such faultless impressions 
they make utterances which constitute a disagreement because they express incompatible 
propositions.  Whether or not such cases involve faultless disagreements, my account does 
allow for similar situations involving contrasting aesthetic value judgments based on the 
ideal aesthetic experiences of different critics. 
The same work of art may be apt to produce two incompatible kinds of aesthetic experience 
in ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience, with each experience being indicative of 
capacities possessed by the work, which in virtue of the values of the experiences are 
aesthetic capacities, or in other words aesthetic values.  The experiences may be 
incompatible just because they rely on varieties in the sensibilities of different human 
beings, or even because they involve experiencing the same property as either beautiful- or 
ugly-making.  A critic in ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience cannot step away from 
her own sensibility-laden experience of the work without losing access to its values relative 
to her sensibility.  Different ideal aesthetic experiencers may therefore reach different 
conclusions about the aesthetic values of a work, without it being the case that any of them 
could have made an improvement to their epistemic position.   
In a sense, then, ideal aesthetic experiencers might faultlessly disagree on my account.  But 
it remains the case that a work W has aesthetic value V if and only if there could be a critic 
in the circumstances ideal for the aesthetic experience of W who experiences W as having V.  
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Different sensibilities may cause different ideal aesthetic experiencers to experience W as 
having V or not having V, or as having V or V*, but in fact it has all of the values that it can 
be experienced in ideal circumstances as having.   
I have not said enough to rule out forms of Relativism such as that which Kölbel endorses, 
but I hope to have shown that the apparent possibility of faultless disagreement does not 
provide a strong reason to prefer such an account to my own.  I discuss fine-grained forms 
of Aesthetic Relativism in relation to aesthetic testimony in §7.3.2.  I will now consider one 
final, more speculative way in which an apparent faultless disagreement might occur and 
might be explained by Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism.  In doing so I will introduce the topic 
of cultural differences in aesthetic taste, and following on from this in chapter 6, the 
challenge from sceptics about the aesthetic values of art. 
5.4 Cultural Variation 
As I tried to illustrate in §5.1, some cases of apparent faultless aesthetic disagreement may 
occur between members of disparate cultures.  Consider first a thought experiment: 
suppose that a British artist has a love life which is unusual compared to fellow Brits, but 
which resembles the love lives of most members of some undiscovered culture who are 
very aesthetically sophisticated (call them the Atlanteans).    Suppose this love life inspires 
an art work which baffles or bores most Brits, but were it to be observed by Atlanteans it 
would be adored and hailed as a masterpiece, alongside their own masterpieces. Do its 
aesthetic values, if it has any, correspond to the judgments of the home culture in this 
instance, or to the culture that gets the most out of experiencing the work, or are these 
values relative to cultures so that in Britain the work is bad and in the land of the Atlanteans 
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the work is excellent?  Do the judgments of the Brits who think the art work is bad, and the 
judgments of the Atlanteans who think it is good, constitute a faultless disagreement? 
A cultural relativist can say here that the values are relative to cultures, and in doing so can 
vindicate appreciation of the work in one culture and dissatisfaction with it in the other: this 
may constitute a faultless disagreement.  But perhaps it is not safe to assume that the 
judgments of the foreign culture would be based on a correct interpretation of the work.  If 
an ant creates a pattern in the sand that happens to look to us like a portrait of Winston 
Churchill, we would nevertheless be mistaken to consider this to be a drawing of Winston 
Churchill.  As Putnam explains, its resemblance to Churchill is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for it to represent Churchill.178   Similarly, the resemblance of the content of an art 
work to the common experiences of a culture is neither necessary nor sufficient for it to 
really be about such experiences.  This may mean that the Atlanteans only enjoy the work 
by misinterpreting it as being about social practices common to their culture. 
To be in ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience it will be necessary to hold certain true 
ďĞůŝĞĨƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚĞĂŶƐĨĂůůƐŚŽƌƚŽĨŝĚĞĂů
circumstances relative to the work in question by lacking the knowledge that it is about the 
strange romantic adventures of a Brit.  As far as the Atlanteans are concerned, the work is 
about ordinary love, but in fact it is about the (relatively) unusual experiences of love had by 
one British artist.  The positive aesthetic experiences of the Atlanteans may, for this reason, 
fail to indicate the aesthetic values possessed by the work.  Rather, the negative 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƌŝƚƐǁŚŽĐŽƌƌĞĐƚůǇ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚ ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĂƐďĞŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞĂƌƚŝƐƚ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ
                                                             
178 PUTNAM, Hilary. Brains in a Vat.  In STEHR, Nico, and GRUNDMANN, Reiner (eds.) Knowledge: Critical 
Concepts 1, Taylor & Francis, 2005: 192-207; p. 192. 
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unusual experiences of love indicate that the work is bad.  It surprisingly lends itself to being 
misinterpreted as a masterpiece by other cultures, but it does nothing for those who 
correctly interpret it.  Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism can therefore offer a plausible 
explanation of this thought experiment, and so there is no need to appeal to Cultural 
Relativism.  But I will now turn to what might be a real example of this sort of case. 
5.4.1 Artistic Constructivism 
The poems of William McGonagall are widely believed to be terrible attempts at serious 
poetry, but they are also widely sought out as a source of amusement, unlike most bad 
poetry.179  Perhaps their popularity as objects of amusement is due to their appropriation as 
works of comedy: although the poems are failed attempts at serious poetry and (as far as I 
ŬŶŽǁ ) ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ĂŶ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ŽŶ DĐ'ŽŶĂŐĂůů ?Ɛ ƉĂƌƚƚŽ ĂŵƵƐĞ ƌĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƚŚĞ
exhibition of them to be ridiculed and enjoyed as comedy is the creation of a new work, not 
by McGonagall but perhaps partly about him.   
This idea is sometimes called Constructivism, for example by Phillip Percival who argues that 
widespread interpretations of a work of art might change its aesthetic properties.  Perhaps 
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐůŝŬĞƚŚŝƐŚĂƐŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚǁŝƚŚDĐ'ŽŶĂŐĂůů ?ƐƉŽĞŵƐ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚĨŽƌĞĂĐŚĂŵƵƐingly bad 
poem there are two works of art: the bad poem, which properly understood does not 
provide critics in ideal circumstances with very valuable aesthetic experiences; and the 
funny poem, which when taken by a critic in ideal circumstances to be a pieĐĞŽĨ ‘ĨŽƵŶĚĂƌƚ ? ?
exhibited by an aesthetic community rather than McGonagall himself, for the amusement of 
the reader, has the capacity to create valuable experiences of amusement.   
                                                             
179 See McGonagall Online.  Extra Connections Ltd., 2014 [viewed 25 August 2014].  Available from: 
http://www.mcgonagall-online.org.uk/. 
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Constructivism allows us to say that in certain cases of apparent faultless disagreement 
there is no real disagreement.  For example, if one ideal aesthetic experiencer judges 
DĐ'ŽŶĂŐĂůů ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŽďĞĂůŵŽƐƚĚĞǀŽŝĚŽĨĂŶǇƐŽƌƚŽĨǀĂůƵĞĂŶĚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌũƵĚŐĞƐƚŚĞƉŽĞŵƐ
to be hilarious, it may be that each of them is evaluating a different work, constructed by 
interpretation, and so there is no disagreement. 
Returning briefly to the hypothetical case, the Atlanteans may do something similar when 
they adopt the bad British art and see it as a depiction of their own human condition: they 
might create a new work about which their beliefs are true, and whose value is constituted 
by the values of the aesthetic experiences it elicits for Atlantean ideal aesthetic 
experiencers.  Perhaps when the Atlanteans adopt the work it becomes a new work with 
greater value than the work from which it originates.   
Rather than the same work having different aesthetic values relative to different cultures, 
this would be a case of the same object being a different work of art in different contexts 
depending on the interpretive behaviour of different cultures.  Distinct works of art can 
have distinct sets of aesthetic values, and so again the differing evaluations of different 
cultures may both be vindicated.  Perhaps this would constitute a faultless disagreement 
between cultures, or perhaps merely something close but which is not quite a disagreement 
since each culture evaluates a different work.  Either way, Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism 
could appeal to Constructivism to explain such apparent cases of faultless aesthetic 
disagreement. 
If Constructivism turns out to be false, however, rather than reverting to Cultural Relativism, 
ŝƚ ƐĞĞŵƐ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ƚŽ ĂĚŽƉƚ >ĞǀŝŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁ ƚŚĂƚ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞ ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐ ? ďƌŽĂĚ ?
cross-cultural appeal (see §3.3.1).  A work of art that cannot be well-received across cultures 
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may simply not be a great work of art, no matter how beloved it might be by its home 
culture.  If it were necessary to be from the English speaking world in order to appreciate 
the works of Shakespeare, then we would have greatly overestimated the aesthetic values 
of his works.  If that seems implausible one need only remember that the aesthetic values of 
works of art are, on my account, contingent, and in fact it seems that the works of 
Shakespeare are widely appreciated across cultures.  I will now consider a separate 
objection to forms of Aesthetic Objectivism, involving again the issue of cultural differences 
leading to divergent aesthetic value judgments. 
5.4.2 Universal Interest in the Aesthetic 
If it is possible to construct ĂǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛidentity by being disposed to respond to it in certain 
ways, a related worry is that the aesthetic values of a work may be constructed in the same 
manner, and this may justify a strong form of Aesthetic Subjectivism.  In particular, it has 
seemed to some authors that aesthetic values are only important to particular social classes 
at particular times in history, and that this may be best explained by aesthetic values being 
socially constructed, rather than something objective that people from all sorts of 
backgrounds could discover in a work.180  This is a claim that Stecker attributes to Terry 
Eagleton.181  
                                                             
180 My responses in this section to Eagleton may also apply to a similar line of argument put forward in 
SHUSTERMAN, Richard. Of the scandal of taste: Social privilege as nature in the aesthetic theories of 
Hume and Kant.  Philosophical Forum, 20:3, 1989:211-229. 
See also SHUSTERMAN for a similar view to this. 
181
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Eagleton considers the definition of literature as writing of a kind which can be aesthetically 
valuable.182  This seems to me a good definition, consistent with my definition of art in 
general as consisting of objects produced in order to be aesthetically valuable.   Some art is 
bad, so it seems an object does not need to be positively aesthetically valuable in order to 
be a work of art, but it seems it must be of a kind which could be positively aesthetically 
valuable but which falls short of this: a bad work of art is a work which is supposed to 
produce positively valuable aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances, but which fails to 
do so, either completely or to a significant degree.  Literature is at the very least artistic 
writing, and so it consists of textual objects of a certain type, tokens of which can be 
aesthetically valuable. 
But Eagleton is concerned with the extent to which aesthetic value judgments vary, and he 
suggests that they vary according to variations in ideology, ideology being a product of 
power-structures, and a tool of class control: 
/ĨŝƚǁŝůůŶŽƚĚŽƚŽƐĞĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĂƐĂŶ ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝve category, neither 
will it do to say that literature is just what people whimsically choose to call 
literature. For there is nothing at all whimsical about such kinds of value-
judgement: they have their roots in deeper structures of belief which are as 
apparently unshakeable as the Empire State building. What we have 
uncovered so far, then, is not only that literature does not exist in the sense 
that insects do, and that the value-judgements by which it is constituted are 
historically variable, but that these value-judgements themselves have a close 
relation to social ideologies. They refer in the end not simply to private taste, 
                                                             
182 EAGLETON, Terry. Literary theory: An introduction. University of Minnesota Press, 1996; p. 9. 
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but to the assumptions by which certain social groups exercise and maintain 
power over others.183  
Stecker interprets Eagleton as claiming that aesthetic values are a social construction, 
 “ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŽŶůǇ ƚŽ Ă ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ĐůĂƐƐ Ăƚ Ă ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ŝŶ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ĂƐ Ă ŵĞĂŶƐ ŽĨ
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌƐƉĞĐŝĂůƐŽĐŝĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐ ? ?184  Whether that interpretation is faithful or not I am 
not sure, but the general notion that aesthetic values are a social construction is a challenge 
to my Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism that I will now resist.  I expressed sympathy in the 
previous section for the notion that aesthetic communities can construct, through 
interpretation, new works of art but not that cultures can construct, through evaluation, 
new aesthetic values of a work. 
Eagleton does seem to be claiming that certain cultural circumstances determine our 
aesthetic value judgments, which in turn determine what counts as literature.  Aesthetic 
ǀĂůƵĞ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ ŽŶ ŵǇ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ĂƌĞ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ? ŶŽƚ
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐ ? ǀŝĞǁƐƵĐŚĂƐĂŐůĞƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ŝƐ ŝŶƐƉŝƌŝƚĂĚŵŝƌĂďůǇĂŶƚŝ-
chauvinistic, but this seems often to lead unnecessarily into implausible forms of Relativism 
or Subjectivism, as I will now argue. 
5.4.3 Cross-Cultural Aesthetic Values 
Consider social class differences, which relate to what Eagleton says about ideology as a tool 
of social class control and a determiner of aesthetic value judgments.  For as long as it has 
existed, Hip-,ŽƉ ŵƵƐŝĐ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ƐƚƌĞĞƚ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŽ ŵĞĂŶ
people of a certain social class: originally, marginalised New Yorkers of African or Caribbean 
                                                             
183 EAGLETON 1996, p. 14. 
184 STECKER 2006, p. 2. 
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descent, and now many people throughout the world who are often from ethnic minorities 
or disadvantaged backgrounds.185  Performers and listeners are by no means exclusively 
from such backgrounds, but there seems to be a strong association between this style of 
music and people from less privileged social classes, just as there seems to be an association 
between the appreciation or performance of Classical styles of music and more privileged 
social classes.  It seems, then, that members of different social classes aesthetically 
appreciate art, albeit sometimes different styles of art. 
If critical judgments were the product of tools of social class control we might expect, as 
Stecker interprets Eagleton as claiming, the aesthetic to be something of interest only to the 
ruling classes.  But the case of Hip-Hop suggests that while this theory might be borne of 
anti-chauvinism it ironically demotes the appreciation of the lower classes for some of their 
favourite works of art to a non-aesthetic status: classical music connoisseurs, presumably, 
are thought to be considering the perceived aesthetic merits of music, whereas fans of Hip-
Hop are apparently doing something else when they make critical judgments of music. 
A fan of Hip-Hop might not express their appreciation of Hip-Hop in the way that a scholar 
of Classical music might express their aesthetic appreciation, but it seems obvious that their 
appreciation of Hip-Hop is aesthetic and that it is at least partly the aesthetic features of 
Hip-Hop that are important to them.  Popular music can be appreciated for reasons of 
fashion or group identity, but it would probably not be so appreciated if it were not also 
appreciated (rightly or wrongly) for its rhymes, rhythms, tunefulness or other aesthetic 
features: the very same sorts of ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞĚŝŶŵŽƌĞ ‘ŚŝŐŚ-ďƌŽǁ ?ƐƚǇůĞƐŽĨŵƵƐŝĐ ? 
                                                             
185 See, for example, CHANG, Jeff. Can't stop won't stop: A history of the hip-hop generation. Macmillan, 2007. 
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This is only one example of perceived aesthetic value being appreciated by members of 
various social backgrounds, but it is plausible that this is more generally true.  Different art is 
important to different groups, but the values of art appear to be important to people 
regardless of their social background or the age in which they live; aesthetic appreciation 
seems to be part of human nature (I discussed this in §3.4.5).   
Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism states that aesthetic values are capacities to produce 
valuable aesthetic experiences, and on this account it seems implausible that aesthetic 
values are only important to particular social classes at particular times in history; the 
aesthetic is important to the human species.  Music, for example, is prehistoric: human 
beings have crafted musical instruments for over 40,000 years.186  This does not prove that 
music is more a product of human nature than social nurture, but it does seem likely that as 
humans we had certain capacities for enjoyment that we produced music in order to satisfy 
and not that we produced music and then acquired a taste for it.  Art more generally seems 
to be something we produce in order to satisfy a pre-existing thirst for the activation of 
certain human capacities for enjoyable experience. 
Of course, one might reject Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism and doubt that aesthetic 
values-as-capacities are in fact present in performances or works of music, literature or 
other art forms ?ĂŶĚƐƵĐŚĚŽƵďƚǁŽƵůĚƉĞƌŵŝƚĂǀŝĞǁƐƵĐŚĂƐĂŐůĞƚŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ
we merely socially construct the concept of the aesthetic.  I consider some such sceptical 
arguments and theories in the next chapter. 
                                                             
186 ^ĞĞ ,/',D ? dŚŽŵĂƐ ? Ğƚ Ăů ? ɈĞƐƚŝŶŐ ŵŽĚĞůƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŝŐŶĂĐŝĂŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂĚǀĞŶƚ ŽĨ
figurative art and music: The radiocarbon chronology of Geißenklösterle. Journal of human evolution, 62:6, 
2012: 664-676. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have acknowledged the possibility that critics in ideal circumstances for 
aesthetic experience might disagree about the aesthetic values of a work of art.  I have 
argued that such disagreements are not straightforwardly faultless, but rather involve 
blameless limitations of perspective which might cause misapprehension, even in ideal 
circumstances for aesthetic experience, of the full range of the aesthetic capacities of a 
work relative to human sensibilities which differ.  This may amount to a coarse-grained 
Aesthetic Relativism which preserves the notion of critical expertise and the claim that 
errors of aesthetic judgment are widespread.  In the next chapter I defend my account from 
scepticism about the existence of aesthetic values and the descriptivism of aesthetic value 
judgments. 
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6. Aesthetic Scepticism 
6.0 Introduction 
In this short chapter I argue that Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism is neither susceptible to 
an Error Theory nor to Non-Cognitivism about aesthetic value judgments.  I thus continue 
my defence of Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism from objections and rival Meta-Aesthetical 
positions.  I also consider an argument to the effect that aesthetic evaluation is more of an 
emotional process than my account might allow.  I conclude that the aesthetic capacities my 
account posits are not queer entities, and their ontological objectivity is independent of 
whether or not aesthetic evaluations are cognitive or emotional. 
6.1 Aesthetic Error Theory 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for an art work to be aesthetically valuable are, on 
my account, that it be apt to produce valuable aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances.  
My account is false if such aptness is insufficient for a work to be aesthetically valuable: that 
is, if something else is required for a work of art to be aesthetically valuable.  John Mackie 
argues that for something to be morally or aesthetically valuable it would need to be 
objectively prescriptive: there would need to be an objective state of affairs which has the 
power to make demands on us.187  For example, for it to be wrong to torture kittens, there 
would need to be facts about kitten torture that effectively tell us not to enact it.  People 
can tell us not to torture kittens, but Mackie finds the notion that facts could do this a 
 ‘ƋƵĞĞƌ ? ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ?188  Mackie focuses on moral values but suggests that the same 
                                                             
187 MACKIE, John. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. Penguin UK, 1986; pp. 41-2. 
188 MACKIE 1986, p. 38. 
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considerations apply to aesthetic values.189  Presumably his concern is that the fact that 
something is beautiful would have to be a fact that demands our appreciation, in a way that 
inert states of affairs seem not to. 
DĂĐŬŝĞ ?Ɛ ƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵ ĂďŽƵƚ ǀĂůƵĞ ŝƐ ĂŶError Theory because he claims that our moral and 
aesthetic judgments are truth-apt cognitive judgments which are invariably false due to 
reality containing no aesthetic or moral facts.  Mackie rejects value talk as a bogus form of 
enquiry akin perhaps to religious or supernatural enquiry.190  An Error Theory about the 
spiritual, for instance, would say that claims about the spiritual are false because there are 
no spiritual facts: such facts would be queer entities and it is unlikely that our naturalistic 
ontology ought to include them.  Mackie argues that morality and aesthetic criticism rest on 
this kind of error: they imply the existence of that which probably does not exist. 
But it seems that Mackie is wrong to suggest that the ontological objectivity of values 
requires prescriptivity.  McDowell responds to Mackie by defending the claim that being 
 “ƚŚĞƌĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚ ? ŝƐ ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ŽĨ ǀĂůues.191  For 
something to be there to be experienced it must be discoverable rather than something that 
our experiences invent, and so for values to be objective according to McDowell they need 
only be things that are reflected by our evaluations rather than generated by them.  
Opponents of Mackie are not committed to bogus value talk, because it is possible that 
value talk is about dispositional values which, despite being secondary qualities, are 
nevertheless there to be experienced and are therefore objective.  This is McDowell's 
response to Mackie and in the case of aesthetic values it seems a good response because it 
                                                             
189 MACKIE 1986, p. 15. 
190 MACKIE 1986, p. 35. 
191 MCDOWELL 1988, pp. 168-70. 
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seems implausible that aesthetic values are disconnected from our aesthetic experiences, 
and at the same time it seems plausible that there are objective standards as to what sorts 
of experience count as bestowing value upon works of art.   
This relates to the order of determination which I discussed in chapters 3 and 4: it seems 
that being there to be experienced and to determine our experiences of discovery is 
necessary for something to be ontologically objective, but is it sufficient? I will now further 
explain why it seems that aesthetic values as dispositions are not vulnerable to an Error 
Theory. 
6.1.1 Objectivity without Prescriptivity 
AĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐKďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƐŵŵĂǇďĞŝŵŵƵŶĞƚŽDĂĐŬŝĞ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƋƵĞĞƌŶĞƐƐŝŶĂǁĂǇƚŚĂƚ
Moral Objectivism is not.  The discoverability of moral values might not be sufficient for 
their objectivity.  Facts about what ought to be done might require what Mackie describes 
ĂƐ Ă ƋƵĞĞƌ ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ŽĨ  “ƚŽ-be-ƉƵƌƐƵĞĚŶĞƐƐ ? ? ŝŶ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĨĂĐƚƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ǁŚĂƚ
actions ought to be pursued may well need to be facts that somehow prescribe actions.192  
But facts about the aesthetic values of works of art may not be facts about what ought to be 
done, so it is not clear that Mackie is right to assume that if Moral Objectivism is susceptible 
to his argument from queerness, then so is Aesthetic Objectivism. 
In chapter 4 I explained that works of art are, on my account, aesthetically valuable insofar 
as they are apt to produce distinctively aesthetic experiences which are non-aesthetically 
ǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ?ƐDĐŽǁĞůůƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ?ĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ƵĐŚĂƐĂǁŽƌŬŽĨĂƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ
produce valuable aesthetic experiences, may be objective just in virtue of being there to be 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚ ? ŝŶĂǁĂǇ ƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ƚŚĞ  “ƋƵĞĞƌ ? ŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀŝƚǇ
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that Mackie is concerned with.193  But the non-aesthetic values of aesthetic experiences 
may themselves be susceptible to the argument from queerness: perhaps for an aesthetic 
experience to be valuable it must possess a property of to-be-pursuedness. 
But such a sceptical challenge, when applied to my Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism, would 
seem to exaggerate what I am claiming: I only claim that some experiences are aesthetic, 
and some such experiences are more enjoyable than others, due to the sensibilities of one 
ǁŚŽ ŚĂƐ ƚŚĞŵ ĐŽŵŝŶŐ ŝŶƚŽ ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ ǁŝƚŚ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ƐĂůŝĞŶƚ ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
experience.  My ontology does not contain objectively prescriptive experience values; it 
contains human beings with a capacity to enjoy some things more than others, and it 
contains sensible properties of works of art which in circumstances of epistemic objectivity 
cause human beings to have aesthetic experiences of various kinds and involving various 
degrees of enjoyment.   
There need be no to-be-pursuedness inherent in valuable aesthetic experiences; they may 
just be experiences that involve aesthetic pleasure.  This allows for conditional prescriptions 
ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  ‘ŝĨ ǇŽƵ ǁĂŶƚ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĞŶ ǇŽƵ ŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ƐĞĞŬ ŽƵƚ ŝĚĞĂů ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨǁŽƌŬt ? ?  /ĂŵĂƚƚƌĂĐƚĞĚƚŽ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚĐŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽ ?ƚŚĞƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ
such pleasure is a morally good-making feature of these experiences, as pleasure is in 
general within a Utilitarian moral framework.  If Moral Objectivism could survive the 
argument from queerness, no further defense would need to be made on behalf of 
Aesthetic Objectivism so long as aesthetic pleasure is construed as a morally good-making 
feature of acts of aesthetic engagement with works of art.  But for brevity I must leave aside 
here a defense of Moral Objectivism or Realism from the Error Theory and say that, if the 
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argument from queerness succeeds in Meta-Ethics, this at least does not change the fact 
that the capacities of art works and human beings make some works of art better than 
others in terms of their potency as providers of aesthetic pleasure for humans. 
As McDowell observed, comparing values to secondary qualities, as Moderate Aesthetic 
KďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƐŵĚŽĞƐ ?ŐŽĞƐƐŽŵĞǁĂǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐDĂĐŬŝĞ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƋƵĞĞƌŶĞƐƐ ?
as there seems to be nothing particularly queer about secondary qualities.  A property to 
which a response-dependent concept applies can be construed as a dispositional property, 
for example something is red if and only if it looks red in certain conditions, and redness 
may therefore be a disposition to produce appearances of redness.  Primary qualities are 
thought to be non-dispositional.  Primary qualities are also objective in the sense that they 
are there to be experienced, and are not figments of our imaginations.  Secondary qualities 
might also be objective in that sense; their dispositional character does not entail that they 
arĞ ŶŽƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ƚŽďĞ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚ ? DĂĐŬŝĞ ?Ɛ ƌƌŽƌ dŚĞŽƌǇĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ƐĞĞŵƚŽƉŽƐĞ Ă ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ
threat to a dispositional theory of aesthetic values.   
I do not wish to defend a dispositional theory of moral values, and Error Theory may or may 
not be a serious challenge for the objectivity of moral values, but that is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation.  I turn now to a different sort of scepticism about values, which is 
directed at value judgments. 
6.2 Non-Cognitivism 
In defending the moderate objectivity of aesthetic values in art, I have assumed so far that 
we make judgments that are about such values: aesthetic values are attempts to describe 
the aesthetic values of art, and they can be true or false.  I will now consider whether this is 
right, and whether this affects Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism.   
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Non-Cognitivism is the view that judgments in a particular domain are not truth-apt: they 
can neither be true nor false because they are not attempts to describe anything.  Non-
cognitivist theories of value go by the name of Expressivism, a broad category of views 
which state that value judgments are expressive of non-belief-like mental states.194  A 
notable member of the category is Emotivism: the view that value judgments are 
expressions of emotion rather than descriptions of values.195  &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝĨ/ĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ ‘/ƚ
ŝƐ ǁƌŽŶŐ ƚŽ ƐĞƚ ĨŝƌĞ ƚŽ ĐĂƚƐ ĨŽƌ ĨƵŶ ? ? ĂŶ ĞŵŽƚŝǀŝƐƚŵŝŐŚƚ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŚĂƚ / Ăŵ ĚŽŝŶŐ ŝƐ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ  ‘ďŽŽŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ ďƵƌŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ ĐĂƚƐ ĨŽƌ ĨƵŶ P / Ăŵ ŵĞƌĞůǇ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ŵǇ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ
emotions towards that behaviour.   
Another type of expressivist might claim more broadly that my utterance has at least a 
component which is expressive of some mental state which does not function descriptively 
like a belief, and perhaps this is all I do in making my utterance: perhaps I am simply not 
making a claim about the world being thus-and-so.196  Insofar as my utterance is expressive 
rather than descriptive, it cannot be true or false and is therefore non-cognitive; or rather 
the non-belief-like state, whether it be an emotion or something else expressed by my 
utterance, is a non-cognitive state. 
Expressivist theories usually share with Error Theory the claim that there are no 
ontologically objective values, so even if value judgments were descriptive, there would be 
nothing for them to describe.  Error Theory states that value judgments are descriptive and 
therefore, since nothing is valuable, they are always false.  Expressivists deny Descriptivism 
                                                             
194 SINCLAIR, Neil. Recent work in expressivism. Analysis, 69:1, 2009: 136-147. 
195 See, for example, STOLJAR, Daniel. Emotivism and truth conditions. Philosophical Studies, 70:1, 1993: 81-
101. 
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(see §1.3.3), so on their view value judgments are not true but nor are they false.197  
Emotional or other non-belief-like states can perhaps be more or less appropriate, in some 
sense, but unlike cognitive states they cannot be true or false.  
Expressivist theories in Meta-Ethics are sometimes said to explain the imperative function of 
ŵŽƌĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?^ƵƉƉŽƐĞ/ƐĞĞƐŽŵĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶƐĞƚƚŝŶŐĨŝƌĞƚŽĂĐĂƚĂŶĚ/ƐĂǇ P ‘ƚŚĂƚŝƐǁƌŽŶŐ ? ?
It seems that part of what I am doing is trying to make the children share my attitude of 
disapproval and perhaps experience shame as a result, or at least try to extinguish the cat 
and refrain from setting fire to any other cats.  I am, in other words, attempting to co-
ordinate the behaviour of these children, and this according to some Expressivists is the 
function of moral discourse: the co-ordination of behaviour, not the description of 
normativity in the world.198   
^ŽĨĂƌƐŽƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ PŝƚŝƐĂƐŝĨ/ŚĂǀĞƐĂŝĚ ‘ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐĨŝƌĞƚŽĐĂƚƐ ? ? ? ? ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ
the state of the world is such that setting fire to cats has the property of being morally 
wrong.  The latter claim would perhaps not have the desired effect on the behaviour of the 
pyromaniac children, because it is a mere description.  Just as it might seem queer that a 
state of affairs could make demands on us, it might seem that a description of such a state 
of affairs cannot, without some additional expressive component, motivate others to 
ďĞŚĂǀĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇ ?  /ƚ ŵĂǇ ŚĂǀĞ ŶŽ ŵŽƌĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ƚŚĂŶ Ă
description of the physiology of cats, whereas an exclamation may have the necessary 
impact to make the children reconsider their actions.  Perhaps, then, moral judgments as 
tools for the co-ordination of behaviour are best understood as expressions of non-cognitive 
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states, since such expressions, it seems, would fare better than statements of belief in 
altering the behaviour of others. 
It is not wise, however, to assume that such observations about the function of moral 
discourse will be just as true of other kinds of value discourse.  Are aesthetic value 
judgments tools for the co-ŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?WĞƌŚĂƉƐ PŝŶƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚŝƐƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐŝƐ
ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ? / ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ǀŝĞǁ ƚŚĞ ƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐ ? ŶŽƚŝĐĞ ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ŽĨ ŝƚ ?
respond to it as I do and share my attitude towards it.  But perhaps not: I might simply be 
describing the painting as being beautiful.  The case for saying otherwise seems weaker in 
the aesthetic case since all sides agree that moral discourse is to do with behaviour, 
whereas discourse purportedly about the values of art is not obviously to do with behaviour 
rather than just to do with works of art.  Having briefly expressed a scepticism towards 
Aesthetic Expressivism, I will now explain why it is not necessary for me to argue against 
such a view: Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism is consistent with Non-Cognitivism about 
aesthetic value judgments, so non-cognitivist arguments are no objection. 
6.2.1 Non-Cognitivist Objectivism 
On my account aesthetic values are objective just in the sense that they are dispositions 
possessed by works of art independently of how we are disposed to respond to them.  Our 
dispositions to respond do, however, shape our aesthetic value concepts and determine the 
status of certain objective dispositions of works as values of those works.  This account 
includes a Response-Dependence analysis of aesthetic value concepts, but it may 
nevertheless be consistent with an analysis of aesthetic value judgments according to which 
they do not describe works as falling under concepts, but rather express non-cognitive 
mental states, as Expressivism would entail. 
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An object can be disposed to induce a state of mind in an observer, even if the observer 
never does more than express this state of mind as one might sigh to express tiredness.  The 
fact that the object is disposed to have this effect may be a describable, objective fact, but 
in practice it might be that aesthetic discourse is not used to describe it, and is merely used 
for expressive purposes.   
One might object at this point that if aesthetic judgments are not attempts to represent 
aesthetic facts, but merely expressions of non-cognitive mental states, then we may have no 
access to such facts.  But epistemic access to the fact that P is not necessary for it to be the 
case that P.  One can be in a state of appropriate engagement with or appreciation of the 
values in a work of art, without being aware that one is in such a state.  Suppose that a 
painting is elegant, and elegance is a capacity to produce a certain aesthetic satisfaction in 
ideal circumstances.  That satisfaction may be caused by the work without one judging that 
the work has the capacity to cause it.  Epistemic Access to the fact that the painting is 
elegant is not necessary for one to be satisfied by its elegance.   
So even if all one ever does when one speaks of elegance is express such satisfaction, this is 
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞďĞŝŶŐĂĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĞůĞŐĂŶĐĞ ? 
As Walter Sinnott-Armstrong explains, expressivist and realist theories each tend to 
combine claims about metaphysics, semantics, epistemology and so on.199  Realism about 
values normally combines, among other things, the metaphysical claim that there are 
objective values, with the semantic claim that value judgments are true if and only if they 
correspond to objective values.  Expressivism about value judgments normally combines, 
among other claims, the metaphysical claim that there are no objective values, with the 
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semantic claim that value judgments are not apt for truth by correspondence to objective 
values.200   
It is not immediately clear why one cannot take the metaphysical claim from one camp and 
combine it with the semantic claim from the other.  Mackie does this, by claiming both that 
value judgments are a true if and only if they correspond to objective values, and that there 
are no such values.201  I propose that it is similarly coherent to claim both that there are 
objective aesthetic values and that aesthetic value judgments are not apt for truth by 
correspondence with them.   
6.2.2 Non-Cognitivist Ideal Observer Theory 
Not only is Non-Cognitivism potentially compatible with Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism, 
but ideal observer theories in general, including my own, could be construed as versions of 
Expressivism.  Gilbert Harman argues that expressivist or non-cognitivist theories including 
Emotivism, unlike the view that value is entirely in the eye of the beholder, are compatible 
with the existence of universal values.202  This is because it is possible that all human beings 
are hard-wired to have similar emotional (or other) responses to certain things.  Harman 
refers to moral values but the same option is available for aesthetic values: my appreciation 
of a work of art might be an indication that the work is disposed to produce positive feelings 
in all observers under similar circumstances.  Not only might I approve of the work, but it 
might actually be universally good in the sense that it can be experienced as such by anyone 
who observes it.   
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Hume claims that aesthetic value judgments are based on sentimental reactions to objects.  
Sentiments, he claims, do not represent anything, but they can nevertheless be more or less 
in conformity with the nature of the object which arouses them; they can indicate a 
"match", as Railton puts it, between the nature of the object and the cognitive or sensory 
faculties of the observer.203  The sentiments of the ideal critic in ideal circumstances, on 
Hume's account, will conform as closely as possible to the way the object is; or rather, the 
way it appears within constraints set by the general nature of human beings.204  These 
sentiments will therefore be a reliable indication of the aesthetic values of works of art, 
even if they do not in any way describe works as being thus-and-so. 
,ƵŵĞ ŵĂǇ Žƌ ŵĂǇ ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  “ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ŚĞ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ ŝŶ
presenting the paradox of taste, that the relevant aesthetic responses are non-
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶŵĂƌŬ “ĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝƚǇŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ
ŽďũĞĐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶƐŽƌĨĂĐƵůƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŵŝŶĚ ? ?205  It seems, however, that in resolving the 
paradox this notion can be preserved: that the responses of critics in ideal circumstances 
can indicate, without representing, a match between certain properties of works of art and 
certain features of human sensibility. 
One way of describing Hume's mingling of feelings and understanding is, therefore, as a 
modified version of Expressivism or Emotivism.  Expressivist theories including Emotivism 
seem to say that value judgments are not claims about objective values, and so our talk 
about values does not imply the existence of any such values.  But according to Harman's 
interpretation of Emotivism, in expressing the relevant kind of attitude, a speaker implies 
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that the attitude is appropriate and justified, at least from a certain point of view.206  Hume 
explains how this might be the case. Many of our passions are based on beliefs, and beliefs 
can be mistaken.  For example, feelings of trust can be based on beliefs about 
trustworthiness.  If a passion is based on a mistaken belief, then we can say that the passion 
is in some sense mistaken.207  
Aesthetic value judgments, then, need not be expressions of cognitive states in order to be 
indicative of the objective aesthetic values of art, and this is the basic reason for resisting 
the Anti-Objectivism that tends to accompany non-cognitivist theories in Meta-Ethics and 
Meta-Aesthetics.  Consider this illustration.  Suppose that I am afraid of the tiger in front of 
me.   My feeling of fear is, or forms part of, an intentional state whose object is a tiger.  My 
state of fear indicates the presence of its object: I am afraid because there is a tiger; my fear 
of the tiger implies that there is a tiger that I am afraid of, assuming normal circumstances 
apply.   
Now suppose that I find a painting beautiful.  My finding it beautiful is similar to the above: 
there is a painting, I have some sort of response the painting; my response indicates at least 
that it is apt to make me respond this way in present circumstances.  Perhaps in the right 
circumstances my response to the painting indicates its beauty, just as my fear of the tiger 
indicates a tiger or danger.   
My fear of a tiger might not represent the tiger as dangerous, and yet indicate that it is.  It is 
at least conceivable that a feeling of fear in response to a tiger could lack propositional 
content: I would not have to believe that the tiger is dangerous in order to feel this fear; 
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perhaps I am aware that the tiger is under sedation and cannot harm me or anyone else, 
and yet I am naturally disposed to react to it with a feeling of fear.   
My finding a painting beautiful also may or may not involve propositional content: by 
responding as I do, I perhaps judge that the painting is beautiful; or perhaps I simply 
respond as I might to a tiger in the sense that the painting is the cause of my response 
without my response being about it in any propositional sense.   
6.2.3 Realist-Expressivism 
An example of an attempt to combine Realism and Expressivism comes from David Copp, 
who defends the possibility of Realist-Expressivism for moral values.  He compares moral 
ƚĞƌŵƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌĚ  ‘ĐƵƌ ? ? ƚŚĞ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ůĂƌŐĞůǇďƵƚŶŽƚĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚďǇ ƚŚĞ
ƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘ŵŽŶŐƌĞůĚŽŐ ? ?208  ŽƉƉƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚǁŚĞŶƐĂǇŝŶŐ ‘ĐƵƌ ?ŽƌŵĂŬŝŶŐĂŵŽƌĂůĐůĂŝŵ ?ŽŶĞ
expresses a belief ƐƵĐŚĂƐ  ‘ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐĂŵŽŶŐƌĞůĚŽŐ ?Žƌ  ‘ƚŚŝƐĂĐƚ ŝƐŵŽƌĂůůǇǁƌŽŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŝŵƉůŝĞƐ
further states of mind with regards to the object of the claim: for example, disliking the dog 
or disapproving of the act.  He suggests therefore that moral discourse is expressivist 
because moral judgments do express non-cognitive states, but moral discourse is also 
descriptivist because moral judgments also express cognitive states.  For example, when I 
say it is wrong to burn cats I perhaps describe features of the act while simultaneously 
expressing an attitude of disapproval towards the act.   
As well as being consistent with the descriptivist element of Realism (see §1.1 for the 
tripartite definition of realism I am employing here), ŽƉƉ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁ ŵĂǇ ĂůƐŽ ďĞ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ
with the objectivity of moral values, and it being objectively morally wrong to burn cats: 
                                                             
208 COPP, David. Realist-expressivism: A neglected option for moral realism. Social Philosophy and Policy, 18:2, 
2001: 1-43. 
 214  
 
expressivist semantics does not imply expressivist metaphysics.  Realist-Expressivism has an 
explanatory advantage: as I explained in §2.2, thick value predicates combine a descriptive 
and an evaluative component, and Realist-Expressivism can say that judgments deploying 
ƐƵĐŚƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŽŶĞ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŝƚ ?/Ĩ
this evaluative-descriptive practice is something we engage in, then this explains why we 
have thick value concepts.  But whether such a view can allow for the objectivity of values in 
combination with the expressivity of value judgments is a separate matter. 
Copp's view or another hybrid view may or may not succeed in Ethics or Aesthetics, but the 
possibility for success partly undermines the challenge to forms of Aesthetic Objectivism 
from Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism, because it is not certain that Non-Cognitivism about value 
judgments entails Anti-Objectivism about values.  I am inclined to assume that aesthetic 
value judgments are cognitive expressions of belief, but Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism 
does not seem to depend on this assumption because it is primarily about the ontological 
objectivity of aesthetic values as capacities, not the descriptivity of aesthetic value 
judgments.  To make this clearer I will now consider how ideal observer theories in 
particular, such as my own, could be reconciled with Non-Cognitivism. 
Supposing that aesthetic judgments are cognitive it is still quite possible that aesthetic value 
judgments are not about the capacities of art works to please ideal aesthetic experiencers.  
&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ‘Toast of London ŝƐĂĨƵŶŶǇdsƐŚŽǁ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞůǇƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĂƐ ‘ŝŶŝĚĞĂů
circumstances for the aesthetic experience of Toast of London, one would experience 
ĂŵƵƐĞŵĞŶƚ ƵƉŽŶ ŽďƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ŝƚ ? ?  dŚŝƐ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŵĞƌĞůǇ ŶĚĞƌƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ŽĨ ĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐ
Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism a revisionary project rather than a descriptive one.  It may 
be the case that the only sense in which a work of art is ever beautiful is that it is apt to 
 215  
 
produce worthwhile aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances.  This aptness can be 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚǁŝƚŚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ďĞĂƵƚǇ ?ĂƐĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ ?
ƚŚŝƐŝƐĂĨůĞƐŚŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨǁŚĂƚǁĞŵĞĂŶďǇ ‘ďĞĂƵƚǇ ? ?ŽƌƉŽƐƐŝďůǇĂƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨŚŽǁƚŚĞƚĞƌŵŝƐ
normally understood.   
I turn now to arguments for the more general claim that aesthetic value judgments are 
essentially emotional, which might suggest either that aesthetic value judgments are non-
cognitive or that aesthetic values are entirely subjective. 
6.2.5 Emotional Evaluation 
I have suggested that the ontological objectivity of dispositional aesthetic values is 
consistent with aesthetic value judgments functioning as expressions of non-cognitive 
mental states.  But I have not yet said enough to dispel the notion that this is the primary 
function of aesthetic discourse and that there is nothing about works of art themselves, 
independently of our mental states, to substantiate the feelings or attitudes we have 
towards them.  Jesse Prinz argues that aesthetic evaluations are themselves emotional: they 
ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ŵĞƌĞůǇ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐ ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ŵĞƌĞůǇ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŽ
induce emotions, but aesthetic appreciation is itself an emotional state.209  This view seems 
plausible to the extent that aesthetic experiences are very often, if not always, emotional 
experiences: it seems that great art can in ideal circumstances move us to tears, for 
example, and that in other circumstances bad art can also do this, such as art which is overly 
sentimental.  If Prinz is right, this might suggest an Extreme Subjectivism according to which 
our emotions make objects evaluable one way or another, or it might suggest a form of 
                                                             
209 PRINZ, Jesse. Emotion and aesthetic value. American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, San 
Francisco, CA, April [online], 2007a [viewed 16 September 2014].  Available from: 
http://subcortex.com/EmotionAndAestheticValuePrinz.pdf. 
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Expressivism according to which our aesthetic evaluations as emotional states cannot 
describe works of art as being one way or another.   
Prinz cites evidence that feelings influence our aesthetic value judgments.210    This influence 
might be best explained by what Hume and Kant identified about aesthetic value 
ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ PƚŚĞǇĂƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶŽŶĞ ?ƐƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽĂŶŽďũĞĐƚ ?ƵƚWƌŝŶǌ
goes further in claiming that aesthetic value judgments are not just based on feelings, but 
they are themselves emotional states: we evaluate art with feeling, not just on the basis of 
feeling.211   
Suppose that the empirical evidence does demonstrate that aesthetic value judgments are 
typically emotional.  Should they be?  We are typically subject to biases in our assessment of 
current affairs that we learn about through the prism of news media, but it seems that 
where possible we should try to form judgments that are not swayed by such prejudice.  In 
the sciences also it is appropriate to take a dispassionate approach when forming judgments 
of, say, cause and effect.  In Ethics too it may be the case that the appropriate level of 
ŝŵƉĂƌƚŝĂůŝƚǇŝƐŽŶůǇĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚŝĨŽŶĞƐĞƚƐŽŶĞ ?ƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐƚŽŽŶĞƐŝĚĞ ?WƌŝŶǌŚŝŵƐĞůĨďĞůŝĞǀĞƐƚŚĂƚ
moral judgments too are emotional states, but it certainly seems that there are types of 
judgment that ought to be dispassionate, and so if Prinz is right there must be something 
distinctive about value judgments in this respect.212  Aesthetic value judgments are 
distinctive but do feelings play a special role in them? 
On my account feelings do play a special role in ideal aesthetic value judgments that they do 
not play in ideal scientific judgments, but this role is as part of the subject matter of the 
                                                             
210 PRINZ 2007a, pp. 2-4. 
211 PRINZ 2007a, pp. 4-6. 
212 See PRINZ, Jesse. The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press, 2007b. 
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judgments, not as part of the judgments themselves.  Aesthetic value judgments are 
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĐĂƵƐĞ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů
responses.  But such assessments should not themselves be emotional; they should be 
dispassionate judgments about cause and effect.  Emotional experiences are relevant to our 
observations about the aesthetic values of art: art can be valuable partly insofar as it can 
ŵĂŬĞƵƐĨĞĞůĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŝĚĞĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵWƌŝŶǌ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ
aesthetic evaluations are themselves emotional states. 
Prinz considers a view such as mine, according to which we should dispassionately evaluate 
ĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĞůŝĐŝƚĞŵŽƚŝŽŶǁŚĞŶǁĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?,ŝƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŝƐ
as follows: 
If the units used to assess art were not affective in nature, then it's not clear 
why we should call them units of goodness.213  
He seems to be saying that if we assess art with feeling this explains why we consider such 
assessments to be evaluations of a work as being good or bad: when we rate a work highly 
we express that it feels good to experience the work.  But if positive and negative emotions 
ĐĂŶŚĞůƉƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ƐďĞŝŶŐĞǀĂůƵĂďůĞĂƐŐŽŽĚŽƌďĂĚ ?ŝƚŝƐƵŶĐůĞĂƌǁŚǇƚŚŝƐĐĂŶŶŽƚ
be so on my dispositional account: a work may be good or bad partly depending on the way 
it is disposed to make us feel, and so to assess whether a work is good or bad we must 
estimate its capacities to give us feelings.  The subject of assessment may be (partly) the 
capacity to elicit emotion, but the assessment is dispassionate, and this view can make use 
of what Prinz regards as the explanatory role of emotions in a theory of values. 
                                                             
213 PRINZ 2007a, p. 8. 
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But suppose that Prinz is right that aesthetic evaluations are themselves unavoidably 
emotional and therefore at least partly non-cognitive.  As I have argued, this is consistent 
with the existence of objective aesthetic values qua dispositions to produce valuable 
aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances.  Furthermore, positing the existence of such 
dispositions can account for the convergence of aesthetic judgments and our intuitions 
about the possibility of expertise and error in aesthetic judgment.  There are facts of the 
ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ĂďŽƵƚ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ĞůŝĐŝƚ ǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚŽƐĞ
capaĐŝƚŝĞƐĐĂŶďĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨŽƵƌ
assessments of works are (at least sometimes) too emotionally-laden to pick out such 
capacities with ideal epistemic objectivity.  
6.3 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have further clarified and defended Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism, which 
says that the aesthetic values of art are ontologically objective dispositions to produce 
valuable aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances.  I have argued that on this account 
aĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ŝŶ Ăƌƚ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƋƵĞĞƌ ? ƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀŝƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ŵĂŬĞ ƚŚĞŵ
susceptible to an Error Theory.  I have also resisted non-cognitivist and subjectivist notions 
of the role of emotions and expression in aesthetic evaluation, arguing that my account is 
neutral as to whether aesthetic value judgments are cognitive, and that it fully accounts for 
what role there may be for emotions in the aesthetic appreciation of a work, without 
compromising on the ontological objectivity of aesthetic values as dispositions to produce 
valuable experiences, be they emotional experiences or not.  I turn now to a final sort of 
objection, regarding the implication that if aesthetic values are objective, it ought to be 
possible to learn that a work has them without direct experience of them. 
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7. Aesthetic Testimony 
7.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that aesthetic testimony is weak evidence of aesthetic value and that 
to be informative it would need to be gathered with scientific precision.  And yet, I argue, 
this is no reason to doubt the (partial) objectivity of aesthetic values.  The ontological 
objectivity of aesthetic values can seem to generate the expectation that learning from 
aesthetic testimony should be possible because learning from testimony about that which is 
ontologically objective usually is possible.  The Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism I have 
defended in particular suggests that at least in principle it ought to be possible to learn that 
something is the bearer of a particular value by listening to the aesthetic value judgments of 
critics in ideal circumstances.  But this is controversial and therefore the theory I am putting 
forward is open to question by pessimists about aesthetic testimony. 
I will lay out an explicit argument against Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism which relies on 
Pessimism about aesthetic testimony.  I will consider the coherence and plausibility of this 
pessimistic view, as well as reasons to favour a more optimistic view.  I will attempt to 
provide an Error Theory about the view that one must directly experience a work of art in 
order to reliably evaluate it.  I will defend the coherence and plausibility of Moderate 
Aesthetic Objectivism combined with a modest Optimism about aesthetic testimony, 
according to which aesthetic testimony can at least in principle provide evidence of the 
aesthetic values of works of art that one has not experienced.  I will conclude that this 
evidence does not need to be strong for Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism to survive the 
objection from aesthetic testimony. 
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7.1 Aesthetic Objectivism and Testimony 
We can normally learn about objective states of affairs indirectly, without experiencing 
them first-hand: for example, we can acquire knowledge by listening to teachers, to the 
news, by reading books and in any other situation in which we learn that P simply by being 
ƚŽůĚ ?ďǇĂƌĞůŝĂďůĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ ) ‘W ? ?/ĨƚŚĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐŽĨǁŽƌŬƐŽĨĂƌƚĂƌĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚĞƐŽĨ
affairs, then it seems at least very likely that we will be able to find out about these states of 
affairs just by being told about them, and without having to experience them first-hand.  
However, it is counter-intuitive that we can find out that a work of art is beautiful or ugly 
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐŝƚ ? ‘dŚĞ<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ^ƉĞĞĐŚ is a great film bƵƚ/ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚƐĞĞŶŝƚŵǇƐĞůĨ ?ǁŽƵůĚ
ƐĞĞŵ Ă ƐƚƌĂŶŐĞ ƚŚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƐĂǇ ? ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƚŽ  ‘/ƚ ŝƐ ƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ďƵƚ / ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƚŚŝŶŬ ŝƚ ŝƐ ? ?  ŽƚŚ
express propositions which may be true and yet there seems to be something wrong with 
asserting them or with the speaker believing them.  Therefore, aesthetic values appear not 
to be objective, or so one might argue.   
To summarise, the objection is as follows: 
1. Objective states of affairs are such that we can find out that they are 
so via testimony. 
2. If aesthetic values in art are objective states of affairs then we can 
find out the aesthetic values of works of art via testimony. 
3. We cannot find out the aesthetic values of works of art via testimony. 
4. Therefore, aesthetic values in art are not objective states of affairs. 
In this chapter I argue that premise 3 in this argument is false, and therefore that this 
objection to Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism fails.  I accept premises 1 and 2.  The ways in 
which we can normally acquire knowledge from testimony, such that 1 is true, can tell us 
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something about how to acquire aesthetic knowledge from testimony.  I will now consider 
how testimony might normally work. 
7.2 Transmission Testimony and Evidential Testimony 
When testimony succeeds in providing knowledge, one way of understanding this is to say 
that a testifier who knows that P transmits her warrant for believing that P to another 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶďǇĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐ ‘W ? ?ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƉĞƌƐŽŶƚŽŚĂǀĞĞǆĂĐƚůǇƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂƌƌĂŶƚĨŽƌďĞůŝĞǀŝŶŐ
that P as the testifier.  For example, suppose you ask a reliable person for directions to the 
train station, and they share with you their knowledge of its location.  On the present 
account, you are then exactly as warranted as the speaker in believing that the station is 
where they say it is.  Robert Hopkins calls this kind of testimony transmission testimony, 
because it involves the transmission of warrant from the testifier to those who receive the 
testimony.214  
Another way of understanding the acquisition of knowledge via testimony is as the process 
of inferring that P from testimony that P.  We routinely draw inferences from our 
observations, and these observations often include the testimony of others.  When 
somebody tells me where the station is, I could regard this as a piece of evidence about its 
location, and consider how strong that evidence is, how it weighs up against any conflicting 
evidence, and attempt to draw the appropriate inferences.  Testimony may in some cases 
provide very good evidence for something and allow one to acquire knowledge, whereas in 
other cases it may not be sufficient to put one in a state of knowledge.  Hopkins calls this 
                                                             
214 HOPKINS, Robert. Beauty and testimony. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 47, 2000: 209-236, p. 
222. 
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kind of testimony evidential testimony.215  I will now say more about these two models of 
testimony and consider which might best apply to testimony about the aesthetic values of 
art. 
Transmission testimony seems to be a somewhat passive process compared to evidential 
testimony, which requires that the recipient perform an inference.  Suppose that I learn by 
transmission testimony that Osama Bin Laden has been killed: I read in a good newspaper 
that this has happened, and I become as warranted in believing it as the author of the 
article.  It would seem that, supposing that such learning takes place by transmission, I now 
cannot help but know that Bin Laden was killed.  Given that I am able to read and 
understand English and I am presented with a reliable article in English describing the events 
ŽĨŝŶ>ĂĚĞŶ ?ƐĂƐƐĂƐƐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚŽǁŵŝŐŚƚ/ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŵǇƐĞůĨĨƌŽŵďĞŝŶŐŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚ ?ĂƐŝƚǁĞƌĞ ?ďǇ
this knowledge?  If I had reason to doubt the reliability of the testifier, transmission 
testimony might fail to take place, but otherwise warrant is transmitted from one person to 
another.  This is slightly mysterious compared to evidential testimony. 
On the evidential model of testimony, I ŵŝŐŚƚůĞĂƌŶŽĨŝŶ>ĂĚĞŶ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚďǇƚƌĞĂƚŝŶŐƌĞůŝĂďůĞ
journalism as a source of evidence, and a newspaper article as a piece of evidence, and 
infer, from whatever evidence I have gathered pertaining to the hypothesis that Bin Laden 
has been assassinated, that in fact he has been.  How is this different from transmission of 
warrant?  It is different because my warrant for believing that Bin Laden was killed does not 
necessarily equal that of the testifier, because each of our respective warrants is dependent 
on our distinct epistemic positions and the evidence that each of us has access to and can 
draw inferences from.   
                                                             
215 HOPKINS 2000, p. 221. 
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7.2.1 Evidential Aesthetic Testimony 
Drawing inferences from evidence is something we do on many occasions, whereas the 
transmission of warrant is not so obviously part of our epistemic lives.  But Hopkins suggests 
that most testimony does occur by transmission, and that aesthetic testimony is an 
exception to this.216  He may or may not be right to claim that other testimony is done by 
transmission of warrant, but more importantly for present purposes, I wish to endorse his 
claim that aesthetic testimony is evidential. 
The reason Hopkins claims that aesthetic testimony is evidential is that the receiver of 
testimony that something is beautiful would seem to have at least some reason to think that 
it might be beautiful, but certainly less reason than the person who has actually experienced 
its beauty.217  For instance, if I tell someone who has not been to Vienna that the 
architecture there is beautiful, as I found it to be on my holiday there, that person at least 
has some small reason to think that this might be true, and it may be reasonable for them to 
go and see whether they agree.  Alternatively, if I tell them that the Austrian flag (which 
they have not seen) is red and white, they may then acquire a much stronger reason to 
think that this is the case.   
That at least is intuitively plausible, and Hopkins believes it can be explained by testimony 
about colour working by transmission of warrant, and testimony about beauty merely 
providing evidence (possibly very little evidence) that something is beautiful.  The person 
becomes as warranted as I am in judging the colours of the flag to be red and white, but less 
warranted than me in believing the city to be beautiful.  As I have said, Hopkins may be 
                                                             
216 HOPKINS 2000, p. 223. 
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wrong to think that judgments about things such as the colour of a flag work by 
transmission of warrant, but it seems clear that testimony about beauty does not involve 
the transmission of warrant, for this would imply an implausibly strong Optimism about 
aesthetic testimony: that we can, without experiencing it, be as certain that something is 
beautiful as someone who has experienced its beauty.   
Although such an extreme Optimism seems not to be justified, I will argue that we can learn 
about the aesthetic values of a work of art from testimony by treating it as evidence and 
drawing inferences from it.  This will fulfil the expectation generated by Moderate Aesthetic 
Objectivism that it should be possibůĞ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ ŽƵƚ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
experiencing them.  In other words, the possibility of learning from evidential aesthetic 
testimony speaks against premise 3 in the above objection. I will now examine the premise 
more closely. 
7.3 Pessimism about Aesthetic Testimony 
Pessimists about aesthetic testimony claim that it provides little or no reason for us to form 
or modify aesthetic value judgments.  Optimists deny this, and claim that aesthetic 
testimony can sometimes justify the formation or alteration of aesthetic value judgments.  
Pessimism about aesthetic testimony as a source of aesthetic knowledge seems to be a 
popular folk view.  Suppose a teacher tells his pupils that the Battle of Hastings took place in 
1066 and (on a separate occasion) that Romeo and Juliet is a beautiful piece of writing.  It is 
plausible that the teacher has taught his pupils the date of the Battle of Hastings, and that 
they now know when this battle took place, or at least have a good reason to think it took 
place in 1066.  They do not need to travel back in time and observe the battle to learn this 
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fact, or even look at the historical evidence; they can simply listen to their teacher, 
assuming that he is a reliable source of this piece of information.   
However, I would expect fewer people to say that the teacher has taught his pupils that 
Romeo and Juliet is beautiful such that they now know that it is, and perhaps people would 
even doubt that the pupils have acquired a good reason to suppose that the play is 
beautiful.  I am assuming here that the pupils have not read or seen the play.  I would 
expect many people to claim that the pupils would need to read the play or see it 
performed in order to learn that it is beautiful.  Whether or not I am right in my estimation 
of folk opinion, some philosophers do defend such pessimistic claims. 
7.3.1 Kant's Pessimism 
/Ŷ ƚŚĞ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ? WĞƐƐŝŵŝƐŵ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƚƌĂĐĞĚ ďĂĐŬ ƚŽ <ĂŶƚ ?  <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁƐ ŽŶ
aesthetic testimony are more than a historical curiosity simply because <ĂŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ
of Aesthetic Objectivism (or, at least, the claim that aesthetic value judgments imply 
universal validity) and Pessimism about aesthetic testimony is used as a starting point for 
contemporary discussions of aesthetic testimony and the objectivity of aesthetic values.  As 
I explained in §2.4, Kant offers a theory of aesthetic value judgments according to which 
they are based on subjective feelings and yet we can justifiably demand that others 
experience the same feelings in response to the same objects.  To recap briefly, the relevant 
subjective feelings involve what Kant describes as pleasure produced by a harmony between 
the imagination and the understanding. 
Kant also claims that aesthetic value judgments make a claim to universal validity, as I 
explained in §2.4.  He suggests that not only do we call upon others to agree with our 
aesthetic value judgments, but we can reasonably expect people to respond to the same 
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objects in similar ways: human beings are similar enough that we can have some 
expectation that others will respond to the same objects with similar aesthetic 
experiences.218  It therefore seems that the existence of ontologically objective aesthetic 
ǀĂůƵĞƐ  ?ĂůďĞŝƚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽŚƵŵĂŶƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ )ŵŝŐŚƚďĞ ŝŵƉůŝĞĚďǇ<ĂŶƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁthat we can 
justifiably call upon the agreement of others with our assessments of the aesthetic values of 
ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ?/ǁŝůůŶŽǁĞǆƉůĂŝŶ<ĂŶƚ ?ƐWĞƐƐŝŵŝƐŵĂďŽƵƚĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇ ? 
tŚŝůĞ<ĂŶƚ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐŵĂǇŽƌŵĂǇŶŽƚďĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĞĚ as a form 
of Aesthetic Objectivism, he is certainly a Pessimist about aesthetic testimony: 
The judgement of taste is not determinable by grounds of proof, just as if it 
were merely subjective. 
If a man, in the first place, does not find a building, a prospect, or a poem 
beautiful, a hundred voices all highly praising it will not force his inmost 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ƚŚĂƚĂƚŚŝŶŐŚĂƐƉůĞĂƐĞĚŽƚŚĞƌƐĐŽƵůĚŶĞǀĞƌƐĞƌǀĞĂƐƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨ
an aesthetical judgement.  
 ?^ƚŝůů ůĞƐƐ ?in the second place, can an a priori proof determine according to 
definite rules a judgement about beauty. If a man reads me a poem of his or 
ďƌŝŶŐƐŵĞƚŽĂƉůĂǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĂĨƚĞƌĂůůƐƵŝƚŵǇƚĂƐƚĞ ?ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƉĂƐƐĂŐĞƐ
which displease me may agree very well with rules of beauty (as they have 
been put forth by these writers and are universally recognised): but I stop my 
ears, I will listen to no arguments and no reasoning; and I will rather assume 
that these rules of the critics are false, or at least that they do not apply to the 
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case in question, than admit that my judgement should be determined by 
grounds of proof a priori.  
 ?/ƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝĞĨƌĞĂƐŽŶƐǁŚǇƚŚŝƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůĨĂĐƵůƚǇŽĨ
judgement has been given the name of Taste. For though a man enumerate 
to me all the ingredients ŽĨ Ă ĚŝƐŚ  ?/ ƚƌǇ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐŚ ǁŝƚŚmy tongue and my 
palate, and thereafter (and not according to universal principles) do I pass my 
judgement.219  
Kant is clearly pessimistic about the prospect that testimony about the aesthetic values of 
art (or indeed the niceness of food) expressed by other subjects could force us to change 
ŽƵƌŽǁŶũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐŽƌƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽƌĂůƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
own aesthetic value judgments.   
Kant says that it is as if such judgments were merely subjective, but he does not say that 
they are merely subjective.  But although Kant does not assert that aesthetic values are 
subjective or relative to individual subjects, if they were this would, it seems, justify <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ
pessimistic observations.  I will return shortly to Anti-Objectivist justifications of Pessimism. 
For Kant, aesthetic value judgments are universally valid, and yet one cannot use the 
ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ĂƐ Ă ďĂƐŝƐ ĨŽƌ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ?  Ƶƚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ / ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?
suggests, this is a difficult position to hold: if the universal validity of aesthetic value 
judgments is due to the objectivity of aesthetic values, it seems to be inconsistent with the 
Pessimism Kant defends.  If there is a tension between Objectivism and Pessimism one 
should reject at least one of these views.  I will now consider arguments to the effect that 
one should retain Pessimism and therefore reject Objectivism. 
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7.3.2 Anti-Objectivist Pessimism 
If the argument in §7.1 is successful, Pessimism is true and Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism 
is false, as are stronger forms of Aesthetic Objectivism.  I will now examine whether this 
combination of Aesthetic Anti-Objectivism with Pessimism about aesthetic testimony is 
coherent or plausible.  One option is to defend an Aesthetic Error Theory, according to 
which all aesthetic value judgments are false.  It should be clear that this would easily 
explain the apparent shortcomings of aesthetic testimony: we would be unable to learn of a 
ǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐďǇ ůŝƐƚĞŶŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ value judgments of testifiers, because 
these judgments would in all cases be false.  But for reasons given in §6.1, Aesthetic Error 
Theory is implausible, and although it can explain Pessimism should Pessimism turn out to 
be true, there may be better explanations than simply the non-existence of aesthetic values. 
Fine-grained Aesthetic Relativism, such as the view that aesthetic values are relative to 
individual subjects, seems to be an even worse option for the pessimist.  Consider the 
following two utterances: 
1.  ‘/ ?ǀĞũƵƐƚƐĞĞŶdŚĞ<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ^ƉĞĞĐŚ ?/ƚ ?ƐĂŐŽŽĚĨŝůŵ ?ǇŽƵƐŚŽƵůĚŐŽĂŶĚƐĞĞŝƚ ? ? 
2.  ‘dŚĞ<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ^ƉĞĞĐŚŝƐĂŐŽŽĚĨŝůŵ ?ǇŽƵƐŚŽƵůĚŐŽĂŶĚƐĞĞŝƚ ?/ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚƐĞĞŶŝƚ
ŵǇƐĞůĨ ? ? 
Perhaps because of our inclination towards Pessimism, 2 seems to be a problematic 
assertion even if it expresses a proposition which is true.  In this respect it is comparable to 
DŽŽƌĞ ?ƐƉĂƌĂĚŽǆ P ‘/ƚŝƐƌĂŝŶŝŶŐďƵƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬŝƚŝƐ ?ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞƐĂƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŵĂǇďĞ
true and yet there seems to be something wrong with asserting it.220  I am not suggesting 
                                                             
220 See, for example, ROSENTHAL, David M. Self-knowledge and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Studies, 77:2, 
1995: 195-209. 
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that 2 necessarily is a Moore-paradoxical sentence, just that compared to 1 it seems odd 
and it may seem this way for the same reasons that Pessimism can seem plausible.   
Fine-grained Aesthetic Relativism, or at least Relativism to individual subjects, will struggle 
to explain this difference between 1 and 2, because it will imply that 1 is also a problematic 
assertion even if it is true.  1 is true according to Individualistic Aesthetic Relativism if and 
only if the speaker has seen the film, it is good relative to her aesthetic sensibility, and it is 
also good for the person the statement is addressed to such that they have a reason to go 
and see it.  However, there is a problem with the transition from asserting truthfully that 
one has seen a good film, to asserting truthfully that another person should see it, because 
according to Individualistic Relativism its goodness relative to the speaker is unrelated to its 
goodness relative to the addressee.   
So on such a view there is reason to find 1 to be an infelicitous statement, and Pessimism 
provides a reason to find 2 to be an infelicitous statement, whereas intuitively 1 is a much 
more felicitous assertion than 2.  Such a Relativist-Pessimist might respond by claiming that 
1 implies that the addresser and the addressee share similar sensibilities such that the same 
things might be beautiful relative to them as individual subjects.  This would allow the 
Relativist-Pessimist to say that 1 is at least in some contexts a reasonable assertion to make, 
whereas 2 is a problematic assertion, just as intuition seems to reveal.   
But this response might be too successful, in the sense that 2 could also, at least in some 
contexts, be taken to imply that the addresser is referring to that which is good relative to 
ƚŚĞ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĞ ?Ɛ ƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?  /ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ZĞůĂƚŝǀŝƐŵ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ƐĞĞŵ ƚŽ ƌƵůĞ ŽƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶĞ
might take themselves to have some insight into what is good relative to another, and so 
such a view has trouble explaining the intuition that there is something wrong with 
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asserting 2.  I will now consider how Aesthetic Objectivists can explain Pessimistic intuitions 
such as the above. 
7.3.3 Objectivism and Pessimism 
Despite advocating Pessimism, Kant provides a distinction which can help explain away 
intuitions that favour Pessimism.  He draws a distinction between aesthetic value judgments 
and judgments of agreeableness¸ which I described in §2.4.  The latter are judgments about 
how nice something is for the person judging.  Like aesthetic value judgments, Kant claims 
that judgments of agreeableness are based on subjective feelings, but they differ in that 
they make no claim to universal validity.221  If I make a judgment of agreeableness about 
something I judge only that I find the thing agreeable; I do not judge whether it is worthy of 
ĂŶǇŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůŽƌĞŶũŽǇŵĞŶƚ ? 
Individualistic Aesthetic Relativism can perhaps be understood as the rejection of this 
distinction: as the view that aesthetic values are relative to individuals and that there is 
therefore no good reason to distinguish between judgments about what one likes and 
judgments about what is universally likeable.  Aaron Meskin argues that whether such a 
view is true or false, those who believe it will be inclined to blur this distinction that Kant 
proposes.222  In some cases this will result in Relativists passing off judgments of 
agreeableness as aesthetic value judgments, and in other cases it may involve an 
expectation that testimony about aesthetic values will merely ďĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?Ɛ
personal preferences.  In other words, widespread Relativist or Subjectivist views, enshrined 
ŝŶ ƐĂǇŝŶŐƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  ‘ďĞĂƵƚǇ ŝƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞǇĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘de gustibus non est 
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disputandum ? ?ŵĂǇƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚWĞƐƐŝŵŝƐŵ ? Belief in such theories, rather than the 
truth of such theories, may be sufficient to explain our pessimistic tendencies. 
The objectivist optimist can therefore explain intuitions favouring Pessimism by appealing to 
the fact that certain Anti-Objectivist views are widely held. But this raises the question of 
how to explain intuitions favouring those views.  The claim that we are confused between 
aesthetic value judgments and judgments of agreeableness may be a question-begging 
explanation as it assumes that the distinction is appropriate, which in turn assumes the 
universal validity of aesthetic value judgments, which Anti-Objectivist views deny.   
Meskin suggests that the source of belief in views such as Aesthetic Subjectivism and fine-
grained versions of Aesthetic Relativism is the immediacy of aesthetic experience combined 
with the fact of aesthetic disagreement, both of which are causes of the popularity of such 
views without being good reasons to adopt them.  The thought here is that, since aesthetic 
value judgments vary so wildly from person to person, and since they are based on the 
appearance of beauty as something immediately apparent in an object, it can seem as 
though aesthetic value judgments are nothing more than reports about how things seem to 
us.223 
The immediacy of aesthetic experience derives from the subjective character of aesthetic 
experience, upon which aesthetic value judgments are based, as I explained in §2.3.2.  I 
have already explained and defended an objectivist Response-Dependence for aesthetic 
values in art which accounts for this immediacy as the manifestation of objective aesthetic 
capacities.  In chapter 5 I acknowledged that this Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism might 
imply Sensibility Relativism, but this means only that aesthetic values are anthropocentric, 
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and only different relative to individuals insofar as human sensibilities differ in relevant 
ways in the circumstances ideal for aesthetic experience.  The immediacy of aesthetic 
experience therefore does not speak against Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism or in favour of 
a more fine-grained Aesthetic Relativism. 
The fact of disagreement is also not a good reason to adopt a fine-grained form of Aesthetic 
Relativism.  A jury may disagree significantly over whether a defendant is guilty, but this 
does not imply that the guilt of the defendant is relative to different members of the jury.  
Nevertheless, it is common for people to confuse the epistemic with the metaphysical, and 
infer such Relativism from the fact of disagreement.  Philosophers, of course, are not 
immune to such errors: Mackie defends his Error Theory with an argument from 
disagreement as well as his more compelling argument from queerness.224  The problem is 
that disagreement is easily explained by one or more of the participants in the disagreement 
being mistaken, or subject to a cognitive shortcoming.   
The immediacy of aesthetic experience and the fact of widespread aesthetic disagreement 
are, then, explanations of the widespread acceptance of Anti-Objectivist views without 
being good reasons to hold such views.  Widespread belief in Anti-Objectivism is in turn a 
sufficient explanation for widespread belief in Pessimism, and so the intuitions favouring 
such views can be explained away by the Objectivist Optimist.  But should they be?  Perhaps 
Pessimism can be given a plausible defence. 
7.3.4 Unusability Pessimism 
I have alluded to folk and historical intuitions favouring Pessimism, but Hopkins provides a 
principled defence of Pessimism which deserves attention.  Hopkins distinguishes between 
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Unavailability Pessimism and Unusability Pessimism.225  The former is the standard 
pessimistic view that aesthetic testimony does not make aesthetic knowledge available.  The 
latter is the more complicated view that, while aesthetic testimony does make aesthetic 
knowledge available, it is nevertheless irrational to form beliefs on the basis of this 
knowledge.  Hopkins suggests that there is a non-epistemic norm prohibiting the use of 
testimony in forming aesthetic value judgments, even when such testimony provides 
ĞǆĐĞůůĞŶƚ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ?226  This is an attempt to defend the 
pessimistic intuitions I have described, but I will argue that it is a costly defence. 
Hopkins considers the objection that it seems to be rational to see a film that is 
recommended by a friend.227  If this is rational then it seems that it is rational to infer from 
aesthetic testimony that a film is worth seeing.  Hopkins suggests that in such cases the 
norm against making use of the knowledge offered by aesthetic testimony lapses when the 
only alternatives are perverse.228  Assuming that one is unable to sacrifice the time it would 
take to watch every film that is showing in order to determine which ones are worth seeing, 
the only alternative is to remain agnostic about the values of the films and pick one at 
random.  This is perverse because the films are unlikely to be of equal value, and so Hopkins 
suggests that under the circumstances one can temporarily make use of aesthetic 
testimony.229   
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TestŝŵŽŶǇŝƐ ?ĂĨƚĞƌĂůů ?ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞŽŶƚŚĞƵŶƵƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƉĞƐƐŝŵŝƐƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ŝƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ
a norm prohibiting the use of this information, but the norm lapses in this sort of emergency 
situation.  Once one sees the film that is recommended, however, the norm kicks in once 
ĂŐĂŝŶ ? ĂƐ ŝƚ ǁĞƌĞ ? ĂŶĚ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ Ĩŝůŵ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶůǇ ŽŶ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ
experience of it, not the testimony that was the rational basis for the decision to see it. 
Hopkins claims, then, that when one experiences a film recommended by a friend, that 
ĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚƉůĂǇĂŶǇƌŽůĞŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ
testimony was a good reason to see the film, apparently because it was a good reason to 
expect the film to be good.  So the testimony justifies the expectation of aesthetic values in 
ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ?ďƵƚ ŝƐ ƚƌƵŵƉĞĚďǇŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĨŝƌƐƚ-hand experiences when one comes to judge what 
aesthetic values, if any, the work has.  This might seem plausible, for reasons I will come to 
in §7.4, or it might seem rather odd that a somewhat reliable source of evidence of 
aesthetic value should be trumped by a more reliable source, rather than merely 
ŽǀĞƌƐŚĂĚŽǁĞĚŽƌŽƵƚǁĞŝŐŚĞĚŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶďǇƚŚĂƚŵŽƌĞƌĞůŝĂďůĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ ? 
7.3.5 Evidential Optimism 
Hopkins suggests that in the particular case he describes, intuitions favour his pessimistic 
ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ PĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇŝƐƵŶƵƐĂďůĞĂƚůĞĂƐƚŝŶĐĂƐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĂĐƋƵĂŝŶƚĂŶĐĞ
with a work is available as a source of aesthetic knowledge.  The Optimistic explanation, 
however, appears to be simple and effective: aesthetic testimony provides evidence of 
aesthetic values, so when a friend recommends a film this provides some evidence that the 
film is worth seeing, and therefore a defeasible reason to see it.  Once one experiences the 
ĨŝůŵĨŝƌƐƚŚĂŶĚ ?ŽŶĞĂĐƋƵŝƌĞƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ƚŽďĞǁĞŝŐŚĞĚ
up with the evidence gathered from testimony.   
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DŽƐƚůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĞƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇŽĨĂĨƌŝĞŶĚǁŝůů ?ŝĨŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ďĞ
outweighed by the evidence from an acquaintance with the work.  But here Hopkins is 
ƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂů ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞĐĂŶĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞŽĨĂĐĂƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŽŶĞ ?ƐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ
are inconclusive, such that evidence from testimony might be what decides whether one 
judges the film to be good or bad.230  ^ƵƉƉŽƐĞŵǇĨƌŝĞŶĚƐĂǇƐƚŽŵĞ ? ‘/ũƵƐƚƐĂǁdŚĞ<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ
Speech ?/ƚ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚ ?ǇŽƵƐŚŽƵůĚŐŽĂŶĚƐĞĞŝƚ ? ?^ƵƉƉŽƐĞ/ƚŚĞŶƐĞĞƚŚĞĨŝůŵĂŶĚŵǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ
by itself would lead me to judge the film to be of average quality: not particularly great, not 
ƚŽŽďĂĚ ?/Ĩ/ǁĞƌĞƚŽŵĂŬĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽƉŝĞĐĞƐŽĨĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ/ŚĂǀĞŐĂƚŚĞƌĞĚŽĨƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?Ɛ
ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ĨƌŽŵ ŵǇŽǁŶĂŶĚŵǇĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ? /ǁŽƵůĚ ƌĞĂĐŚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ The 
<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ^ƉĞĞĐŚ is a good film, even though I did not particularly like it.   
Hopkins understandably finds it counter-intuitive that this is a rational way to form an 
aesthetic value judgment.231  However, the optimist need not be so optimistic as to say that 
ŽŶĞ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇ ĚĞƐĞƌǀĞƐ ĂƐ ŵƵĐŚ ĐƌĞĚĞŶĐĞ ĂƐ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
experiences.  That, it seems, would be to adopt a transmission model of aesthetic 
testimony.  But as Hopkins himself argues and as I explained in §7.2.1, the evidential model 
may be the more plausible way to conceive of aesthetic testimony, and evidence from first-
hand experience in this as in other areas may be given a significantly greater weight than 
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵŽŶĞŽƚŚĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇ ?232  
This Evidential Optimism might run into problems if the intuition Hopkins expresses remains 
for cases which are similar except that the testimony comes from more than one person or 
from expert critics.  But such cases might involve for example a professional critic with good 
                                                             
230 HOPKINS 2011, pp. 154-5. 
231 HOPKINS 2011, pp. 154-5. 
232 HOPKINS 2000, p. 143. 
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credentials reviewing a work of art based on his first-hand experience of it, or a number of 
reliable critics who are acquainted with a work reaching a consensus about its aesthetic 
merits and defects.  I am not so convinced that the pessimistic intuition ? that in such cases 
such testimony should never be the decŝĚŝŶŐ ĨĂĐƚŽƌ ŝŶ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĞƌĚŝĐƚ ĂďŽƵƚ Ă
work ? is a particularly strong or widespread intuition.  Optimistic intuitions are also 
widespread, and I try to illustrate this further in §7.5.  Before that, I will consider a much-
discussed principle which Hopkins suggests as a possible candidate for the non-epistemic 
norm in his Unusability Pessimism. 
7.4 The Acquaintance Principle 
The Acquaintance Principle (AP) states that one must be acquainted with a work of art in 
order to be in a position to pass judgment on its aesthetic values.233  ǇďĞŝŶŐ ‘ĂĐƋƵĂŝŶƚĞĚ
ǁŝƚŚ ?ŚĞƌĞ/ƐŝŵƉůǇŵĞĂŶŚĂǀŝŶŐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌŽŶĞƐĞůĨ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŚĂǀŝŶŐƐĞĞŶ
a film, having read a novel, and so on.  AP seems to imply Pessimism about aesthetic 
testimony, which in turn can be used as premise 3 in the argument in §7.1 against Moderate 
Aesthetic Objectivism.  Barring reasons other than AP for being a pessimist about aesthetic 
testimony, one way to defend Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism from the argument from 
Pessimism is to deny AP. 
AP seems to account for some of the pessimistic intuitions I have described, and Hopkins 
proposes AP as a potential candidate for the non-epistemic norm that he believes prevents 
aesthetic testimony from being usable when we make aesthetic value judgments.234  Budd 
interprets Pettit as defending AP and suggests that, at least for Pettit if not other advocates, 
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234 HOPKINS 2011, p. 150. 
 237  
 
belief in AP is based on the assumption that aesthetic characterisations are perceptual: 
when we express aesthetic value judgments about something we make reference to what 
we perceive, suggesting that perceptual access to aesthetic values may be a necessary 
condition for aesthetic knowledge.235  
Kant seems to endorse something like AP when, as I explained in §7.3.1, he claims that 
aesthetic value jƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐŵĂǇŽŶůǇďĞĨŽƌŵĞĚŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?<ĂŶƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨWďǇŽƚŚĞƌƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĂďůĞ
by the fact that testimony cannot convey what it is like to experience a work of art.  In the 
philosophy of mind, the case of Mary in the black and white room is a much discussed 
thought experiment relating to what it is like to experience colour, and to the subjective, 
phenomenal aspects of consciousness, or qualia, which are difficult to account for in a 
physicalist theory of the mind.236  A version of this case may prove illustrative in the present 
discussion of aesthetic testimony. 
In the original Mary case, Mary is born and raised in a black and white room in which she 
learns all of the physical facts about the colour red, but without ever seeing anything red. 
She then leaves the room and sees a red object for the first time.  This seems to involve a 
phenomenal experience of red which is new to her and could not have been conveyed to 
her in the way that the physical facts were conveyed to her while she was living in the black 
and white room.237   Perhaps when seeing red for the first time she learns something new, 
or perhaps not; perhaps she gains a kind of know-how as opposed to knowledge that, since, 
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according to the physicalist, all knowledge of the latter kind in relation to the colour red was 
given to her previously.  This is subject to a lively debate which is of little relevance for 
present purposes, except that a parallel case involving aesthetic testimony suggests that 
pessimistic intuitions might be explained away. 
7.4.1 Aesthetic Mary 
Consider Aesthetic Mary, who is born and raised in a cell in which she is deprived of 
experiencing works of art.  She is able to learn everything that she can learn about art 
without experiencing it: what it consists in, what sorts of objects it involves, what sort of 
experiences it elicits in those who experience it, and what judgments are made about it and 
so on.  She will know, for example, that Jimi Hendrix is widely regarded as one of the 
greatest electric guitar players there has been, that he made a certain number of studio 
records with the Jimi Hendrix Experience, featuring particular songs on particular subjects, 
that they marked a transition in popular ŵƵƐŝĐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ Ă  ‘ŚĞĂǀŝĞƌ ? ƐŽƵŶĚ ?  ^ŚĞ ĐĂŶ ĞǀĞŶ
read the lyrics of the songs and read scores transcribed from the recordings, and imagine 
how the music might have sounded.  She can watch silent footage of Hendrix performing.  
But she cannot find out what it ŝƐ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ůŝŬĞ ƚŽ ŚĞĂƌ ,ĞŶĚƌŝǆ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬƐ ŽĨ Ăƌƚ ? ŚĞƌ
imagination cannot give her an auditory hallucination of a set of unique studio recordings, 
even if she can grasp certain melodies or rhythms from the information she does have.   
Mary breaks out of her cell and heads to a music shop where she is able to listen to the Jimi 
Hendrix Experience albums and so she finds out what it is like to hear them.  This could not 
have been conveyed to her while she was in her artistic-deprivation cell; one must hear the 
recordings to know what it is like to hear them, just as one must see a Rembrandt to know 
what it is like to see a Rembrandt, or navigate by echolocation in order to know what it is 
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like to navigate by echolocation.  The Pessimist and the Optimist can agree on this: to know 
what it is like to experience something, one must have the experience or at least a very 
similar experience.  One might empathise with another person but to the extent that this 
involves knowing what their experiences are like, it must involve feeling something that 
approximates what they feel to a high degree, and I am presupposing that it was ensured 
ƚŚĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐDĂƌǇ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐĨĞůůƐŚŽƌƚŽĨĂŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
experiences she later had in the music shop. 
What the Optimist and the Pessimist will not agree on is whether Aesthetic Mary could have 
deduced that the recordings were aesthetically valuable in various ways before she heard 
them.  The Pessimist might be willing to grant that Aesthetic Mary would be inclined to form 
aesthetic value judgments on her limited information, but why should the Pessimist believe 
that these judgments could constitute knowledge?   
The notion of the ideal aesthetic judge that I introduced in §3.2.2 is what I have in mind 
here: a ĨƵůů ? ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ŵŝŐŚƚ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ
require a non-perspectival overview of the values of the aesthetic experiences that various 
different ideal aesthetic experiencers would have of a work.  But that is not to diminish the 
importance of acquaintance in actually having the aesthetic experiences offered by a work, 
and in doing so using art exactly as it should be used.  The ideal aesthetic experiencer, as the 
name suggests, experiences a work of art in an appropriate sort of way.  The ideal aesthetic 
judge ŵĞƌĞůǇ ŐĂƚŚĞƌƐ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂďŽƵƚ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĨŽƌŵƐ Ă
ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚŽƐĞ
values in her own aesthetic experiences.     
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There is, uncontroversially, much that can be learned about a work without being 
acquainted with it, such as who made it and by what means, how it is regarded by others, 
and how it fits into art history.  It is plausible, I will argue, that the gap in the puzzle, as it 
were, when one is not acquainted with a work but knows plenty about it, can sometimes be 
ŵĂĚĞƵƉĨŽƌďǇǁŚĂƚŽŶĞĚŽĞƐŚĂǀĞĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚŽŶĞĐĂŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞůǇũƵĚŐĞƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ
aesthetic values.  It is tempting to over-estimate, I think, the epistemic importance of 
ĂĐƋƵĂŝŶƚĂŶĐĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐĂĨƚĞƌĂůůƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨĂƌƚ P,ĞŶĚƌŝǆ ?ƐƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞŶŽƚŵƵĐŚƵƐĞŝĨ
one does not listen to them; learning about them may be interesting but it just cannot 
provide one with the sort of aesthetic enjoyment that listening can.  But the importance of 
acquaintance in enjoying a work does not equate to the importance of acquaintance in 
evaluating a work, because enjoying guitar music and forming accurate judgments are two 
very different things, even when those judgments are about the enjoyability of guitar music. 
Suppose that aesthetic values are objective.  Aesthetic Mary would then be able to learn the 
facts about the aesthetic values of particular works of art without experiencing them; that 
is, AP would be false.  When she does experience these works what changes is that she can 
actually reap whatever rewards those works offer in virtue of their aesthetic values: for 
example she can be moved emotionally by works that are expressive.  This was not possible 
prior to her acquaintance with the works, and this might be enough to explain intuitions 
that favour a principle which states that one must experience a work in order to know its 
aesthetic values, even though the truth may be slightly different: one must experience a 
work in order to appreciate its aesthetic values.  I am not presenting a question-begging 
defence of Aesthetic Objectivism and Optimism here, I am merely describing the Objectivist 
KƉƚŝŵŝƐƚ ?ƐƚĂŬĞŽŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐDĂƌǇŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĂt the position is 
coherent and remains on the table despite intuitions that favour AP, because it can explain 
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those intuitions.  Having discussed Pessimism about aesthetic testimony, I will now discuss 
Optimism and defend a version of it. 
7.5 Optimism about Aesthetic Testimony 
I will now begin to argue that Optimism about aesthetic testimony is more explanatory than 
Pessimism.  Although Pessimism can account for certain intuitions and observations, 
Optimism can account for those same intuitions and observations plus some things that 
Pessimism fails to explain.  At the start of this chapter the challenge faced by my account of 
aesthetic values was that the account implied an implausible Optimism about aesthetic 
testimony.  I will now attempt to demonstrate that Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism can 
explain away some of the intuitions about the implausibility of Optimism, while implying 
Optimism and thus accounting for our more optimistic intuitions.  The Optimism defended is 
not implausibly strong and does not seem to pose a problem for the Moderate Aesthetic 
Objectivism that implies it. 
We often rely on aesthetic testimony when forming beliefs about the aesthetic values of 
objects.  I mentioned in §2.3 the example of critical reviews, which are widely used in 
making decisions about, for instance, what films to spend money on seeing.  Reviews 
written by non-professional critics are now hugely popular on the internet, but reviews by 
purported experts still have an audience, for example in movie  or music magazines and in 
newspapers.   
Our reliance on reviews can, however, be explained away by Pessimism.  Meskin explains 
that the information we take from reviews may be about what is likely to please people with 
particular aesthetic sensibilities, rather than about what is aesthetically valuable in a way 
 242  
 
that is independent of such specialised sensibilities.238  Readers of Empire movie magazine 
may tend to have a particular taste in films, such that they can rely on the rating Empire 
ascribes to a particular film as a good indication that they, the readers, are likely to enjoy 
that film.  This is consistent with such readers being unable to learn, without seeing it, 
whether a film is actually good. 
This pessimistic explanation may or may not be more successful than the optimistic view 
that reviews tell us about aesthetic values and not just what some people will like.  Facts 
that might be harder for Pessimism to explain include the fact that we are willing to pay 
large amounts of money to travel great distances to see particular works of art which mere 
testimony has informed us are worth seeing.  Keren Gorodeisky suggests that this is best 
explained by Optimism: 
 ?ƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶŝƐƚŽŽǁĞĂŬĨŽƌŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŽƌƚƐŽĨĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŚĂƚǁĞŽĨƚĞŶŵĂŬĞ
on nothing more than the word of another with regard to an object's 
aesthetic merit. For example, I might spend a lot of money on getting tickets 
to a concert, on the basis of the testimony of my musically informed and 
trustworthy friend, according to whom the concert is superb. And if we are 
deep lovers of art, we might also make flight reservations and go all the way 
to Berlin in order to see Alfred Menzel's paintings, about whose greatness we 
read in a book by the art historian Michael Fried. Would it be reasonable to 
make such efforts if what the testimony here gave us were mere unjustified 
ƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶ ?ƌĞŶ ?ƚǁĞŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚƚŽŐŽƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƌƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚ
it is great on the basis of testimony, perhaps rather like my mother might be 
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motivated to get me a red desk lamp to match the colour of my desk on the 
basis of my testimony that my desk is red, even if she hasn't seen it?239  
Indeed, the sacrifices involved, of time, money, effort and so on, seem to undermine what 
the pessimist must say, which is that travelling across the world just to see an object for the 
first time is a gamble with or without relevant aesthetic testimony, and that it is perhaps 
therefore unwise that so many people are willing to do this on the basis of testimony.  Such 
sacrifices must be a gamble according to Pessimism because testimony cannot tell us what 
is worth investing in experiencing.  But given that we routinely engage in these investments, 
the explanation is plausibly that we do not believe we are taking such a gamble, because we 
do not believe in Pessimism. 
But perhaps a similar explanation can be given as in the case of critical reviews: perhaps 
testimony about far-off works of art informs us about what is likely to please us, without 
informing us of what is aesthetically valuable.  But in the previous case this ability to inform 
only needed to be reliable enough to justify parting with a few hours and a cinema ticket 
fare, and this made the hypothesis that reviews cater to particular, unrepresentative tastes 
easier to defend.   
It is less plausible that testimony about far-off works of art is testimony about what only 
certain kinds of people will enjoy, as if this were more plausible it seems we would be more 
hesitant than we are to travel at great cost to see the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ǁŽŶĚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?Ƶƚ
the most reliable forms of aesthetic testimony might provide evidence of what one would 
enjoy in ideal circumstances; if a source of testimony can provide evidence of what would 
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please certain sensibilities, why not ideally refined sensibilities?  On my account, evidence of 
ĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐƚŽƉůĞĂƐĞŝŶŝĚĞĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ?
If, as the Evidential Optimist says, aesthetic testimony provides evidence of the aesthetic 
values of works of art, it is less of a gamble to ĚƌĂŐŽŶĞ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞŐůŽďĞ
to bring it in touch with what is calculated to please.  Whereas if the testimony only tells us 
what is idiosyncratically enjoyable, the chance of having the wrong idiosyncrasies seems too 
high.  I have not said enough yet to defend Optimism about aesthetic testimony, however.   
7.5.1 Objectivist Optimism 
It seems that Objectivism can account for the intuitions that lie behind the objection I 
presented in §7.1.  But before I dismiss the intuitions favouring AP and consequently 
Pessimism, it will be necessary to provide a more positive defence of Optimism about 
aesthetic testimony.  Although as I have explained there are also intuitions favouring 
Optimism, more needs to be said to tip the balance in its favour.  DĞƐŬŝŶ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐĂǁĂǇ
of pessimistic intuitions hints at the problems this defence of Optimism will face.  Not only 
can belief in the subjectivity or subject-relativity of aesthetic values lead to belief in 
Pessimism about aesthetic testimony, but to some extent Pessimism may be justified due to 
the confusion that widespread belief in the subjectivity of values can generate.   
Aesthetic testimony may fail to take place at all if the testifier draws no distinction between 
what is good and what they like, and so learning from aesthetic testimony will face the 
obstacle of identifying genuine aesthetic testimony.  However, this does not lead to the 
pessimistic claim that we cannot find out the aesthetic values of a work from testimony 
alone.  This merely renders learning from aesthetic testimony a difficult thing to do.  This is 
something I will try to demonstrate in my defence of Optimism. 
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So although I think it is false that aesthetic values in art are entirely subjective or subject-
relative, it is widely believed and this can explain why, rightly or wrongly, Pessimism about 
aesthetic testimony is also widely believed.  Objectivist pessimists might be justified in their 
Pessimism given the undermining effects of popular Anti-Objectivist views.  Alternatively, 
Objectivist Optimism might be justified if this and other confounding variables are 
controlled for in the gathering of aesthetic testimony.  For example, one could listen only to 
testimony from people who do draw a distinction between what they like and what is good.  
I will now consider how strong evidence from aesthetic testimony could be, as this will 
determine whether it will be possible to learn about the aesthetic values of works of art 
from such evidence. 
7.5.2 Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism and Optimism 
If aesthetic values are capacities to produce valuable aesthetic experiences in ideal 
circumstances, it should be possible to find out what aesthetic values a work has by hearing 
testimony from someone who has experienced the work in ideal circumstances, without 
ŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶǀĂůƵĂďůĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?
There are various obstacles to this indirect approach to ascertaining the aesthetic values of 
a work.   
A major obstacle is the difficulty of attaining ideal circumstances for the aesthetic 
experience of a work of art.  Ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience are something we 
can move towards with incremental rewards, like an athlete gradually building up strength, 
but only an ideal aesthetic experiencer can be guaranteed to have experiences which reflect 
the aesthetic capacities of a work.   
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Inasmuch as the sensibilities of ideal aesthetic experiencers vary, only the even less realistic 
ideal aesthetic judge can have the knowledge required to give a comprehensive picture of 
the valuable aesthetic experiences that a work is apt to produce for human beings in 
general.  The ideal aesthetic judge is perhaps a hypothetical receiver of all available 
aesthetic testimony: he knows what values of aesthetic experience will arise for every 
instance of the heterogeneous human sensibility kind when it is put in ideal circumstances 
for the aesthetic experience of the work in question.  If one can learn the aesthetic 
capacities of a work via testimony then this ideal epistemic point makes sense and, like the 
ideal circumstances for the aesthetic experience of a work, can perhaps be moved towards 
with incremental improvements in judgment.  But it is beginning to look very difficult to 
learn from aesthetic testimony. 
The dispositional nature of aesthetic values on my account is an asset in combining 
Optimism about aesthetic testimony with Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism.  One can be 
aware that something has a disposition without experiencing the manifestation of that 
disposition: for example one does not need to smash a glass in order to know that it is 
fragile.  One needs to know, perhaps, that glass is fragile, and that this object is made of 
glass.  Or one could simply be told by a reliable source that if the glass is dropped on a hard 
surface it will most likely break.  A reliable critic can give some evidence that a work of art is 
such that if it is experienced in ideal circumstances the resulting aesthetic experiences will 
have some degree or type of value.  But an expert in the properties of glass is experienced 
ŽƌŚĂƐŐĂŝŶĞĚŚĞƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĨƌŽŵŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶũƵƐƚŽŶĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽŶŽŶĞŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶ
of glass breaking.  Similarly, a single critic cannot give strong evidence that a work of art has 
some aesthetic value, because that critic is limited by his own sensibility even in ideal 
circumstances for aesthetic experience.   
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KŶĞǁŽƵůĚŶĞĞĚƚŽŐĞƚŽŶĞ ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇĨƌŽŵƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐůŝŬĞĂŶŝĚĞĂůĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐũƵĚŐĞ ?ŽƌďĞ
something close to an ideal aesthetic judge by gathering large amounts of controlled data 
regarding the aesthetic experiences had in response to a work, especially in conditions 
approaching the ideal for aesthetic experience.  To reliably detect the aesthetic values of a 
work via testimony, it might be necessary to act as an aesthetic scientist and conduct 
controlled investigations, based on as much information as possible, into what the 
experiential capacities of particular objects are.  There are many obstacles to success in 
ascertaining the objective aesthetic values of a work by this or any means, but this does not 
undermine the thesis that aesthetic values are objective capacities of works.  Having said 
ƚŚĂƚ ?/ǁŝůůŶŽǁĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚĨŝŶĚŝŶŐŽƵƚĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐĂŶĚŝŶ
doing so clarify the modest Optimism that I am defending and which can both explain 
pessimistic intuitions and defend Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism from the challenge they 
might seem to pose.  
7.5.3 Modest Evidential Optimism 
Hopkins and I agree that aesthetic testimony should be understood on the evidential model, 
as I described it in §7.2.  One of the reasons Hopkins mentions is that the alternative model 
of transmission testimony might create situations in which one is warranted in believing 
both P and not-P, because aesthetic disagreement is so widespread that there will likely be 
reliable aesthetic testifiers who disagree.240  If one critic transmits to me her warrant for 
believing that a work is very beautiful, and another critic transmits to me his warrant for 
believing that a work is very ugly, it seems I must form contradictory aesthetic judgments.  I 
remain agnostic as to whether testimony ever takes place by transmission, so I will not 
                                                             
240 HOPKINS 2000, p. 231. 
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discuss this problem regarding transmission testimony.  But unfortunately for the evidential 
model of aesthetic testimony, which I do endorse, it seems to face a similar problem. 
Suppose that I ask one critic what she thinks of dŚĞ<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ^ƉĞĞĐŚ, and she says that it is a 
good film.   I then, according to the evidential model, acquire evidence that it is a good film.  
This evidence could theoretically be balanced by the testimony of another critic who thinks 
that it is a bad film.  With two conflicting testimonies, the epistemic probability of the film 
being good might be the same as it was before I acquired any evidence at all.  I could stop at 
one critic, and then I would only be aware of evidence that the film is good.  But the 
existence of a second critic who thinks the opposite might constitute a reason for me to 
refrain from assuming that the film is good.  Although I am not aware of the second critic, I 
might be aware that it is possible that he exists and thinks that dŚĞ<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ^ƉĞĞĐŚ is a bad 
film.  So in every case of evidential testimony it will be possible that the true balance of 
evidence available to be gathered from testimony is not accurately reflected in the limited 
sample of evidence that actually has been gathered from testimony.   
But this is a problem already faced by scientists, who cannot be expected to gather all 
available evidence, and it is always possible that the next available piece of evidence could 
refute a theory.  Nevertheless, it is usually thought that scientific enquiry affords some 
degree of epistemic objectivity, and that the mere possibility of conflicting evidence is not 
necessarily sufficient to undermine scientific conclusions.   
Asking for film recommendations is a lot less rigorous than conducting an experiment, of 
course, so perhaps the evidence gathered from each instance of evidential testimony is not 
going to be very substantial.  Even large samples of testimony about beauty are unlikely to 
be collected under controlled conditions, with confounding variables accounted for.  The 
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possibility of critics who disagree does not render testimony completely uninformative, but 
it is never going to be very informative unless it is gathered in the way that scientific 
evidence is gathered: very briefly, this will involve controlling for confounding variables, 
collecting large samples of data, performing rigorous analysis and meta-analysis, and so on.  
I will now look at some examples of confounding variables in the evaluation of art, to 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚŝƐŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĂƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝĨŽŶĞŝƐƚŽŐĞƚĂƌĞůŝĂďůĞƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨĂǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ
aesthetic values without experiencing it. 
7.5.4 Confounding Variables 
More would need to be known about what would count as a confounding variable in order 
for aesthetic testimony to be a good source of aesthetic knowledge.  For example, snobbery 
seems to be widespread and may render many of our aesthetic judgments unreliable. 
Matthew Kieran defines snobbery as the corruption of the aesthetic response by irrelevant 
(usually social) considerations.241 He draws on evidence from Frédéric Brochet that we fail 
to notice the similarity of taste between a white wine and the same white wine dyed red.242 
Brochet also finds that wine is described as being of better quality if it is decanted into an 
expensive-looking bottle.243  
Kieran also mentions James Cutting who has found that we tend to prefer visual art that we 
are more familiar with; it seems that mere exposure to a work of art can lead us to rate it 
                                                             
241 KIERAN, Matthew. The Vice of Snobbery: Aesthetic Knowledge, Justification and Virtue in Art Appreciation. 
The Philosophical Quarterly, 60:239, 2010: 243-263. 
242 BROCHET, Frédéric. Chemical object representation in the field of consciousness. Application presented for 
the grand prix of the Académie Amorim following work carried out towards a doctorate from the Faculty of 
Oenology, General Oenology Laboratory 351, 2001. 
243 BROCHET 2001. 
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highly, and this would suggest that mere exposure might also act as a confounding variable 
in the gathering of reliable evidential testimony.244   
Kieran, Meskin, Margaret Moore and Mark Phelan have recently provided a counter-study 
to Cutting which suggests that the mere exposure effect works positively for good works 
and negatively for bad ones: that is, exposure to good art tends to lead one increasingly to 
judge it to be good, whereas exposure to bad art tends to lead one to increasingly judge it to 
be bad.245  This methodology presupposes that there are objectively good and bad works of 
art, but in doing so it provides evidence of a distinction between works of art which we like 
more the more we see them, and those which we like less the more we see them, and this 
distinction may be best explained by the presupposition being correct.  The study is also 
good news for Optimism about evidential aesthetic testimony, because rather than being a 
confounding variable, exposure may improve the reliability of our aesthetic judgments and 
therefore their strength as indications of aesthetic value.   
Whether mere exposure or widespread snobbery in particular can make aesthetic testimony 
unreliable is not important for current purposes; my point is that there are variables which 
would need to be ruled out as explanations of aesthetic responses, if aesthetic testimony is 
to be gathered in a way that produces reliable evidence of aesthetic value.  But it is unclear 
ǁŚĂƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ƚŚŝƐ ĨƌŽŵ ďĞŝŶŐ Ă ŵĞĂŶƐ ŽĨ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐ ŽƵƚ ĂŶ ŽďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ
without experiencing it, apart from the same challenges that scientists face in answering 
questions that require the controlled and systematic gathering and analysis of large 
quantities of data.   
                                                             
244 CUTTING, J.E.  The Mere Exposure Effect and Aesthetic Preference.  In LOCHER, P. et al. (eds.), New 
Directions in Aesthetics, Creativity and the Arts, New York: Baywood, 2006, pp. 33-46. 
245 MESKIN, Aaron, et al. Mere exposure to bad art. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 54:2, 2013: 1-26. 
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This is no defence of evidential testimony as a good ǁĂǇŽĨ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐŽƵƚĂďŽƵƚ ĂŶŽďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ
aesthetic values ? quite the opposite ? but the mere possibility of learning from aesthetic 
testimony, however difficult that might be, is sufficient to block the argument presented in 
§7.1.  I will now consider a further challenge to this modestly optimistic position. 
7.5.5 Qualified Optimism 
Even with a scientific approach in which variables such as snobbery are ruled out as 
explanations of the data, it might turn out to be impossible to achieve a necessary 
independence between subjects, without jeopardising the cultural knowledge which might 
be required for the proper aesthetic appreciation of art.  It seems that as long as evidential 
aesthetic testimony is possible, no matter how weak it is it should be possible to gather 
enough testimony to provide strong evidence for an aesthetic value judgment.  However, 
there may be a problem of testimonial evidence levelling off at a certain threshold due to 
diminishing returns.  This might happen if the testifiers are not independent. 
Suppose two twins nearly always answer questions in the same way, rightly or wrongly. 
Twin 1's testimony gives us some evidence that X, but twin 2's similar testimony does not 
double the evidence gathered because the twins are not independent judges.  This is 
perhaps implied about miracles in Hume's writing on the subject.  He says that miracles are 
so improbable that we can never amass enough evidence to justify believing in them.246  
Either Hume must say that the evidence against miracles is infinite, or he must say that the 
evidence from testimony levels-off below a certain threshold.   
It seems that non-independent observers might not each provide us with an equal amount 
of evidence for what they are testifying to.  Religious communities might work in a similar 
                                                             
246 HUME, David. An enquiry concerning human understanding. Broadview Press, 2011: section 10. 
 252  
 
way to the twins that I have described, rendering testimony about miracles to be 
inadequate as Hume describes.  Perhaps the second piece of testimony provides less 
evidence than the first, and this trend may continue so that the level of justification for the 
aesthetic value judgment stays below a certain threshold.  This might prevent evidential 
testimony from providing us with knowledge or justification in some cases.   
This may be a problem for aesthetic testimony if aesthetic value judgments require cultural 
knowledge and if cultural knowledge prevents us from being independent.  Reliable 
aesthetic judgment seems often to require cultural knowledge, for example to appreciate 
some works of Haitian visual art it is necessary to have some knowledge of the beliefs and 
concepts involved in Vodou theology.  But sufficient knowledge of a culture may cause 
cultural bias leading to diminishing returns from gathering aesthetic testimony.  Perhaps 
when different subjects acquire cultural knowledge of this kind they become more similar 
and less independent, rather like the religious communities who, perhaps due to their 
shared cultural heritage, may be insufficiently independent for their testimony to ever add 
up to a good case for the occurrence of miracles. 
This worry about evidence levelling-off is perhaps nothing more than pessimistic 
speculation, but it may be necessary to investigate the role of cultural knowledge in 
aesthetic appreciation, in relation to independence and its importance for the reliability of 
testimony, before we can confidently conclude that evidential aesthetic testimony can 
justify the forming or chĂŶŐŝŶŐŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐ/ŚĂǀĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚ
to demonstrate, in order to defend Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism, one need only be an 
optimist about aesthetic testimony to the extent that one rejects premise 3 in the argument 
I presented in §7.1 (or in other words, one rejects AP).  There may be serious practical 
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obstacles to learning from aesthetic testimony, but this would only imply that it would be 
ĨĂƌ ĞĂƐŝĞƌ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚŽƵƚĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐďǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐ ŝƚ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚ ƚŚĂƚŽŶĞcould 
only ĨŝŶĚŽƵƚĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐďǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐŝƚ ? 
A work being aesthetically valuable is nowhere near as unlikely as the occurrence of a 
miracle, so it is not clear that the same epistemic problems apply when gathering aesthetic 
testimony.  It seems that in principle one could find out the aesthetic values of a work of art 
without experiencing it, but this may be an extremely difficult task, and so although AP is 
false, pessimistic intuitions are understandable. 
One might argue that Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism implies a stronger Optimism than the 
one I have defended.  But it seems that claiming that aesthetic values are objective 
capacities of art works does not commit me to the notion that we could learn about 
aesthetic values as easily as we can learn the location of a hotel, for instance.  Aesthetic 
capacities are inferred from their manifestation in ideal aesthetic experiences, and this 
speaks against a strong form of Optimism.  One would need to know that someone was in 
ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience when they had the experience that is the basis 
of their aesthetic testimony, in order to know that the testimony is evidence of aesthetic 
values in the work rather than of some irrelevant subjective influence.  It seems that 
Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism does not imply an implausibly strong form of Optimism. 
7.6 Conclusions 
The Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism that I have defended in this dissertation seems not to 
be vulnerable to a challenge from aesthetic testimony.  The challenge is based on the 
assumption that the objectivity of aesthetic values implies that we should be able to learn 
about the aesthetic values of works of art via testimony, which allegedly we cannot.  
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Pessimism about aesthetic testimony is based on the idea that one must directly experience 
something in order to know its aesthetic values, which in turn is based on confusions 
involving widespread Anti-Objectivist assumptions and a conflation of how valuable 
something is with what it is like to appreciate it.  The apparent reasons for Pessimism can be 
accounted for by Optimism, as can our more optimistic intuitions which Pessimism struggles 
to explain.  Aesthetic testimony seems to provide some evidence of the aesthetic values of 
objects, and although this evidence might be very weak or difficult to accumulate, the 
Aesthetic Objectivism I defend does not imply otherwise and remains unscathed by these 
observations about aesthetic testimony.  Aesthetic testimony is testimony about the 
capacities for works of art to produce certain responses, and is much like testimony about 
cause and effect more generally.  In the next and final chapter I draw conclusions from and 
summarise the dissertation thus far, concluding that the aesthetic values of art are 
ontologically objective capacities to produce non-aesthetically valuable aesthetic 
experiences in ideal circumstances. 
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8. Conclusions 
8.0 Introduction 
In this final chapter I draw concluding remarks from the previous chapters and summarise 
the claims that I have been defending.  I begin by revisiting the paradox of taste and 
explaining how I have attempted to answer it.  I then summarise the account of aesthetic 
values in art that I have defended, including the claim that non-aesthetic values of aesthetic 
experiences are primary in the constitution of the aesthetic values of art works.  I clarify that 
aesthetic values on this account are objective capacities possessed by works, and they are 
anthropocentric values in that they depend on human sensibilities, which may vary even in 
ŝĚĞĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?/ƚŚĞŶƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐŝĚĞĂůŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌƚŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚƐƵŵŵĂƌŝƐĞŵǇŽǁŶ
account of ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience and judgment.  Finally, I recap my 
responses to objections favouring rival meta-aesthetical positions, and summarise 
Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism. 
8.1 The Paradox of Taste Revisited 
As I explained in §2.3, we have conflicting intuitions about the objectivity or subjectivity of 
aesthetic values in art.  It seems that some works are much better than others, but it also 
seems that beauty is in the eye of the beholder in the sense that our responses to works of 
art which are the basis for our evaluations of them are subjective, sometimes emotional, 
ĂŶĚĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇƋƵŝƚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ?/ŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐŝƚŝƐĂ ‘ŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨƚĂƐƚĞ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌǁŽƌŬŝƐďĞƚƚĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶǁŽƌŬ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚŽŶĞ ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐĂůůǇĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ
by a judgment-independent reality and one cannot therefore be in error, it seems that it is 
never universally or objectively true that work A is better than work B.  On the other hand, 
 256  
 
supposing that works can be objectively better or worse, it would seem that the aesthetic 
values of art works must not be a matter of subjective taste.  Which is it, then: are the 
aesthetic values of art, or are they not, a matter of taste about which there is no disputing? 
It can seem that we can be mistaken about whether something is beautiful or otherwise 
aesthetically valuable or disvaluable, that some aesthetic disagreements are reasonable, 
and that some works of art are far better than others regardless of what we think.  On my 
account this is indeed the case: the aesthetic values of art are not merely a matter of taste 
about which there is no disputing.  The possibility of error in aesthetic judgment is due to 
the cognitive command exerted by that which is ontologically objective (§1.4).  When 
judgments diverge over an objective matter of fact, this is due to cognitive shortcomings on 
the part of at least one judge, and patterns of convergence in judgment are best explained 
by the tracking of ontologically objective states of affairs (§§1.4.1-2).   
One might argue that patterns of convergence in aesthetic judgment would be better 
explained by similarities in psychology, without the need to posit objective entities to 
explain convergence.  But ontological objectivity can explain similarities in psychology, and it 
seems to be the right explanation: we have adapted to be sensitive in some ways to the 
ontologically objective environment so that we may survive to reproduce, and so similarities 
of psychology are to some extent similarities in sensitivity to that which is ontologically 
objective.   
Our sensitivity to that which is ontologically objective can be more or less refined, and we 
can misattribute aesthetic values by basing aesthetic value judgments on aesthetic 
experiences that take place outside ideal circumstances.  Errors in aesthetic judgment are 
therefore possible, in fact most likely widespread since ideal circumstances are not easy to 
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obtain, and so it is often reasonable for us to disagree about the values of art works and 
debate those values, as critics do in practice.  Recall, as I explained in chapter 3, that ideal 
circumstances for aesthetic experience include whatever will allow one to understand the 
work in question and appreciate masterpieces in general.  This will involve exercising the 
abilities that comprise epistemic objectivity, and possibly other characteristics such as 
emotional responsiveness and reflective capacities.  Errors of aesthetic judgment are likely 
to occur often since it would not take much to fall short of the ideal circumstances for 
aesthetic experience and therefore respond to a work in ways that are not indicative of its 
aesthetic capacities.  I will now summarise in further detail my proposed answer to the 
paradox of taste, or rather the explanation of our conflicting intuitions in Meta-Aesthetics 
that I have been defending. 
8.2 Aesthetic Values in Art 
To account for our conflicting intuitions about the objectivity of aesthetic values in art I have 
offered the following account.  A work W has aesthetic value V if and only if there could be a 
human critic in the circumstances ideal for the aesthetic experience of W who would 
experience W as having V, and the critic would experience W as having V because W has V.  
For example, a piece of music may be elegant if and only if in the ideal circumstances suited 
to the aesthetic experience of the music, one might experience the music as elegant.  The 
elegance of the music will be what causes one in ideal circumstances for aesthetic 
experience to experience the music as elegant.  One who judges the music to be entirely 
lacking in elegance will be straightforwardly mistaken given that its elegance is there to be 
experienced by a critic in ideal circumstances. 
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Aesthetic values such as elegance, then, are objective features of works of art.  And yet, we 
evaluate art on the basis of our subjective states: aesthetic value judgments are based on 
the way art works and particular features of them make us respond (§2.4.1).  Our responses 
to art can involve thoughts and imaginings engaged in a complex interaction, which is 
aesthetic experience.  On occasion such experiences are complex in a particular way 
involving indirect pleasure, for eǆĂŵƉůĞƚĂŬĞŶŝŶĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽŵĂŬĞ
one feel sad (§4.4.5).  Insofar as they are pleasurable, subjective experiences of an aesthetic 
sort can be valuable experiences.  Works of art can have ontologically objective dispositional 
properties which in ideal circumstances cause one who experiences their manifestation to 
ŚĂǀĞǀĂůƵĂďůĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?^ƵĐŚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐĂƌĞƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
dŚĞ ĞůĞŐĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ Ă ƉŝĞĐĞ ŽĨ ŵƵƐŝĐ ? ƚŚĞŶ ? ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ? ŝŶ ǀŝƌƚƵĞ ŽĨ ŝƚs natural 
properties, to give an ideal aesthetic experiencer valuable aesthetic experiences as of 
elegance in the music.  Elegance is an example of a thick value predicate, as although it is 
partly evaluative it is also partly descriptive and not just any valuable work could fall under 
its description (§2.2.1).  Natural properties of a work, for example the structure of a piece of 
music, make the work describable in certain ways, and if it falls under the descriptive 
ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ĞůĞŐĂŶƚ ?ĂǁŽƌŬŵĂǇĂůƐŽďe evaluable as elegant.   
When a work does fall under such thick aesthetic concepts a work may in virtue of this fall 
ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƚŚŝŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞŽĨ  ‘ƵŐůǇ ?Žƌ ‘ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ? ?ƐŽ ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞĂďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů
piece of music may be beautiful partly because it is elegant, and elegant because of certain 
natural properties that it possesses (§2.2.1).  But these properties must be something that 
we can, in ideal circumstances, experience aesthetically in a manner which is valuable.  The 
ultimate source of aesthetic value in art is our propensity to enjoy it, so to that extent it is 
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right that we have the impression that aesthetic values are subjective, as I will now 
reiterate. 
8.2.1 The Value of Aesthetic Experience 
Experiencing an art work W as having aesthetic value V involves having an aesthetic 
experience E which is itself valuable in virtue of being pleasurable in a complex manner 
involving the imagination and the understanding (§4.3.1).  Although an ideal aesthetic 
experiencer would have experience E because W has V, W only has V because E is itself 
valuable. The distinctiveness of aesthetic experience is the interaction of belief and 
imagination, and this can involve a sense of playful exploration or quasi-learning.  The 
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ Đognitive experience of an art work can be a source of 
pleasure of this distinctive aesthetic kind, and insofar as the work has the capacity to 
produce such pleasure in ideal circumstances, the work will be aesthetically valuable. 
For example, the content oĨŽŶĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƉƵƌĞŵƵƐŝĐŵĂǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞƚŚĞŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
sadness in the music due to certain antecedently valueless properties such as tones or 
rhythms.  One may take pleasure in this cognitive-imaginative experience of music which 
involves the imagination of sadness which the music does not literally possess, but which is 
ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚĂŶƚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŽŶ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
sensibility, producing a valuable aesthetic experience as of sad music.  The music will be 
expressive of sadness and aesthetically valuable in virtue of this because in ideal 
circumstances human critics will experience the music in this way. 
The value of aesthetic experiences is probably not aesthetic value, given that aesthetic value 
is an instrumental value to provide valuable aesthetic experiences (§4.4).  To avoid a regress 
of aesthetically valuable aesthetic experiences, it seems there must be non-aesthetically 
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valuable aesthetic experiences in virtue of which works apt to produce them are themselves 
aesthetically valuable in an instrumental sense.   
The pleasure taken in aesthetic experience can supply its non-aesthetic value if we conceive 
of aesthetic pleasure just as ordinary pleasure taken in a distinctive kind of experience 
involving the interplay of the imagination and the understanding.  The value of such 
experiences is hedonic and perhaps ultimately moral: aesthetic pleasure may be a morally 
good-making feature of the act of engaging with a work of art.  Aesthetic values in art are 
instrumental values to supply aesthetic enjoyment.  Valuable aesthetic experiences involve 
taking pleasure in the aesthetic, but the value of this need not be, and perhaps should not 
be, construed as aesthetic value.  Positive aesthetic value is, then, the capacity to produce 
experiences which have two features: they are aesthetic; and they are pleasurable.  
Negative aesthetic value is the capacity to produce unpleasant aesthetic experiences.  I will 
now further summarise the element of Aesthetic Value Empiricism in my account. 
8.2.2 Aesthetic Value Empiricism 
The dependence of the aesthetic values of a work on the values of aesthetic experiences 
does not imply that just anything could produce the experience in virtue of which a work 
has a certain aesthetic value (§4.2).  Works are valuable because of how they can be 
experienced, but not just anything could supply the same experience as could a work, 
because one of the identity conditions for an experience is that it is an experience of the 
particular thing that it is an experience of.  Aesthetic experiences are externalist: the object 
of an aesthetic experience is part of the experience, so that an indistinguishable experience 
of something else could not bestow that thing with the aesthetic values of the former object 
(§4.2.1).   
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ƵƚƚŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨĂŶŽďũĞĐƚ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐŝƐƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ
itself, because were it not for the imaginative content of aesthetic experiences of the object, 
which insofar as they are imaginative depart from the mere veridical apprehension of the 
ŽďũĞĐƚ ? ƚŚĞ ŽďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ?  /ƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
unnecessary to regard works of art as primary in the constitution of their own aesthetic 
values in order to avoid the conclusion that anything which produces an experience with a 
certain character is an aesthetically valuable object, because there is more to an aesthetic 
experience than its character.   
Aesthetic values are constituted by properties of works of art that dispose the work to 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞǀĂůƵĂďůĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŝŶŝĚĞĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ
such experiences bears a relation to the aesthetic sensibilities of human beings, in their 
refined state in ideal circumstances, but the capacity also supervenes on natural properties 
of the work which are its objective aesthetic values.  The value of the ideal aesthetic 
experience is the degree to which it is pleasurable in virtue of its involvement of a 
harmonious interplay between thoughts and imaginings. 
Aesthetic object values depend on aesthetic experience values: for example, we can only 
ŵĂŬĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĂǀĂƐĞ ?ƐĞůĞŐĂŶĐĞŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŝƚƐĂƉƚŶĞƐƐƚŽďĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚƉůĞĂƐĂŶƚůǇ ?KŶĞ
might argue that the elegance of a vase is entirely due to response-independent features 
such as shape, but this seems to overlook the evaluative aspect of a thick concept such as 
 ‘ĞůĞŐĂŶĐĞ ? ? ‘ůĞŐĂŶƚ ?ĚŽĞƐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐƐ ĐŚĂƐƐŚĂƉĞ ?ŝƚƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞƐ
an object according to such features, and it is unclear how one could do this without 
reference to the positive value of experiencing such features.   
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In Ethics one might rationally condemn an act that has never occurred, and therefore that 
nobody has experienced, by applying moral principles.  But it seems that in Aesthetics there 
are no principles that one could refer to as the basis for an evaluative judgment, other than, 
perhaps, the principle that art is to be experienced.  Aesthetic experiences must figure in 
ƚŚĞ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐvalues, whereas this need not occur in the 
ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŵŽƌĂůǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐƉůĂƵƐŝďůǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
Value Empiricism.  I will now clarify that, on the account that I am summarising, the 
aesthetic values of art are capacities possessed by works of art. 
8.2.3 Aesthetic Capacities 
We sometimes respond with aesthetic experiences to works of art when we engage with 
them in ordinary ways, such as by listening to music or reading a novel.  These experiences 
are aesthetic because of the way they involve the imagination and the understanding in a 
ŵĂŶŶĞƌƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞĂƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞ ?KŶĞĐĂŶďĞŵŽƌĞŽƌůĞƐƐĞŶŐĂŐĞĚǁŝƚŚĂǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ
capacity to exercise the imagination and the understanding in this way.  Being more or less 
engaged with this amounts to moving towards or away from the ideal circumstances for the 
ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ? 
The aesthetic values of works of art manifest themselves, in ideal circumstances for 
aesthetic experience, iŶ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŽƌŬƐ ?  dŚŝƐ
ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƵŶůŽĐŬĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ǁŝƚŚ
valuable aesthetic experiences to the features of works.  The joint manifestation of the 
properties of works of art and the properties of human sensibilities can result in aesthetic 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŵŽƌĞŽƌůĞƐƐǁŽƌƚŚŚĂǀŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨĂŶĂƌƚǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ
aesthetic values.   
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The dispositions of a critic in ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience to appreciate a 
ǁŽƌŬĂƌĞŶŽƚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ďƵƚĚĞƚƌŵŝŶĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĨĂůů
upon those values, so for example an elegant vase is elegant because of properties such as 
shape, but the concept of elegance applies to a vase with such properties because of how 
human beings in ideal circumstances are disposed to respond to a vase with such properties 
(§3.4).   
The above account of aesthetic values involves Response-Dependence: the view that 
aesthetic value concepts are shaped by our dispositions to respond to works of art, so that a 
work is aesthetically valuable if and only if in ideal circumstances one would respond to its 
properties in particular ways.  Response-Dependence is related to Relativism as it involves 
Anthropocentrism, which may be defined as relativity to the reference class of humans in 
general (§5.2.1).   
Anthropocentrism implies that faultless disagreements about the aesthetic values of art 
would be possible between human critics and members of a Martian species capable of 
aesthetic appreciation but with different sensibilities to Humans.  But if aesthetic values in 
art are relative to sensibilities, then to the extent that individual human beings are different 
to one another with respect to their aesthetic sensibilities, it seems that faultless 
disagreements might occur among Human critics (§5.3.2).  The constraint of ideal 
circumstances for aesthetic experience may reduce the extent to which faultless 
disagreements can occur, as presumably under the same epistemic circumstances we can 
expect more convergence than otherwise.  I will now further summarise the stance I have 
taken on the possibility of faultless disagreement. 
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8.2.4 Faultless Disagreement 
The ideal circumstances for aesthetic judgment would allow one to judge a work on the 
basis of the aesthetic experiences it is apt to produce for ideal experiencers of all stripes 
(§3.2.2 ) ?dŚĞƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůŝĚĞĂůũƵĚŐĞǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĨƵůůƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ?
and so although in a way aesthetic values are relative to different instances of human 
sensibility, one might say they are not so much relative but pluralistic: a work may be apt to 
produce a variety of aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience, 
and the values of all of thŽƐĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐǁŝůůƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ?
even though an individual ideal aesthetic experiencer may or may not have access to the full 
range of experiences available. 
Insofar as human aesthetic sensibilities differ in ideal circumstances, aesthetic values may 
be relative in a fine-grained way.  But we are probably too similar for aesthetic values to be 
subject-relative.  Cultural disagreement might speak in favour of Cultural Relativism, but on 
my account the disagreements can be explained, even as faultless if indeed they are, if 
Constructivism is plausible: that is, if different cultures by interpreting a work differently can 
essentially construct a work which may have distinct aesthetic values to those of the work 
as interpreted by other cultures, because these separate interpretations produce distinct 
works of art (§5.4.1).  On the other hand, interest in the aesthetic is cross-cultural and it is 
plausible that a work appealing to some cultures and not others is best explained by cultural 
misunderstandings, overestimations or underestimations of aesthetic value (§§5.4.2-3). 
The sorts of apparent faultless disagreements that might occur among ideal aesthetic 
experiencers would not be in violation of the cognitive command constraint (§1.4), because 
ŝĨŽŶĞũƵĚŐĞƐĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐũƵƐƚŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ
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it, one falls short of appreciating the different aesthetic experiences made possible by 
individual differences among ideal aesthetic experiencers, or by repeated acquaintances 
with the work.  The cognitive shortcoming one would be subject to would be the inevitable 
falling short of the requirements for ideal aesthetic judgment, which would require one to 
ĨŽƌŐŽŽŶĞ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĂůĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ǁŽƌŬĂŶĚƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ
relative to human ideal aesthetic experiencers of all stripes.   
Inevitably falling short of the ideal circumstances for aesthetic judgment and instead judging 
a work in the ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience, and judging it differently to other 
ideal aesthetic experiencers, could be construed as a faultless disagreement, but perhaps it 
is not disagreement at all.  I will now elaborate on this summary of my Moderate Aesthetic 
Objectivism with refĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽŝƚƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƐŽƵƌĐĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨƚĂƐƚĞ ? 
8.3 Humean Response-Dependence 
Hume's standard of taste is broadly correct: a work is valuable insofar as an ideal aesthetic 
experiencer would find it to be so (§3.1).  The ideal experiencer is in a state of epistemic 
objectivity and understands the work in question.  Their human sensibility disposes them to 
respond with aesthetic pleasure to that which has the capacity to produce it.  Their 
sensibility is refined so as to allow them to appreciate that which meets independent 
standards including the test of time (§3.3.1).  Passing such tests is best explained by 
objective values, and one who is good at detecting values in works that pass the tests will be 
good at detecting them elsewhere as well. 
,ƵŵĞ ?ƐŝĚĞĂůŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨďĞĂƵƚǇŝŶĂƌƚĐĂŶďĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĞĚĂƐĂZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ-Dependence 
theory because it identifies beauty as that which is possessed by a work if and only if an 
ideal critic in ideal conditions would respond in the right way to the work.  The concept 
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 ‘ďĞĂƵƚǇ ? ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ,ƵŵĞ ? ƐŚĂƉĞĚ ďǇƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂů ĐƌŝƚŝĐ ƚŽ
respond to works of art.  On my account, this and other aesthetic value concepts are shaped 
by human dispositions to respond in ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience.  They are 
shaped so as to pick out certain ontologically objective features of works in virtue of which 
those works are capable of producing valuable aesthetic experiences in such circumstances. 
Ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience are the circumstances that will allow a human 
observer to enjoy works that by other measures may be identified as masterpieces.  The 
convergence of judgments by disparate individuals, cultures and eras regarding 
masterpieces of art is best explained by the potency of such works as providers of 
worthwhile human experiences of an aesthetic sort.  This indication is independent to that 
of ideal aesthetic experiences, which themselves will succeed as indications of aesthetic 
values in art if ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience are those in which one would 
appreciate masterpieces. 
One might argue that consensus over masterpieces can be explained otherwise than by 
objective aesthetic excellence.  This might involve convergence of judgment not in the 
service of knowledge but in the service of conformity, perhaps for social reasons.  But it is 
not clear why we would make the choices we do in promoting particular works as those 
over which we should converge in our aesthetic judgments.  And if we chose works lacking 
in objective excellence to form a consensus as if they were excellent, it seems there would 
be more resistance to such conformity than we actually see with works about which there is 
a consensus that they are masterpieces. 
The excellence of an artistic masterpiece, and the aesthetic values that make a masterpiece 
which may be found to a lesser extent in lesser works of art, are capacities possessed by the 
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art objects to produce valuable aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances.  Ideal 
circumstances involve sufficient epistemic objectivity to allow one to detect the features of 
masterpieces which explain their universal approbation, and to detect such features in other 
works, whether works that are not as good as masterpieces, or masterpieces which for 
whatever reason are not universally praised.  One only detects those features that are 
ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂƌĞ
ĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞǁŝƚŚŝĚĞĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ŽŶĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛŝdeal aesthetic experiences may differ in 
ǀĂůƵĞĨƌŽŵĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ? 
Only in the ideal epistemic conditions for aesthetic judgment, which involve an awareness of 
the values of all of these sensibility-variant aesthetic experiences, would a critic be 
guaranteed to comprehensively judge the aesthetic values of a work of art.  To enjoy art one 
must get swept away, as it were, whereas to judge its capacities for worthwhile experience 
in oneself and others (where those capacities vary for different individuals in ideal 
circumstances for aesthetic experience), one must step back and dispassionately examine 
the information of how disparate human sensibilities would respond in ideal circumstances 
for aesthetic experience.  I will now further recap this distinction between ideal aesthetic 
experience and ideal aesthetic judgment. 
8.3.1 Ideal Critics in Ideal Conditions 
Ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience are circumstances in which all available 
pertinent information is known, and so ideal conditions for the aesthetic experience of a 
work of art are those conditions in which the work is fully understood.  Ideal conditions for 
aesthetic judgment of a work of art, on the other hand, are those conditions in which the 
values of all ideal aesthetic experiences are known about.  To reap the rewards of aesthetic 
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experiences of a good work of art one should aspire towards ideal conditions for aesthetic 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƵƚƚŽŚĂǀĞĂĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁŽĨĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ŽďƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ
ideal circumstances for aesthetic experience might be neither necessary nor sufficient, since 
Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ
oneself would have in ideal circumstances, but to the values of all of the aesthetic 
experiences offered by the work to ideal aesthetic experiencers with all the varieties of 
sensibility that the human race includes.   
Ideal circumstances may vary for different works, and an ideal aesthetic experiencer may 
only be ideal relative to a particular work, style or medium.  For example, a scholar of 
Shakespeare might not be qualified to reliably detect the aesthetic values of abstract 
sculptures, and it might even be the case that in order to reliably detect the values of one 
kind of art work it is necessary to forgo the skills needed to reliably detect the values of the 
other.  Furthermore, it is clear that whereas, for example, a Horror film might be best 
appreciated with the lights switched off, a different sort of work will be best appreciated in 
different lighting conditions, and so ideal external circumstances can vary for particular 
works.   
&ŽƌƚŚĞƐĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƐŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƐĞŶƐŝďůĞƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐůŝƐƚŽĨŝĚĞĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?,ƵŵĞ ?Ɛ
attempt to identify the characteristics of the ideal critic seems to be a somewhat successful 
attempt to characterise epistemic objectivity in relation to art objects, but not much more 
should be said about the ideal aesthetic experiencer than that she has an objective 
awareness of whatever the art object is and has the capacity to appreciate works that by 
other measures are excellent. 
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Plug a person with ideal epistemic objectivity into the ideal circumstances for the 
experience of a particular work, and the values of the aesthetic experiences she undergoes 
as a result will be indicaƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽŚĞƌƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?WůƵŐĂ
person with ideal epistemic objectivity into the ideal circumstances for aesthetic judgment, 
if that is possible, and her aesthetic value judgments will reflect all the aesthetic values of a 
work, relative to all human sensibilities.   
For purposes of making a comprehensive aesthetic value judgment one must do the best 
one can to approximate the ideal circumstances for aesthetic judgment, and this could 
involve employing the scientific method in gathering the aesthetic testimony of ideal (or 
close to ideal) aesthetic experiencers (§7.5.5).  The project would be difficult, however, 
given all the opportunities for error.  More importantly, to get out of art what is offered to 
us, we should pursue the easier and more worthwhile task of honing our appreciative 
abilities and ideal experiential faculties, so that we can gain increasing access to the valuable 
experiences that a work can provide one who appraises it in the ideal circumstances for 
aesthetic experience.  Given that ideal circumstances are defined in relation to certain 
identifiable masterpieces, it is likely that they will give one access to some of the greatest 
aesthetic pleasures available from art.  I will now recap the responses I made in the previous 
few chapters to some of the main objections to Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism. 
8.4 Anti-Objectivism 
Ontological objectivity seems to involve existence independent of our awareness, making 
certain propositions true independently of whether they are believed, such that we can be 
mistaken about that which is ontologically objective (§1.1).  Something might fail to be 
ontologically objective, or lack this objectivity to a significant degree, if: its existence 
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depends on our awareness of it, or beliefs about it are true if and only if they are believed 
(Subjectivism); or if it makes no propositions true at all, whether because they are all false 
(Error Theory) or because no propositions describe it (Non-Cognitivism).  Barring those 
possibilities, the degree to which something is ontologically objective might depend on to 
what extent different beliefs about it are faultless, due to the relativity of truth to a 
reference class which may be more or less fine-grained (§5.1).   
It can seem that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, such that for example it can seem that 
we cannot learn that something is beautiful without beholding it (§7.1-4).  Indeed, beauty 
and other aesthetic values are in the eye of the beholder in the sense that what shapes 
aesthetic value concepts including beauty is our capacity to behold properties of works of 
art in a more or less enjoyable manner.  But this does not make it impossible to learn that 
something is beautiful without beholding it. 
dĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇĂďŽƵƚĂǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĂĞsthetic values can in principle justify the formation or alteration 
of an aesthetic value judgment.  Such aesthetic learning takes place according to the 
evidential model of testimony, as the experiential nature of aesthetic values in art implies 
that the discovery of such values is an empirical matter: normally one finds out that a work 
is aesthetically valuable by experiencing the manifestation of its aesthetic capacities, and 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨĂǁŽƌŬĐĂŶƐĞƌǀĞĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨǁŚĂƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ the work 
has.  Aesthetic Value Empiricism, however, might also seem to suggest that to become 
ĂǁĂƌĞ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ŽŶĞ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ĂĐƋƵĂŝŶƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶĞ ĐĂŶ ďĞ
acquainted with the manifestation of its experience capacities.  But one need not have the 
ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽďĞŵĂĚĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŵ ?ĨŽƌŽŶĞĐĂŶ
be aware that others experience a work in a certain way.   
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Scepticism about the ontological objectivity of values can take the form of an Error Theory, 
according to which value judgments all turn out false because they inevitably describe the 
ǁŽƌůĚĂƐďĞŝŶŐĂǁĂǇƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚ ?ŽƌĂƐĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚŝŶŐƐĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚŽŶŽƚƌĞĂůůǇ
exist (§6.1).  In Ethics Mackie identified the objective prescriptivity of values as a queer 
property that we cannot accommodate in a naturalistic ontology.   
Aesthetic values, however, do not prescribe behaviours (§6.1.1).  On my account it seems 
not so much that works of art dictate that we enjoy them, but rather they are disposed to 
cause us to enjoy them, and this is largely a fact about the work itself and what properties it 
instantiates, more so than about human beings spreading their minds onto the world.  I will 
now recap the stance I have taken on the question of whether aesthetic judgments are 
descriptive and also whether their involvement of emotions means that we ought to move 
further in the direction of Aesthetic Subjectivism. 
8.4.1 Non-Cognitivism and Subjectivism 
A work has some aesthetic value V if and only if our dispositions to respond to the work are 
ƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ‘s ?ĨĂůůƐƵƉŽŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?dŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĞŶƚĂŝůƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝƐŽŶůǇs
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞƚŚŝŶŬƐŽ ?ŽƌƚŚĂƚ ŝĨǁĞǁĞƌĞƵŶĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐďĞŝŶŐsŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞs ?
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛs-ness is constituted by dispositions on the part of the work which bear 
relations to human sensibilities, not by instances of aesthetic judgment or experience 
(§3.4.1).  Even though the aesthetic values of art are picked out by concepts which are 
shaped by human dispositions to respond, the values themselves have a degree of 
ontological objectivity because they are dispositions that a work has mind-independently, 
and we can and do make errors in the application of aesthetic concepts in attempting to 
ƉŝĐŬŽƵƚĂǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛaesthetic dispositions. 
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Aesthetic value judgments are based on subjective feelings but imply universal validity.  The 
judgments can function like judgments made in Ethics or the sciences, but unlike judgments 
in the sciences there is something about value judgments that seems to permit basing them 
on how the subject matter makes one feel.  One might therefore be sceptical that aesthetic 
value judgments describe works of art at all (§6.2).   
One can argue that aesthetic value judgments are not attempts to describe aesthetic 
capacities, but this is consistent with aesthetic values being such capacities, or with it being 
felicitous to revise the concept of aesthetic value so that it describes such capacities, since 
ƚŚĞǇƐĞĞŵƚŽďĞƚŚĞŽŶůǇĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ‘ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ?ǀĂůƵĞƐ ŝŶĂƌƚ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?-4).  Aesthetic value 
judgments may be non-cognitive expressions which do not describe works of art as being 
one way or another.  But this is consistent with their being one way or another, and with 
their being more or less capable of producing valuable aesthetic experiences.   
One might argue that evaluation is an emotional process, suggesting that aesthetic values 
are determined by or relative to our emotions, but there is little reason to adopt such a view 
(§6.2.5).  The relevance of emotion to aesthetic evaluation seems to be that the value of 
works of art can be due to their capacity to produce emotional responses, but such 
capacities can be dispassionately discerned, and would have to be if one were to guarantee 
a comprehensiǀĞ ŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŽ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ŝĚĞĂů ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ
experiencers.   
Such dispassionate evaluation might be unrealistic, but ideal circumstances for aesthetic 
experience are achievable and there are incremental rewards to moving towards the ideal 
aesthetic experience of an aesthetically valuable work of art (§3.1.2).  Even if an ideal 
aesthetic experience of a work is inescapably emotional, this merely indicates that aesthetic 
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values can be capacities to elicit emotional experience, and it does not suggest that we 
emotionally construct aesthetic values as a full-blown Aesthetic Subjectivism might imply.   
Although the above Anti-Objectivist theories seem not to pose a challenge to my account, 
this is partly because my account does include an element of Subjectivism.  The order of 
determination between ideal aesthetic responses and aesthetic values of works is such that 
ideal aesthetic experiencers experience a work valuably because it is aesthetically valuable, 
and the judgments of the ideal aesthetic judge would reflect all of the independently 
determined aesthetic values of works.  However, although valuable aesthetic experiences in 
ideal circumstances occur because of the aesthetic values of works, the work itself need not 
be primary in the constitution of its aesthetic values (§§4.1.1-2).   
A work is aesthetically valuable because the ideal aesthetic experiences it is apt to produce 
are themselves valuable, and this is consistent with those experiences being determined by 
the aesthetic values of the work.  For example, one might be amused by a comedy because 
it has the positive value of being amusing, but the capacity to amuse is valuable because we 
enjoy being amused.  Aesthetic values determine ideal responses to them, but the values of 
ideal responses determine the applicability of value concepts to the relevant features of 
works.  I will now make some final remarks about what I have argued are the moderately 
objective aesthetic values of art. 
8.5 Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism 
Da Vinci ?ƐThe Last Supper is beautiful if and only if a human person may experience the 
painting as beautiful, where that person is: in the internal and external circumstances 
generally conducive to the appreciation of works of this kind that have proven themselves 
durable as providers of valuable aesthetic experience for human beings; as well as the 
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circumstances necessary to understand this particular work.  Such a person would be in a 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĚĞƚĞĐƚƚŚĞďĞĂƵƚǇŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚďĞĂƵƚǇŝƐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĐĂƉĂcity to produce, 
in at least these circumstances, an aesthetic experience which is itself valuable. 
Ontologically objective properties, such as those which dispose The Last Supper to produce 
valuable aesthetic experiences in the above circumstances, can be picked out by response-
ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  ‘ďĞĂƵƚǇ ? ?  KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ Ă ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ďĞŝŶŐ
there to be discovered and experienced, independently of how it is responded to.  We are 
disposed to respond to things in certain ways, but this only shapes our concepts of the 
capacities of objects to produce certain experiences; it does not shape the properties of 
those objects.   
Aesthetic value concepts are response-dependent.  Depending on how an ideal aesthetic 
experiencer would respond to a work, the work falls under certain aesthetic value concepts.  
In virtue of being disposed to offer us aesthetic pleasure, a work is positively aesthetically 
valuable, and being so disposed depends on how we are disposed to respond. 
Epistemic Objectivity involves an awareness of that which is ontologically objective, the 
ability to infer objective truths and the ability to respond to the world in a disinterested 
manner.  Disagreements over matters objective are explainable by cognitive shortcomings.  
We make attempts to describe that which is determined independently of our descriptions 
of it, and we can be more or less successful.  Ontological objectivity can come in degrees 
(§1.1).  That which has a nature determined independently of our sensibilities, but which we 
identify by the use of concepts shaped by our sensibilities, is somewhat objective and 
somewhat subjective. 
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Art is the practice of producing objects to perform an aesthetic function: that is, to be 
aesthetically valuable in the sense of being capable of providing valuable aesthetic 
experiences.  The capacities of an object to produce experiences in certain circumstances 
are ontologically objective, albeit relative to the relevant potential experiencers.  Non-art 
objects can have such capacities, especially natural objects such as flowers and landscapes 
(§2.1).  To the extent that it makes sense to distinguish between art and nature, it seems 
that on the one hand art is designed to be experienced and that is necessarily its primary 
function, whereas nature is not designed at all, and if natural objects have a primary 
function it is not necessarily to be experienced (§2.1.1). 
Beauty and ugliness are the paradigm thin (purely evaluative) aesthetic values, but they 
supervene on non-evaluative properties of works, and some clue as to the supervenience 
ďĂƐĞ ĨŽƌ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ďĞĂƵƚǇ Žƌ ƵŐůŝŶĞƐƐ ŵĂǇ ĐŽŵĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ŽĨ
applicable thick aesthetic value concepts.  Just as something may be wrong because cruel, 
something may be ugly because garish, for example.   
We pick out aesthetic values with aesthetic value judgments, which are a disinterested type 
of judgment based on subjective feelings, which imply a universal validity.  The universal 
validity of aesthetic value judgments is in tension with intuitions to the effect that beauty is 
entirely or largely subjective.  Beauty is said to be in the eye of the beholder, and it is said 
that there is no disputing matters of taste.  And yet, we do dispute matters of taste, and we 
sometimes act as though beauty and other aesthetic values may be learned about by 
testimony, or may be overlooked or misidentified in an object.  As much as we might like to 
say that no work is objectively better than another, it is difficult to maintain this view when 
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faced with a contrast such as the sonnets of Shakespeare versus the poems of William 
McGonagall (§2.3).   
A Response-Dependence theory of aesthetic value concepts can resolve the above tension.  
The enjoyable, imaginative and cognitive experiences offered by perceptual acquaintance 
with some works of art are the source of their aesthetic values, but the works themselves 
are the source of these experiences.  The aesthetic values of works of art are dispositions to 
produce subjective experiences, and yet they supervene on properties independent of those 
experiences and of our dispositions to have them. 
8.6 Conclusions 
The claims that I have defended in this dissertation are as follows.  A work W has aesthetic 
value V if and only if there could be a human critic in the circumstances ideal for the 
aesthetic experience of W who would experience W as having V, and the critic would 
experience W as having V because W has V.  However, experiencing W as having V involves 
having an aesthetic experience E which is itself valuable in virtue of being pleasurable in a 
complex manner involving the imagination and the understanding.  Although an ideal 
aesthetic experiencer would have experience E because W has V, W only has V because E is 
itself valuable.  V is, nevertheless, realised by properties of W which dispose it to cause E in 
ideal circumstances.  Those properties are what is objectively aesthetically valuable in the 
work. 
The consensus that there are apparently large disparities in aesthetic value between works 
ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĐĂůů  ‘ŵĂƐƚĞƌƉŝĞĐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƌŬƐ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ
aesthetic values of the songs of Frank Sinatra and Michael Bublé, or the paintings of Picasso 
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and those of George W Bush, are justified because works can be more or less capable of 
eliciting a range of valuable aesthetic experiences in ideal circumstances.   
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